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Abstract 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory posits that cross-domain mappings play a fundamental role in 
thought. However, to date there has been little research investigating the influence of 
conceptual metaphors in the subdomains of cognitive psychology, such as learning, concepts, 
and memory, leading critics to argue that conceptual metaphors are not psychologically real. 
The purpose of this dissertation was to explore whether conceptual metaphors influence 
episodic memory. In four experiments, a modified version of the Deese-Roediger-
McDermott (DRM) paradigm was employed in which participants studied lists of 
expressions. Every expression within each list was based on a proposed conceptual metaphor. 
For example, the TIME IS MONEY list had expressions such as “how did you spend the 
summer break?”, “budget your hours,” and “is that worth your while?”. Following each list 
was a recognition test consisting of old (was on the list) and new (was not on the list) items. 
Critically, some of the new items were expressions that were based on the same conceptual 
metaphor as the study list (e.g., “that cost me a day”). Other new items were control 
expressions that talked about a similar topic but were not based on the same metaphor (e.g., 
“the weekend seems so far away”). In all four experiments, participants were more likely to 
falsely recognize new expressions that were metaphorically consistent with the study list than 
control expressions. These experiments demonstrate a clear influence of conceptual 
metaphors on memory, bolstering the claim that conceptual metaphors are psychologically 
real. Furthermore, it was found that participants showed the memory effect despite rarely 
reporting conscious awareness of the conceptual metaphors (Chapter 3). Participants also 
showed the effect when their attention was divided, which is known to diminish conscious 
and effortful processing (Chapters 4 and 5). Overall, these experiments provide converging 
evidence that conceptual metaphors are psychologically real and influence cognition 
automatically and unconsciously. 
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Summary for Lay Audience 
Metaphors are ubiquitous in language, and much of the everyday language we use is actually 
metaphorical. For example, a phrase such as “I see your point,” when agreeing to an 
argument just made, is metaphorical because there is nothing physical to see. Rather, this 
expression is based on an underlying metaphor that UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING, as are 
other common expressions such as “look at the big picture” or “we have different views on 
this issue.” Beginning around the 1980’s, linguists began to consider metaphor not just as a 
special form of language, but as a fundamental component of thought, what they labeled 
“conceptual metaphors.” Because abstract concepts or ideas are not experienced directly, 
they are difficult to understand. Therefore, to understand these concepts we use conceptual 
metaphors that draw on concrete experiences, such as by comparing thoughts to our visual 
experiences.  
Although linguists have made a compelling case that we use metaphors to think, the idea has 
not gained as much traction in psychology. Some psychologists argue that there is little 
experimental evidence that conceptual metaphors play a role in basic psychological 
phenomena such as problem-solving or memory. The purpose of this dissertation was to 
conduct psychological experiments to see if metaphor really does influence thought, and in 
particular, memory. In a series of experiments, I presented participants with lists of 
expressions that were all based on one underlying hypothesized “conceptual metaphor,” such 
as UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING. Following each list was a memory test in which several 
old (i.e., was on the list) and new items (i.e., was not on the list) were presented and 
participants had to identify the old items. Critically, some of the “new” items were based on 
the same conceptual metaphor as the old items. In each experiment, I found that participants 
falsely recognized these items; they thought these items had been presented before even 
though they were never on the study list. This finding demonstrates that metaphors influence 
how we remember information, in support of the argument that people use metaphors to 
think.  
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Chapter 1  
1 Introduction 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) is an important theory in a wide range of 
disciplines, with Lakoff and Johnson’s seminal work, Metaphors we Live By (1980), 
being cited in over 63,000 publications (Google Scholar, retrieved May 18, 2020). 
Surprisingly, although CMT posits cognitive representations and processes, it has had 
little impact in cognitive psychology. The main aim of the following studies is to provide 
direct tests of some of the fundamental assumptions of CMT using the Deese/Roediger-
McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Roediger & McDermott, 1995). The first goal is to test 
whether conceptual metaphors are psychologically real in the sense they produce a false 
memory effect, as would be expected when studied using an episodic memory test. A 
secondary goal is to explore whether conceptual metaphors, if they do show memory 
effects, operate automatically or require conscious and deliberate attention. 
1.1 Conceptual Metaphor Theory 
The theory posits that the human conceptual system is metaphorical in nature, such that 
knowledge is mapped from one conceptual domain onto a second conceptual domain, via 
“conceptual metaphors.” These metaphors can be inferred from examination of linguistic, 
often metaphorical, expressions. Indeed, the bulk of support for the existence of 
conceptual metaphors comes from text exegesis. For instance, consider the ostensibly 
unrelated expressions “that cost me a day,” “budget your hours,” and “how did you spend 
the summer?”  Lakoff and Johnson (1980) argued that these expressions are in fact not 
unrelated but bear an underlying similarity, namely that each of these expressions talk 
about a target domain (e.g., time: days, hours, seasons) in terms of a very specific source 
domain (e.g., money: cost, budget, spend). They argued further that this particular 
conceptual metaphor, TIME IS MONEY, partially structures one of the ways in which 
we understand the abstract concept of “time,” and the inferences we derive about time. 
Inferences would include thinking about “time” as being a valuable and limited resource 
2 
 
that needs to be managed wisely or else it will be wasted. According to Lakoff and 
Johnson, these inferences would not be possible without the conceptual metaphor.  
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) propose that metaphorical expressions are understood by 
accessing the broader conceptual metaphor mapping upon which the expression is 
supposedly based.  Importantly, the theoretical claim is that, on encountering an 
expression such as “how did you spend the summer?” the underlying conceptual 
metaphor mapping (TIME IS MONEY) is activated automatically and arouses a set of 
correspondences between the two separate mapped domains (Lakoff, 1993, 2008).   
Consider an expression such as “our relationship is at a dead-end.” In this instance the 
theorized set of correspondences that is assumed to be activated relates our stored 
knowledge about journeys to the concept of love.  When one considers a real or literal 
journey, one considers the travelers, the route, the destination, the mode of transport, and 
so on. When JOURNEY is mapped metaphorically onto the domain of LOVE, the 
“travelers” partaking in a literal journey correspond to the lovers, the “vehicle” 
corresponds to the relationship, and the “landmarks” found in a physical travel 
correspond to life-events found in relationships, such as a first date, a first kiss, a 
marriage, and so on (Katz & Taylor, 2008). Thus, for an expression such as “we’re at a 
crossroads,” the correspondence would be that in a literal journey one must make a 
decision regarding which path one must take, and if there is only one vehicle, some 
travelers may have to leave the vehicle if they want to go in a different direction. When 
this information is mapped onto the LOVE domain, the meaning is that the lovers need to 
make a decision regarding whether they will continue together, and if one of the lovers 
wants to go in a different direction, they will have to leave the relationship. According to 
Lakoff (2008), correspondences such as these are automatically accessed upon 
encountering a triggering expression.  
As Murphy (1996) has pointed out, because CMT is a theory of conceptual knowledge, 
there should be observable effects across many domains of cognition, such as memory, 
problem solving, learning, and categorization. Moreover, if CMT is a psychologically 
real theory then several testable hypotheses should follow from its assumptions, based on 
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what is known about semantic memory and episodic memory-based research. Here I test 
implications with observations from an episodic memory task. These hypotheses include, 
first, if a metaphorical expression activates a conceptual metaphor, other expressions that 
are also derived from the same conceptual metaphor should also become partially 
activated. This follows from the spreading activation account of semantic memory, which 
proposes that when one concept (e.g., “mug”) is activated, other related concepts become 
partially activated as well (e.g., “cup,” “coffee,” “drink,” etc.). If a conceptual metaphor 
is psychologically real, then there should be analogous processing when a triggering 
metaphoric expression is encountered: other metaphoric instantiations of the conceptual 
metaphor also should be partially brought to mind. Second, but also crucially, 
expressions that come from a different conceptual metaphor, even if they are on a similar 
topic, should not be activated, or not highly activated. That is, an expression such as “our 
relationship is at a dead-end” should activate the LOVE IS A JOURNEY conceptual 
metaphor and related expressions (e.g., “we’ve come a long way together”) but should not 
activate, at least not to the same degree, the LOVE IS MAGIC conceptual metaphor and 
related expressions (e.g., “she cast a spell on him,” “she’s very charming”). Although in 
this example, the expressions all share the common element of LOVE, according to CMT 
the expressions are derived from distinct mappings. Therefore, the spread of activation 
from LOVE IS A JOURNEY expressions to LOVE IS MAGIC expressions should not be 
as strong as it would be to other LOVE IS A JOURNEY expressions. If the spread of 
activation was equal among all of these expressions, CMT would have little explanatory 
power as a psychological theory (Katz & Reid, 2020).  
1.2 Previous experimental tests of CMT. 
Research that has directly tested CMT’s assumptions has provided mixed support. For 
example, one might expect priming effects, a phenomenon well studied in the semantic 
memory literature.  Allbritton, McKoon, and Gerrig (1995) found support for CMT in a 
recognition priming experiment. Participants were presented with short paragraphs in 
which one of the early sentences instantiated a conceptual metaphor (e.g., CRIME IS A 
VIRUS). The next several sentences either continued talking about the TARGET domain 
(“congruent condition”) or shifted to talking literally about the SOURCE domain 
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(“incongruent condition”). For instance, for the CRIME IS A VIRUS paragraph, the 
congruent condition continued to talk about a crime outbreak and extended the metaphor 
by mentioning that crime was starting to “infect” safe neighborhoods. In the incongruent 
condition, the paragraph instead mentioned that the police force had literally been 
infected with viral pneumonia. The final sentence, “Public officials desperately looked 
for a cure,” which was the same in both conditions, therefore either referred 
metaphorically to a cure for crime, further instantiating the CRIME IS A VIRUS 
mapping, or referred literally to a cure for pneumonia, not instantiating the mapping 
given the context. On a subsequent recognition test, participants were tested on the early 
sentence that first instantiated the conceptual metaphor and on the final sentence, in that 
order. Recognition times for the final sentence were faster in the congruent condition, 
suggesting that recognition of the early sentence primed recognition of the final sentence 
to a greater degree when both sentences instantiated the CRIME IS A VIRUS conceptual 
metaphor. Similar effects were found with single word recognition (e.g., crime-CURE). 
Although these results are consistent with CMT, some have argued that the findings do 
not necessitate that conceptual metaphors were activated automatically as proposed by 
CMT but could be explained if participants engaged in a deliberate memory strategy 
(Keysar, Shen, Glucksberg, & Horton, 2000; McGlone, 2007). 
Studies that focus on online sentence reading also provide mixed evidence for CMT. 
These studies follow the same logic as Allbritton et al. (1995), but with online reading 
measures rather than recognition latencies. Participants first read short paragraphs in 
which a conceptual metaphor is instantiated by several conventional expressions. The 
final sentence, on which reading time is measured, is either based on the same or a 
different conceptual metaphor. Thibodeau and Durgin (2008) and Gong and Ahrens 
(2007) found priming effects supportive of CMT, but Glucksberg, Brown, and McGlone 
(1993) and Keysar et al. (2000) did not. Thibodeau and Durgin (2008) criticized the 
stimuli employed by Keysar et al. (2000), arguing that their conventional expressions 
were not really conventional and that the conditions were not properly matched in terms 
of how well the lead-up sentences conceptually aligned with the target sentence. 
However, Thibodeau and Durgin (2008) point out that their own effects could be 
attributed to lexical priming and not necessarily the consistency of the conceptual 
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metaphor mapping, a position also argued by McGlone (2011). Although this was a 
potential confound, lexical priming typically has limited effects on reading natural 
discourse, especially in terms of total reading time for sentences (Hyönä, 1993; Traxler, 
Foss, Seely, Kaup, & Morris, 2000) which was the measure used by Thibodeau and 
Durgin. Therefore, lexical priming is unlikely to have compromised their conclusions. 
As one further complication, Gong and Ahrens (2007) found that the presentation format 
of the sentences can also influence the results. Thibodeau and Durgin (2008) used a 
paragraph presentation format whereas Glucksberg et al. (1993) and Keysar et al. (2000) 
used line-by-line presentation. Gong and Ahrens argue that line-by-line presentation 
leads participants to expect new information, which hinders them from using the 
conceptual metaphor as a schema to process the paragraph. In a series of experiments, 
they found priming effects supportive of CMT when the stimuli were presented in 
paragraph form, but null effects when presented line-by-line. However, this is an ad hoc 
explanation and it seems unlikely that something as inconsequential as the presentation 
format could disrupt conceptual metaphor processing.  
Although these studies suggest that conceptual metaphor priming is possible, it appears to 
only occur under certain conditions. Furthermore, Gong and Ahrens (2007) argue that 
participants’ expectations influenced the results. If this is true, it suggests that priming 
depends on the participant consciously attending to the metaphorical language and 
noticing how it is repeated through the discourse. If conceptual metaphor activation is 
automatic, expecting new information should not matter as automatic processes are not 
easily disrupted. Therefore, the fact that the form of presentation did have an influence on 
reading times suggests that participants may have deliberately attended to the conceptual 
metaphor mappings.  
Recall that the first aim of my thesis studies is to test whether false memory effects 
consistent with conceptual metaphors can be produced using the DRM paradigm. To 
anticipate slightly, the answer is “yes”. A second aim of the proposed studies is to 
examine whether false memory effects one could attribute to CMT are due to automatic 
activation or deliberate conscious processing. 
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1.3 Deliberate Metaphor Theory (DMT) 
Steen (2009) has proposed that expressions only activate a cross-domain mapping when 
they contain a “deliberate” metaphor. Steen (2008, 2009, 2011, 2015, 2017) defines a 
deliberate metaphor as one that is purposely used as a metaphor in that the speaker or 
writer intends the hearer or reader to see one domain in terms of another domain. 
Deliberate metaphors are identified by examining the language itself. For instance, 
metaphor is used deliberately if the statement or passage includes a direct comparison as 
in the classic Shakespearian metaphor: “Shall I compare thee to a summer’s day.” Steen 
(2008, 2009) argues that this can be considered a deliberate metaphor because the author 
explicitly mentions that a comparison is taking place (“shall I compare”) and the reader 
cannot help but see the individual being described in terms of an alien domain (i.e., a 
summer’s day). Other indicators of deliberate metaphor use are pragmatic markers 
(lexical items that signal a comparison, such as “one might say”; Gibbs, 2015; Steen, 
2008), extended comparisons in which several elements of one domain are mapped onto 
the other domain (Steen, 2008, 2015), novel extensions of conventional metaphors 
(Steen, 2009), similes, in which the comparison is also explicitly stated (Steen, 2009), 
and rejections of conventional metaphors (e.g., a therapist asking a client to think of the 
harmful effects of framing cancer as a war; Steen, 2011). Researchers of deliberate 
metaphor do not directly ask the speaker or writer whether they intended to use a 
metaphor or not. Instead, Reijnierse, Burgers, Krennmayr, and Steen (2018) have a 
procedure for identifying deliberate metaphor use in text and it is assumed that if certain 
features such as those mentioned above are present, then the metaphor is being used 
deliberately.  
According to Steen (2009), only deliberate metaphors afford conscious metaphorical 
thought, and conceptual metaphor mappings only influence cognition (at least in the ways 
proposed by CMT) when the participant is consciously aware that a metaphor is being 
used. As he puts it: “Contrary to what CMT assumes, the power of metaphor may not lie 
in its widespread unconscious use but in its much more restricted and targeted deliberate 
– sometimes conscious – use” (2009, p. 194). In other words, for conscious metaphorical 
thought to occur, the metaphor must be deliberate (and even deliberate metaphors do not 
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always evoke conscious metaphorical thought), and the conceptual mapping is only 
engaged when the reader (or hearer) consciously realizes that it is a metaphor. If the 
reader does not consciously realize a metaphor is being used, they may process the 
metaphor using lexical disambiguation. For instance, for a conventional metaphor such as 
“how did you spend the weekend?”, Steen argues that the hearer would simply access the 
alternate meaning of spend related to “devoting time” in his or her lexicon rather than 
activating a cross-domain mapping between TIME and MONEY. In this case, the 
metaphorical expression should not activate other expressions based on the same 
conceptual metaphor because the conceptual mapping itself is not activated.  
Therefore, Steen is critical of CMT’s claim (see Lakoff, 1993) that conceptual metaphors 
are engaged automatically and unconsciously. Although Steen has the most elaborated 
critique of automatic conceptual metaphor activation, others have also argued that 
psychological findings seemingly supportive of CMT may actually be due to participants 
consciously attending to the metaphors rather than the mappings being activated 
automatically and unconsciously (Glucksberg et al., 1993; Glucksberg & McGlone, 1999; 
Keysar, Shen, Glucksberg, & Horton, 2000; McGlone, 2007).  
Although deliberateness may be an interesting variable, especially its role in 
communication, the more relevant claim of that position for the current thesis is that one 
needs to be consciously aware that metaphors are being used for conceptual metaphors to 
influence his of her cognition. Rather than manipulate deliberateness, attention will be 
manipulated here to directly assess whether cognitive effects of conceptual metaphors 
depend on the participant’s conscious awareness of the metaphors being used. Indeed, if 
conscious awareness is not required, then the question of whether only deliberate 
metaphors evoke conscious awareness of metaphoricity may no longer be relevant, at 
least regarding how conceptual metaphors affect cognition.   
1.4 The current research 
The research reviewed above demonstrates that results supportive of CMT can be found 
using cognitive measures, such as reaction time, at least under certain conditions, though 
the question of automaticity or deliberateness of these effects are to be determined. As 
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noted above, CMT is a broad theory of semantic knowledge, and as such, conceptual 
metaphors, if they exist, should inform all domains of cognition. The research reported in 
this thesis focused on the effects of conceptual metaphors in a specific episodic memory 
task, namely a variant of the Deese-Roediger/McDermott (DRM; Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995) task. In this task, one finds false memory for non-presented items 
related to the items on a study list. As extended to the test of CMT, I argue that analogous 
effects should obtain if the study list consists of expressions that, presumably, draw on a 
common conceptual metaphor. The theory then should lead to the prediction that false 
memories should be observed for items not presented at study but that are also drawn 
from the same conceptual metaphor. 
1.4.1 Use of episodic memory to study CMT 
Episodic memory involves memory for discrete events connected to a time and place in a 
person’s past (Tulving, 1972). Although the participant may not be able to articulate 
exactly where or when the event occurred, they remember the occurrence of the event 
and its temporal-spatial relation with other events (e.g., I remember going for coffee after 
seeing that movie). In contrast, semantic memory involves knowledge about the world, 
such as facts and meanings of words, but one does not typically remember when and 
where this knowledge was learned. A task such as the DRM, in which the participant 
must indicate whether a word occurred in the experiment, is episodic because it asks 
whether an event (i.e., the word) occurred at a specific place and time (i.e., during the 
experiment). In contrast, a question such as “what is the capital city of Ontario?” would 
involve semantic memory; that is, retrieving knowledge not connected to a discrete event 
in the person’s past. Although the person would have had to learn this fact at a specific 
time and place, this temporal-spatial information no longer needs to be connected to this 
fact for the question to be answered. Although there is debate over how distinct the two 
memory systems are (Renoult, Irish, Moscovitch, & Rugg, 2019; Tulving, 2002), it is 
clear that stored knowledge of the world influences how one organizes the encoding and 
retrieval of experienced episodic information, such as read verbal material (Bousfield, 
1953; Tulving & Thomson, 1973, Weidemann et al., 2019). 
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To my knowledge, only two studies have explicitly employed episodic memory tasks to 
examine CMT (Katz & Law, 2010; Reid & Katz, 2018a). Katz and Law (2010) employed 
the release from proactive interference (PI) paradigm, a task in which participants are 
given consecutive short lists of items to remember and the items on all the lists are related 
on some dimension (e.g., members of the same taxonomic category). Typically, a free 
recall test follows each list. Many studies have found a decline in recall over lists (see 
Wickens, 1970, for a review) with one of the main explanations being that the retrieval 
cue (e.g., the category label) becomes overloaded, and thus, ineffective (Gardiner, Craik, 
and Birtwistle, 1972; Watkins & Watkins, 1975). This effect is called the buildup of 
proactive interference as previously learned items from early lists interfere with recall of 
subsequent lists. A “release” from PI occurs when the items change on a dimension, for 
instance, if a list contains items from a different taxonomic category from the previous 
lists. When this change occurs, recall typically improves and sometimes fully recovers 
from the earlier decline due to build-up of PI. Katz and Law (2010) hypothesized that a 
similar build-up and release of PI would occur with metaphor expressions based on 
conceptual metaphors, that is, as consecutive lists containing expressions from the same 
conceptual metaphor are presented, recall would decline, but if a later list contained 
expressions from a different conceptual metaphor, recall would recover. The theory 
behind this was that the conceptual metaphor would act as a retrieval cue that overloads 
as more exemplars are presented. When the conceptual metaphor changes, it acts as a 
new, effective retrieval cue. Katz and Law’s hypothesis was confirmed. They observed 
an initial decline in recall when the lists all contained expressions from the conceptual 
metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY, followed by an increase in recall when the final list 
changed to LOVE IS MAGIC expressions. Although this supported CMT, the results are 
limited because the topics of the sentences also changed, that is, the build-up and release 
from PI could be due to the sentences all being about LIFE (or even JOURNEYS) 
initially and changing to sentences about LOVE (or MAGIC). In other words, the effects 
could be due to topical similarity, and not due to metaphorical mappings. As will be seen, 
I controlled for this in the DRM paradigm by including control lures on the recognition 
tests that shared either the same target or source domain as the expressions in the 
presented study list but did not use the same metaphorical mapping.   
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The only other published study testing CMT using an episodic memory task of which I 
am aware is the DRM study by Reid and Katz (2018a). This study has been published 
and, because it is the foundation for all subsequent studies in this thesis, is included here 
as Chapter 2.  
1.4.2 Employing the DRM procedure 
The DRM procedure is a well-known episodic memory task influenced by semantic 
information, and therefore, affords an explicit test of CMT. In the standard DRM 
paradigm, participants are given multiple lists of words, with all items in a list associated 
to one non-presented concept (Roediger & McDermott, 1995). For instance, the list might 
include a number of words that are associated to “sleep”, such as bed, awake, rest, doze, 
and pillow. However, the word “sleep” is not presented during the study phase.  After 
processing the study list, participants are asked to recall the list or to recognize the 
presented items from a set that also contains “lures.”  The lures consist of new items not 
associated with the list at all and the critical lure, the item around which the study list was 
constructed but was not presented in the study phase. Typically, participants falsely 
remember the non-presented critical lure, sometimes even as often as presented words.  
One of the popular theories to explain this effect is based on the postulation that when 
one concept is activated in semantic memory, activation spreads to other semantically 
related concepts, known as “spreading activation” theory (e.g., Roediger, Balota, & 
Watson, 2001).  With the DRM paradigm, each of the presented concepts partially 
activates the critical non-presented concept, and if this concept receives enough 
activation across all the presented words then it could induce a false memory in a later 
episodic memory test. One of the explanations for false memory that goes hand in hand 
with spreading activation is “processing fluency,” which refers to the ease with which 
stimuli are processed (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; Kelley & 
Jacoby, 1998). There are two types of fluency: perceptual and conceptual. Perceptual 
fluency occurs when a stimulus is more easily processed perceptually, such as if the 
stimulus is flashed on the screen for a short duration in lowercase letters before being 
shown in uppercase levels for the recognition judgment (e.g., mug-MUG; Jacoby & 
Whitehouse, 1989; Rajaram, 1993).  
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Conceptual fluency involves a semantic associate (e.g., drink-MUG) being flashed on the 
screen, leading to semantic, but not perceptual priming of the to-be-recognized stimulus 
(Rajaram & Geraci, 2000). Conceptual fluency is thus a by-product that occurs when 
associated concepts are primed through spreading activation, leading to more fluent 
processing in a subsequent recognition test. Fluency in general affects recognition. 
Jacoby and colleagues (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; Kelley & 
Jacoby, 1998) argue that fluency is a heuristic used to judge the familiarity of a stimulus. 
This not only influences correct recognition, but also false recognition because the 
participant mistakes the ease with which they process the stimulus as familiarity with it 
(Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989). Both conceptual (Rajaram & Geraci, 2000) and perceptual 
(Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; Rajaram, 1993) fluency increase false recognition.  
Conceptual fluency has been proposed as a possible mechanism that causes or at least 
contributes to the DRM false memory effect (Doss, Bluestone, & Gallo, 2016; Gallo & 
Roediger, 2003; Whittlesea, 2002). Whittlesea found that after reading a DRM-type list 
of associates, the critical lure was processed faster in a subsequent lexical decision task. 
This suggests that the study list enhanced semantic processing of the lure. Therefore, 
DRM study lists may parallel semantic masked priming manipulations at recognition 
(Rajaram & Geraci, 2000) as both lead to conceptually fluent processing of the lure.1 
This fluency may then be (mistakenly) attributed to familiarity with the item (Jacoby, 
Kelley, & Dywan, 1989).2 
According to CMT, when one encounters a metaphorical expression, the underlying 
conceptual metaphor is automatically activated, and this activates the entire set of 
 
1
 Note that increased processing fluency does not necessarily lead to faster recognition response 
latencies (Rajaram, 1993; Rajaram & Geraci, 2000). Unlike a lexical decision task that more 
directly measures processing speed, recognition is a judgment of whether the stimulus was 
previously experienced. Therefore, in a recognition task, after the stimulus has been processed the 
participant must still make a memory decision. As such, multiple factors contribute to a 
recognition decision and recognition latency is not a pure measure of processing speed. 
2
 Although the focus here is on false recognition, see Leboe and Whittlesea (2002) for how an 
attribution process could underlie false recall as well.  
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correspondences between the two domains. If the entire set of correspondences is indeed 
activated, presumably other expressions from the same conceptual metaphor should be 
processed more fluently. Therefore, like other conceptual fluency manipulations, 
conceptual metaphors should induce false recognition.  
The other major theory of false memory is fuzzy-trace theory, which proposes that 
participants extract the meaning, or “gist” of the stimuli they are presented, and make 
memory errors because non-presented items are consistent with the gist of the presented 
items (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995; Brainerd & Reyna, 2002). One can in principle extend 
this theory to how conceptual metaphors may induce false memories. When a participant 
reads a list of expressions based on one underlying metaphor mapping, this mapping 
could be considered the “gist” of the list. The conceptual metaphor itself, as well as other 
non-presented expressions based on the same mapping would be consistent with the gist, 
and thus, should be likely to be falsely remembered. Unlike spreading activation which 
posits automatic activation, fuzzy-trace theory does not take a stance on whether gist 
extraction is automatic or more intentional in nature (Brainerd, Forrest, Karibian, & 
Reyna, 2006). Therefore, if false recognition occurs with conceptual metaphor 
expressions, it does not necessarily prove that conceptual metaphors are activated 
automatically. Nonetheless, according to both spreading activation and fuzzy-trace 
theory, it is possible for conceptual metaphors to induce false memories.  
The following chapters will detail four experiments in which I adapted the DRM 
paradigm for testing CMT by constructing lists of expressions based on conceptual 
metaphors. The hypothesis was that activation from reading the study list expressions 
would spread to other non-presented expressions that are based on the same conceptual 
metaphor mapping. As a result, these non-presented expressions would be more likely 
falsely recognized than control expressions that do not engage the same conceptual 
metaphor. Also, because each presented expression should activate the conceptual 
metaphor, the conceptual metaphor label itself (e.g., “time is money”) may also be falsely 
recognized. 
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Chapter 2 is a published article in which we found evidence of a “conceptual metaphor 
false memory effect” using a simple old/new recognition test. Chapter 3 replicates and 
extends the study by assessing participants’ subjective experiences of false recognition 
and their strategies for remembering the lists. Chapters 4 and 5 directly assess the 
automaticity of conceptual metaphor activation by replicating the false memory effect 
under divided attention conditions at both study and test. Finally, Chapter 6 discusses the 
findings from all four experiments and implications for memory theories, CMT, and 
DMT.  
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Abstract 
Although Lakoff and Johnson’s Conceptual Metaphor Theory has been influential across 
many disciplines, little research has tested the psychological reality of conceptual 
metaphors (CMs) using established experimental memory paradigms.  Here we employ 
an episodic memory task based on the DRM false memory paradigm to explore this 
possibility.  We find that after reading lists of sentences based on underlying conceptual 
metaphors that participants are more likely to falsely remember the non-presented 
conceptual metaphors themselves as well as new sentences consistent with the CM 
mapping than control items that do not share this mapping.  This finding provides 
experimental support for conceptual metaphors and highlights the utility of using 
episodic tasks to explore the assumptions of this theory.    
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2.1 Introduction 
Metaphor has been considered traditionally as a matter of language and not as thought. 
Thus, on encountering a metaphor such as “my life is a dead-end street”, traditional 
comprehension models argue that an interpretation depends on mapping semantic 
properties of the concept “life” onto properties of the concept “dead-end street” (eg., 
Bowdle & Gentner, 2005) or in categorizing “dead-end streets” into an  ad hoc category, 
such as  “places that lead nowhere” (e.g., Glucksberg & Keysar, 1990). However, starting 
with Lakoff and Johnson’s seminal work, Metaphors we Live By (1980) the argument has 
been made that metaphor is fundamentally a matter of thought, and not merely language. 
This approach has become known as Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT). From the 
CMT perspective a sentence such as “my life is a dead-end street” is a metaphoric 
expression that is motivated and understood through an underlying metaphoric 
conceptual system, in which a concept (usually abstract), such as “love”, is mapped onto 
a target concept such as “journey”, based on experiential and embodied interactions with 
one’s environment. The LOVE IS A JOURNEY conceptual structure thus motivates and 
structures our understanding of love through our understanding of journeys, such as they 
have a beginning, an end, a route taken, possible impediments and detours, dead-ends and 
the like. From this perspective seemingly unrelated metaphoric expressions can be 
understood as sharing a more basic conceptual underpinning.   
Consider, for example, the abstract concept of “time”. According to the CMT, our 
conceptualization of “time” is structured around the notion that time is like “money” a 
resource that is limited and can be depleted, implicating the conceptual mapping TIME IS 
MONEY. For example, we talk about time as if it can be spent (“I’ve been spending a lot 
of quality minutes with her lately”), wasted (“this project is a waste of time”), invested 
(“studying psychology is a good investment of your time”), hoarded (e.g., “I have more 
than enough months with which to complete that project”), and so on.   
One cannot underestimate the intra-disciplinary influence of conceptual metaphor theory. 
It has become a dominant approach in a large number of disciples (see for instance the 
complete issue of the journal Cognitive Semiotics which not only demonstrates the range 
of applications, but the modifications, limitations and the promissory notes held by the 
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theory, Fusaroli & Morgagni, 2013). Indeed the seminal work, “Metaphors we live by” 
has been cited almost 50, 000 times according to Google Scholar, and a later work by 
Lakoff (The contemporary theory of metaphor, 1993) over 6,000 times.  One reason for 
the popularity of Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) theory is not only its applicability to the 
many disciplines based on analyzing discourse but because it is an early and important 
contributor to broader theories of grounded cognition- a class of theories that argue 
cognition is fundamentally tied to perception and action, and that concepts are not merely 
amodal symbolic representations (e.g., Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Gibbs, 2006).  One of the 
major issues with such theories is in offering an account of how abstract concepts could 
be represented in an embodied format.  Conceptual metaphor theory offers a compelling 
solution for this, that is, that abstract concepts are understood metaphorically via more 
concrete, experiential domains.    
Despite the strong adoption of CMT in many disciplines, and although Lakoff and 
Johnson’s (1980) theory makes many claims about concept representation, semantic 
memory, and language comprehension, the discipline in which it has failed to gain 
significant traction is in the one that most directly and experimentally studies concept 
representation, memory and language, namely cognitive psychology. There are several 
reasons for this lack of support (see Gibbs, 2009), though most frequently mentioned are 
those that revolve around claims that the theory is too underspecified for experimental 
testing and that supportive findings can be more parsimoniously explained  by more 
accepted mechanisms, such as those based on associative mechanisms (McGlone, 2011). 
The paucity of convincing experimental support stand in contrast to the bulk of a 
supportive literature which is based largely on text exegesis, a methodology not favoured 
in experimental cognitive psychology. Additionally, the CMT is based on a hypothetical 
conceptual system that does not fit in easily with current models of online language 
comprehension or semantic memory found in the experimental cognitive science 
literature.  Finally, the supportive evidence is often adduced from studies indicating the 
embodiment of concepts, such that, for instance, showing that physical closeness is 
related to ratings of similarity as suggested by a conceptual metaphor SIMILARTY IS 
CLOSENESS (e.g., Casasanto, 2008) or data indicating brain activity in areas associated 
with motor or sensory regions when one is processing linguistic information that 
18 
 
referenced motor or spatial information (Desai, Binder, Conant, Mano, & Seidenberg, 
2011). Although the findings from such studies are exciting and suggest that conceptual 
metaphors are experiential and grounded in embodied mechanisms, they nonetheless are 
inferential and subject to the criticism that one can show embodied cognition without 
necessarily invoking the presence of conceptual metaphors (see Barsalou & Wiemer-
Hastings, 2005). 
The aim of the paper presented here is to adopt a paradigm found in the experimental 
literature on memory and, by adapting a logic similar to that accepted in the memory 
literature, test to see if conceptual metaphors influence memory in the ways predicted by 
the extant literature. Specifically, in the studies reported here we employ methodology 
well-established in the memory literature in which it has been assumed that underlying 
semantic structures have been activated during the encoding of verbal materials and the 
results of this activation are present during a later memory test of the originally presented 
materials. We also aim to test whether an alternative explanation, based on associative 
similarity, could explain the effects observed. 
It should be noted that there is a very limited literature that has employed memory tasks 
to test CMT.  Katz and Taylor (2008) examined the psychological reality of conceptual 
metaphors using various semantic memory tasks.  Specifically, they examined whether 
the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor structured participants’ semantic memory of typical 
life events. Over a set of studies, Katz and Taylor (2008) argued that their results were 
suggestive of activation of the conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY.  The 
supportive data included preference for forward temporal order in producing idealized 
life events of an imagined 70-year old, along with high agreement between participants 
regarding the age, the affect, and whether the event actually happened. These data 
suggest that knowledge of a typical life is structured as proceeding along a path with 
well-known landmarks along the way.  
More convincing evidence can be found in episodic memory tasks.  In typical episodic 
tasks participants are presented information to remember (study phase) and after a set 
amount of time are asked to remember the presented information. A well-established 
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memory principle is that the nature of encoding the material at study will be reflected in 
subsequent memory. As applied to CMT, the notion is that if seemingly unrelated items 
activate a memory structure without conscious consideration then traces of that activation 
will be found in subsequent memory.  
Allbritton, McKoon, and Gerrig (1995) found that recognition response times were faster 
in contexts that made a critical phrase metaphorical (the schema-matching condition) 
than the sentence as read literally, arguing that the underlying conceptual metaphor 
supported schematically had been automatically activated during text processing and 
facilitated later recognition. However these data have been criticized by McGlone (2007) 
who has argued that the procedure used by Allbritton et al. did not control for the 
possibility of strategic (not automatic) memory effects nor did the study control for a 
more basic explanation, namely lexical priming.  
Katz and Law (2010) also found evidence for CM using the release from proactive 
interference (PI) procedure (Wickens, 1970).  As with the typical release from PI effect 
(based on short-term recall of a set of words (e.g., robin, crow, sparrow), Katz and Law 
found that short phrases exemplifying the basic conceptual metaphor TIME IS AN 
EXPENDABLE RESOURCE, were recalled progressively more poorly as the 
instantiations of the conceptual metaphor were changed over three trials (the so-called 
build up of PI). When the items were changed on the 4th trial to exemplify a different 
conceptual metaphor, LOVE IS A JOURNEY, a noticeable release from PI occurred. 
These data are completely consistent with the notion from CMT that the underlying 
conceptual mapping is automatically engaged when reading the metaphoric expressions. 
Continued exposure to the same conceptual metaphor makes that metaphor a less 
effective retrieval cue over trials, whereas changing conceptual metaphors (on trial 4) 
introduces a new retrieval cue for use. Although these findings clearly support CMT, one 
should nonetheless treat the positive findings cautiously as the data are based basically on 
only one conceptual metaphor. 
In the study reported here another episodic memory task is employed, namely the DRM 
false memory paradigm associated with Roediger and McDermott (1995) and originally 
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used in Deese (1959). We employ this task because it permits for a novel prediction 
while, at the same time affording the introduction of control conditions to discount 
alternative explanations. In the standard DRM task participants are presented with study 
lists of seemingly unrelated words, with each word on any one list strongly associated 
with a non-presented target word. In a later memory test of the items, the non-presented 
target is likely to be “falsely” remembered, that is recalled or recognized as if it had 
actually been on the study list. For example, one of the study lists used by Roediger and 
McDermott consisted of the following 15 words: bed, rest, awake, tired, dream, wake, 
snooze, blanket, doze, slumber, snore, nap, peace, yawn, and drowsy.  The critical non-
presented word for this list was “sleep,” which is associated with each word in the list.  
Roediger and McDermott constructed several lists similar to this and they found that 
participants falsely recalled the critical non-presented words at very high rates (40% and 
55% for experiments 1 and 2 respectively).   
There are two competing explanations for the false memory of the non-presented item. 
One explanation is based on spreading activation, which is the idea that when a concept is 
activated in semantic memory, other associated concepts are also partially activated (see 
Cann, McRae and Katz, 2011 for a review).  In the case of the study lists used by 
Roediger and McDermott, each word in the list supposedly partially activates the non-
presented concept, and as a result, it becomes highly active in semantic memory.  When 
remembering the presented items at a later time the heightened level of activation for 
presented items, plus the non-presented target due to spreading activation, relative to non-
presented items in general, is used to identify the items to be recalled or recognized.  
An alternative theory for the false memory produced in the DRM paradigm follows from 
“fuzzy trace” theory (see Cann et al., 2011, for a review). The basic tenet of this theory is 
that on encountering the items in the study list two forms of representations are formed: a 
verbatim representation based on the details of the item and a gist representation based on 
the generalized (fuzzy) underlying meaning. In most cases, use of gist traces is employed 
in memory and reasoning tasks. In the DRM task gist recall of non-presented items 
occurs because the gist shares high overlap with the verbatim-based representations. 
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Regardless of the theoretical basis for the DRM recall of word lists, the procedure, 
appropriately modified, is arguably an ideal means of testing the psychological reality of 
conceptual metaphors.  Lakoff (2008) argues that when a person encounters a 
metaphorical expression, the conceptual metaphor that underlies the expression is 
automatically activated.  This assumption is similar to the notion found in experimental 
psychology that on encountering a word (e.g., “crow”) associative links, including 
superordinate category names (e.g., “BIRD”) are activated automatically. Following that 
logic, one can speculate that reading a metaphoric expression should automatically 
engage a conceptual metaphor and, if a participant reads several metaphorical expressions 
that, according to Lakoff and Johnson (1980), are all based on a common conceptual 
metaphor, this conceptual metaphor should be highly activated much like the critical non-
presented words in the DRM paradigm or produce a gist representation that encompasses 
the meaning of the metaphoric mapping. If CMT is correct, participants should falsely 
remember a non-presented conceptual metaphor or other metaphoric expressions based 
on that conceptual metaphor after reading a list of several metaphorical expressions based 
on this conceptual metaphor.  
In the experiment presented here, participants will read a set of lists of sentences 
(metaphoric expressions) with each set consisting of items that correspond to a putative 
conceptual metaphor identified by Lakoff and Johnson (1980). Specifically, we argue that 
after reading a set of phrases, such as “that cost me a day,” “how did you spend the 
summer break?” and “budget your hours,” CMT should predict that both the conceptual 
metaphor TIME IS MONEY and other non-presented instantiations of the conceptual 
metaphor will be falsely remembered as having occurred during the study phase at a 
significantly higher rate than found with falsely remembered control lures. Moreover, in 
line with arguments that even if the predicted results obtained they could be based not on 
arousal of an underlying conceptual metaphor but on associative factors, we assess also 
the influence of associative factors. 
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2.2 Method 
2.2.1 Basic task 
Participants were presented with several sets of sentences, each set associated with a 
conceptual metaphor.  Shortly afterwards, for each set, participants were asked to choose 
the presented items from amongst a set of items, some having been presented (OLD 
items), some lures associated with the conceptual metaphors (the conceptual metaphor 
itself and other NEW items that were associated with the conceptual metaphor but had 
not been presented originally) and some control lures. The list structures are described in 
more detail below. Following the presentation and the memory testing of all the lists, a 
final recognition test was conducted consisting of items and lures based on each of the 
earlier presented lists. 
2.2.2 Participants 
Forty-eight undergraduate psychology students were recruited from Western University 
for participation (24 females, mean age = 18.5 years).  Participants were recruited via a 
cloud based participant management system and participated as part of a partial course 
requirement.  This webpage is used to connect participants with researchers -- researchers 
post research study advertisements and eligible participants (mostly first-year psychology 
students) can view descriptions of these studies, and if they so choose, sign up for 
available timeslots.   
2.2.3 Materials 
Five study lists were constructed based on five different well-established conceptual 
metaphors identified by Lakoff and Johnson (1980): IDEAS ARE FOOD, LOVE IS A 
JOURNEY, TIME IS MONEY, THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS, and 
UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING (see Appendix B for full study lists and lures).  Each 
list had 15 phrases that were mostly taken or adjusted from the master metaphor list 
(Lakoff, 1994). The phrases were based on the conceptual metaphors and each phrase 
included one word relating to the target domain (e.g., IDEAS) and one word relating to 
the source domain (e.g., FOOD).  In addition, none of the phrases in the study list 
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contained either of the critical words in the conceptual metaphor, for example, none of 
the phrases in the IDEAS ARE FOOD list contained the words “idea” or “food.”  Also, as 
might be obvious, the phrases were all metaphorical, so that a concept from the target 
domain was framed in terms of a concept from the source domain.  Given that we were 
interested in seeing whether the conceptual metaphor itself would be falsely remembered 
and because these metaphors are typically written in the A IS A B form (e.g., LIFE IS A 
JOURNEY) whereas metaphoric expressions are rarely found in that form, we ensured 
that four of the fifteen phrases in each list used was presented in the nominal “a is a b” 
(e.g., “knowledge is consumable”). If metaphoric expressions in this form were not 
included in the study lists, participants could potentially use this as a strategy for 
correctly rejecting the critical conceptual metaphor items on the recognition test.  
2.2.3.1 Distractor task 
As is common with this procedure, we included a distractor task in between each study 
list and recognition test.  The distractor task consisted of 10 simple math problems that 
required attention to the proper order of operations to solve (e.g., 6 – 6 ÷ (7 – 5), answer 
= 3). Participants were asked to complete these questions mentally without using paper or 
a calculator.  This distractor task was simply to prevent participants from rehearsing the 
study list phrases before memory for the study list items was assessed.   
2.2.3.2 Recognition tests 
Following each study list and on completion of the distractor task, participants completed 
a recognition test on the list they had just completed. The recognition test consisted of 12 
phrases of 5 different types: 5 items presented on the study list (old items), the conceptual 
metaphor (not presented at study), 2 new phrases consistent with the conceptual metaphor 
(new critical phrases not presented at study), 2 new metaphor control lures, and 2 new 
literal control lures.  The old items were simply phrases that were presented on the 
preceding list, and were drawn from serial positions 1, 3, 8, 10, and 15.  The conceptual 
metaphor items were those identified by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) that are putatively 
the underlying cross-domain connections that motivate all the phrases in the study list. 
The new critical phrases were consistent with the conceptual metaphors, but were not 
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presented in the lists.  For example, a new critical phrase for the IDEAS ARE FOOD list 
was “that claim is hard to swallow,” which also frames an idea concept (“claim”) in terms 
of a food concept (“swallow”), but was not one of the phrases presented on the study list.  
The control lures consisted of two types: metaphorical and literal.  The metaphorical lures 
were phrases that framed the same target domain, but with a different source domain.  
For example, the phrase “that kind of thinking is out of style,” which Lakoff categorizes 
under the IDEAS ARE FASHIONS conceptual metaphor, was one of the metaphorical 
control lures for the IDEAS ARE FOOD list.  These lures were added to rule out that 
participants were simply encoding that the lists consisted of metaphorical phrases about a 
target domain (e.g., IDEAS), and not encoding the conceptual mapping of the source 
domain onto the target domain.  For instance, if the participant simply encoded that all 
the phrases were metaphorical expressions about ideas, and not that the expressions 
specifically framed ideas in terms of food.  We also included literal control lures, which 
were literal phrases relating to the source domain.  For example, the phrase “The dessert 
was too sweet” is a literal statement about food, the source domain of the IDEAS ARE 
FOOD conceptual metaphor.  These items were included to rule out that participants were 
simply encoding a list of sentences relating to the source domain, and not encoding the 
conceptual mapping (e.g., if the participant simply encoded that all the sentences were 
about food for the IDEAS ARE FOOD list). The critical point is that for evidence to 
support CMT, false recognition must involve the correct source-target mapping. 
2.2.4 Procedure 
Upon arriving at the lab, participants were given a letter of information that explained the 
requirements of the study, as well as a consent form to sign.  The task was entirely 
computer based.  The first two screens asked for demographic information (i.e., gender 
and age) and then the next three screens were instructions for the task.  The participants 
were told that the researchers were interested in the relationship between mental math 
ability and memory for sentences.  The purpose of this deception was so that the 
participants would take the distractor maths tasks seriously.  The participants were also 
told that they would see several lists of phrases and after each list, they would have to 
identify items as old if it had been on the list, or new if it had not been on the list.  
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Following the instructions was a practice list of items to get the participants used to the 
task.  The items on the practice list were literal phrases taken from Cardillo, Schmidt, 
Kranjec, and Chatterjee’s (2010) matched literal and metaphor stimuli. Each phrase was 
presented in the centre of the screen for 3 seconds, followed by a fixation cross presented 
for 500 ms. The practice list was followed by the maths distractor task, which consisted 
of 10 short math problems.  Participants were instructed to answer the questions as 
quickly and as accurately as possible; however, the program gave them an unlimited 
amount of time to answer each question.  For the 10 practice math questions, participants 
were given feedback on what the correct answers were, but feedback was not given for 
subsequent trials.  Following the maths test, participants completed the recognition task, 
in which several phrases were presented on the screen, and participants had the option of 
either identifying them as old by pressing the “o” key, or as new by pressing the “n” key.  
Similar to the math distractors, participants did not have a time constraint on the 
recognition test.  For the practice recognition test only, participants were given feedback 
on whether they correctly identified each item as old or new.  The five study lists 
followed the practice list, but the format remained the same, that is, they saw the study 
list, answered the maths distractors, and then completed a recognition test for the study 
list they had just read. Each of these three phases was presented in the same way as the 
practice trial, except that no feedback was given for the math distractors or the 
recognition tests.  Following the presentation of all of the lists, there was one more math 
distractor consisting of 10 questions, and then there was a large recognition test at the end 
that tested memory for all 5 lists.  The same 60 items that were already tested in the 
previous recognition tests were retested.  In addition, 14 old items (taken from serial 
positions 5, 7, and 13 from each study list; however, due to an experiment error, only 2 
additional old items from the TIME IS MONEY list were added from serial positions 5 
and 13), 5 new consistent phrases, 5 new metaphor control lures, and 10 new literal 
control lures were added to this recognition test.  The new lures corresponded with the 
five presented lists, that is, there was 1 new consistent phrase, 1 new metaphor control, 
and 2 new literal controls added for each study list.  We could not add new conceptual 
metaphor lures because there is only one conceptual metaphor for each study list. The 
final test was to examine the longevity of the activation of the conceptual metaphor. 
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Following the final recognition task, participants were debriefed and thanked for their 
participation.  The entire task took approximately 30 minutes to complete. 
2.3 Results and discussion 
2.3.1 Initial recognition tests 
Participants completed a recognition test following each of the five study lists. One male 
participant identified all items as “old” and was removed from further analyses, yielding 
a final sample of 47 participants.  The data presented below is based on performance 
across all study lists. That is, scores could go from 0-5 for false recognition of the 
conceptual metaphor, given there was only one opportunity to falsely remember that item 
on each of the five lists.  Participants were quite accurate at correctly identifying 
presented items as old, the mean proportion of old items correctly categorized as old was 
.823.  Of critical interest were the proportions of falsely recognized items for the four lure 
types.  We conducted a one-way ANOVA on these proportions.  Mauchly’s test of 
sphericity revealed that the assumption of sphericity was violated χ²(5) = 34.550, p < 
.001, thus, the degrees of freedom were adjusted using the Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction.  The mean proportion of falsely recognized items between the lure types 
differed significantly, F(2.232, 102.675) = 8.799, p < .001, η² = .161.  The mean 
proportion (and standard deviations) of items identified as old for each item type are 
displayed in Table 2.1. 
 
 
 
 
3
 Due to an experiment error, two of the old items on the recognition tests varied slightly from 
how they were presented on the study lists.  For example, on the study list one of these items was 
“We’ve come a long way as a couple,” but on the recognition test it was “They’ve come a long 
way as a couple.”  We removed these items from further analyses yielding a final count of 23 old 
items. 
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Table 2.1. Mean proportion (and standard deviation) of items categorized as “old” across 
participants for each of the five item types.  Means are collapsed across the five initial 
recognition tests. 
Lure type Number of items in 
category 
Mean (and SD) proportion of items 
categorized as old 
Old 23* .8224 (.1080) 
Critical CM 5 .1745 (.1939) 
Critical consistent 10 .2021 (.1824) 
Control metaphor 10 .1000 (.1216) 
Control literal 10 .0979 (.1440) 
Total 58 .4101 (.0854) 
*NOTE: As mentioned above, two old items were removed from analysis due to slight 
differences between study and test phases. 
As can be seen, there was considerably higher proportional false memories produced for 
the conceptual metaphors and the new items from that for the two control lures. 
We conducted four planned comparisons: critical CM’s vs. metaphor controls, critical 
CM’s vs. literal controls, critical consistent vs. metaphor controls, and critical consistent 
vs. literal controls.  As predicted, all four comparisons were significant and in the 
hypothesized direction (all p’s < 0.02).   
Specifically, Least Significant Difference (LSD) post-hoc comparisons revealed that the 
false recognition rates did not differ significantly between the critical CM’s and critical 
consistent phrases (p = .383) or between the control metaphor lures and the control literal 
lures (p = .875).  However, there were significant differences between false recognition 
of the conceptual metaphor and control metaphor lures (p=.013, Cohen’s d = .460) and 
control literal lures (p=.006, Cohen’s d = .449). Similarly more false recognitions 
occurred for non-presented metaphor expressions that were consistent with the 
conceptual metaphor that both the control metaphor lures (p< .001, Cohen’s d= .659) and 
control literal lures (p< .001, Cohen’s d= .635). 
2.3.2 Latent Semantic Analysis on lures 
Recall that an expressed concern regarding CMT is that supportive results could be 
explained without recourse to postulating a conceptual system of cross-domain mappings. 
With respect to the DRM procedure in standard episodic word list studies the 
predominate theory postulates false memories obtain because of the high level of 
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associative arousal. As applied to the results presented here an associative explanation 
could be that the critical lures (the conceptual metaphors and the new expressions that 
instantiate the conceptual metaphor) were falsely recognized more often than the control 
lures because they are semantically more related to their associated study lists.  To rule 
this out, Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) was used to compute the semantic distance 
between each lure and the sentences on its study list; LSA generates values of semantic 
distance between words, sentences, or texts based on the co-occurrence of words in text 
corpora (Landauer, Foltz, & Laham, 1998).  We computed these values using the 
sentence comparison application on the University of Colorado’s LSA website 
(lsa.colorado.edu) based on the most appropriate grade level, namely “General Reading 
up to 1st year college” setting.  This application, which computes semantic distance based 
on whole sentences, provided us with an LSA value indicating the semantic distance 
between each lure and each sentence in its respective study list (15 values in total) with 
higher values indicating that the sentences are closer in semantic space.  We took the 
average of these 15 values to provide a single value for the lure that represented the 
semantic distance between the lure and its study list, and we did this for each of the 35 
lures.  The average semantic distances (and SD’s) for the four lure types were as follows: 
critical CM = .122 (.043), critical consistent = .097 (.059), metaphor control = .081 
(.080), and literal control = .094 (.058).  A between-item ANOVA demonstrated that the 
lure types did not vary significantly in terms of average semantic distance from their 
respective lists, F(3, 31) = .462, p = .711.   
Additional analysis demonstrated that there was not a significant correlation overall 
between semantic distance values and false recognition rates for the items, r(33) = .168, p 
= .335. Thus, we find no evidence that an associative explanation based on distance in 
semantic memory can account for the data we observed.   
2.3.3 Final recognition test 
Recall that participants also completed a large recognition test at the end of the study that 
consisted of old items and lures from all of the study lists.  This recognition test consisted 
of the 60 items from the previous recognition tests, as well as 34 items that had not been 
tested yet: 14 additional old items, 5 new critical consistent lures, 5 new metaphor control 
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lures, and 10 new literal control lures.  Participants were instructed to categorize the item 
as “old” only if they had remembered seeing it on one of the study lists.   
Participants were slightly less accurate in correctly identifying presented items as old on 
this final recognition test.  The proportion of correctly categorized old items was .77 for 
items previously tested and .56 for items not previously tested.  The lower accuracy for 
previously untested items is likely due to the greater amount of time between test and 
recall in which the memory traces decayed.   
It was not possible to conduct a factorial ANOVA examining the effect of introducing 
new items because the critical conceptual metaphors had been presented as items in the 
original recognition tests. Because each list derives from a single conceptual metaphor, it 
was not possible to add new conceptual metaphors to the final recognition test, which 
created a missing cell in the matrix.  Thus, we conducted a one-way ANOVA with seven 
lure types: repeated critical CM, repeated critical consistent, repeated metaphor control, 
repeated literal control, non-repeated critical consistent, non-repeated metaphor control, 
and non-repeated literal control.  Mauchly’s test of sphericity revealed that the 
assumption of sphericity was violated χ²(20) = 68.423, p < .001, thus, the degrees of 
freedom were adjusted using the Greenhouse-Geisser correction.  The F-test revealed that 
the proportion of falsely recognized items varied significantly between lure types, 
F(3.873, 178.150) = 40.554, p < .001, η² = .469.  The mean number and proportion (and 
standard deviations) of falsely recognized items for each lure type are displayed in Table 
2.2. The upper panel represent items that had been employed in the original list and were 
repeated in the second list, whereas the lower panel represents items introduced just in 
the final test. 
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Table 2.2. Mean proportion (and SD’s) of items categorized as old for each item type 
across participants in the final recognition task.   
Repeated Item type Number of items Proportion categorized as old 
Yes Old 23* .7715 (.1452) 
 Critical CM 5 .3957 (.2843) 
 Critical consistent 10 .4681 (.1990) 
 Metaphor control 10 .3362 (.23165) 
 Literal control 10 .2106 (.2159) 
 Total Repeated 58 .5150 (.1223) 
No Old 14** .5593 (.1647) 
 Critical consistent 5 .2298 (.2206) 
 Metaphor control 5 .0766 (.1355) 
 Literal control 10 .0362 (.0705) 
 Total Non-repeated 34 .2860 (.0901) 
*As mentioned above, two old items were removed from analysis due to slight 
differences between study and test phases. 
**Due to an experiment error, only two non-repeated old items from the TIME IS 
MONEY list were included.  Three non-repeated old items were included from the other 
four lists yielding a total of 14 non-repeated old items.   
As is evident, items that had been previously tested showed a large increase (over 20% on 
average for each lure type) in false recognition on this final test. Posthoc comparisons 
with Bonferroni corrections were conducted on the seven categories of lures and are 
presented in Table 2.3. 
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Table 2.3. Posthoc comparisons with Bonferroni corrections between the seven 
categories of lures for the final recognition test. 
Comparison  Mean Difference p-value 
Rep. Crit. CM  – Rep. Crit. consistent -.072 > .999 
 – Rep. Cont. metaphor .060 > .999 
 – Rep. Cont. literal .185** .004 
 – Non-Rep. Crit. consistent .166* .032 
 – Non-Rep. Cont. metaphor .319*** < .001 
 – Non-Rep. Cont. literal .360*** < .001 
Rep. Crit. consistent – Rep. Cont. metaphor .132* .035 
 – Rep. Cont. literal .257*** < .001 
 – Non-Rep. Crit. consistent .238*** < .001 
 – Non-Rep. Cont. metaphor .391*** < .001 
 – Non-Rep. Cont. literal .432*** < .001 
Rep. Cont. metaphor – Rep. Cont. literal .126*** < .001 
 – Non-Rep. Crit. consistent .106* .030 
 – Non-Rep. Cont. metaphor .260*** < .001 
 – Non-Rep. Cont. literal .300*** < .001 
Rep. Cont. literal – Non-Rep. Crit. consistent -.019 > .999 
 – Non-Rep. Cont. metaphor .134*** < .001 
 – Non-Rep. Cont. literal .174*** < .001 
Non-Rep. Crit. consistent – Non-Rep. Cont. metaphor .153** .001 
 – Non-Rep. Cont. literal .194*** < .001 
Non-Rep. Cont. metaphor – Non-Rep. Cont. literal .040 .698 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
For the sake of simplicity, we will only focus on the comparisons relevant to the test of 
CMT. Importantly, the critical CM lures were falsely recognized at a significantly higher 
rate than literal controls that were repeated and all three of the non-repeated lure types. 
Additionally, the repeated critical consistent phrases were falsely recognized more 
frequently than all the other lure types (repeated and non-repeated) except for the critical 
conceptual metaphor lures.  Also, the non-repeated critical consistent lures were falsely 
recognized significantly more frequently than both the non-repeated literal and metaphor 
controls.  As with the initial recognition tests, these results support CMT as the phases 
consistent with the underlying conceptual mappings were falsely remembered more often 
than control lures.  
There was one deviation from the original recognition test -- the false recognition rate for 
the critical CM lures (M = .3957, SD = .2843) did not differ significantly from the 
metaphor control lures that had been previously tested (M = .3362, SD = .2316), p > .999. 
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Recall the metaphor control lures consisted of metaphoric expressions with the same 
topic as the target conceptual metaphor but a different source mapping. It is not 
completely clear why this occurred. It may be that while the target knowledge is 
maintained over a longer retention period the specific mapping might be more susceptible 
to interference. However, this explanation could not explain the higher levels of false 
memories produced to new items consistent with the target conceptual metaphor 
compared to those produced to the metaphor controls. A more likely explanation is that 
the form of conceptual metaphor (A is a B) is used as a cue to reject the item as old, at 
least relative to items sharing the same topic.  
2.3.4 LSA analysis on final recognition test lures 
As with the initial recognition test, semantic distance of each lure to their respective 
study lists was computed for the final recognition test, using the same procedure as 
employed earlier. A one-way between-item ANOVA on the seven lure types revealed 
that they did not differ significantly on semantic distance to their respective lists, F(6, 48) 
= 1.526, p = .190.  Thus, once again, the recognition memory data is not explicable by 
recourse to an associative explanation.  
In summary, both the initial and the final recognition tests produced findings consistent 
with our interpretation of how CMT would be expressed in an episodic memory task. We 
had postulated that when one encounters a metaphorical expression (e.g., “budget your 
hours”), the root conceptual metaphor (TIME IS MONEY) is automatically activated, 
and that multiple encounters of different metaphoric expression instantiations would 
promote false memories both of the conceptual metaphor itself and novel instantiations. 
Importantly we introduced control lures in the memory tests.  When the lures shared the 
same target domain as the conceptual metaphor but used another source domain, they 
were not falsely recognized as often as the critical lures.  This rules out that participants 
were simply encoding metaphorical language about the target domain.  Also, when the 
lures were simply literal statements about the source domain used in the conceptual 
metaphor (e.g., for the TIME IS MONEY list, literal statements about money), they were 
also not falsely recognized as often as the critical lures.  This rules out that participants 
were simply encoding that the sentences all involved the source domain.  Thus, the 
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results suggest that both the target and source domains were encoded, even though these 
domains were never explicitly mentioned.  Moreover, we conducted statistical analyses 
of semantic distance of the instances to the items on the study list, finding no such 
differences ruling out an explanation for the effects based on associative links. 
We should mention one possibility that did not directly follow from CMT. Studies using 
artificial categories have shown that one can create a set of instances based on an 
underlying pattern, or prototype. Memory studies with these stimuli have shown that the 
non-presented prototype is more resistant to forgetting than learned instantiations of the 
prototype (Posner & Keele, 1970).   If the conceptual metaphor acted similarly to a 
prototype then one might have expected even more false memories in the final 
recognition task, especially relative to the other categories of lures.   However, on the 
final recognition test, the conceptual metaphor lures were not falsely recognized 
significantly more often than either the repeated critical consistent lures, or even the 
repeated metaphor control lures. Although the prototype studies and our task differ 
considerably from one another and the “A is a B” format of the conceptual metaphor 
differs considerably from the metaphoric expressions used with the majority of items in 
our task (and hence can be employed as a cue for rejecting the items) the more general 
question of the longevity with which a conceptual metaphor is aroused in episodic 
memory remains, and is a question for future research.   
In summary, employing a standard episodic memory task and adopting assumptions used 
in the cognitive psychology literature, the data presented here provides evidence for the 
activation of conceptual metaphors.  
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Chapter 3  
3 Subjective experience of the conceptual metaphor false 
memory effect 
3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2 it was demonstrated that conceptual metaphors affect episodic memory, but 
the study provided little insight into the nature of the false memories. For instance, it 
remains unclear whether participants used some type of guessing strategy to identify 
items as old, or whether the conceptual metaphors induced compelling false memories 
that felt real to the participants. The purpose of the study presented in Chapter 3 was first, 
to replicate the conceptual metaphor false memory effect with additional control 
conditions, and second, to gain further insight into the nature of this effect. The latter was 
accomplished by two additions. First, for items identified as old, participants were asked 
whether they “remember,” “know,” or “guess” the item is old (Gardiner, 1988; Tulving, 
1985). Second, for half of the participants, after each list they were asked to elaborate on 
any strategies they used to remember the items. This was added as an indirect measure of 
whether participants were processing the metaphors in the lists consciously, with the 
logic being that if they could easily report the source-to-target metaphor mappings, they 
were consciously aware of the conceptual metaphors. Conversely, if participants rarely 
reported attending to the source-to-target mapping, but there was still evidence of a 
conceptual metaphor false memory effect, it would suggest that the conceptual metaphors 
activated automatically, without requiring conscious awareness. 
3.1.1 The remember-know paradigm 
The remember-know procedure has been used extensively in recognition memory 
research generally including in DRM-type tasks (Gallo, 2006). “Remember” and “know” 
judgments are thought to index recollection and familiarity respectively, two distinct 
memory processes (see Yonelinas, 2002, for a review). Recollection is when one can 
bring to mind details of the occurrence of an event. For a typical lab experiment, this 
could involve remembering what the stimulus looked like on the screen, which serial 
position the item was in the study list, or recalling a thought that came to mind when first 
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seeing the item. Recollection is considered a slower process that involves intentional and 
conscious processes. In contrast, familiarity is when an item is confidently recognized, 
but the participant cannot bring to mind details of the event of experiencing the item. In 
contrast to recollection, familiarity is thought to be fast and automatic. Guess responses 
are thought to capture a weaker feeling of familiarity where the participant is not as 
confident in their decision (Hirshman, 1998; Yonelinas, 2002). 
Remember, know, and guess judgments were employed in the current study and 
subsequent studies for two reasons. First, because the conceptual metaphor false memory 
effect is a memory phenomenon, it is important to place it in context with findings from 
other memory experiments, especially those on false recognition. In general, correct 
recognitions tend to evoke more remembering and false recognitions more knowing 
(Yonelinas, 2002; Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). However, in DRM tasks in which the study 
list items converge on a non-presented associate, participants often report “remembering” 
this lure. In fact, “remembering” reports are often more frequent than “knowing” reports 
for critical lures (Gallo, 2006; Yonelinas 2002), although the ratio of remembering to 
knowing is still higher for correct recognition relative to false recognition. Therefore, 
including remember, know, and guess judgments will provide insight into how the 
conceptual metaphor false memory effect relates to other false recognition effects.  
Second, remember, know, and guess judgments may inform the debate on CMT and 
DMT, albeit indirectly. Neither theory makes explicit predictions on recollection and 
familiarity; however, DMT posits that cross-domain mappings depend on conscious 
awareness of metaphoricity. As such, one may expect that false recognition based on 
metaphor mappings would evoke more feelings of “remembering” as this is associated 
with conscious and intentional uses of memory. In contrast, CMT’s position that cross-
domain mappings are activated automatically and unconsciously should be associated 
with more “knowing” and “guessing” reports of false recognition. These responses 
capture feelings of familiarity, which is the faster, more automatic, and unconscious 
memory process. Furthermore, if conceptual metaphor activation leads to fluent 
processing of metaphorically consistent expressions, there should also be a larger 
magnitude of familiarity-based false recognitions as fluency is a heuristic for judging 
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familiarity (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; Kelley & Jacoby, 
1998). Consistent with this, fluency manipulations have been found to selectively 
influence “know” judgments (Rajaram, 1993; Rajaram & Geraci, 2000). As such, a high 
percentage of false recognitions attributed to “knowing” or “guessing” would suggest that 
conceptual metaphors are activated automatically and promote fluent processing of new 
expressions that use the same mappings. Note though that this is only indirect evidence 
and cannot carry an argument for distinguishing between CMT and DMT on its own. 
Nonetheless, in conjunction with the strategy descriptions, the remember, know, and 
guess judgments may provide some additional insight into the CMT-DMT debate.  
3.1.2 The current study 
The study lists were the same as in Chapter 2. Remember-know-guess judgments were 
added and half of the participants were instructed to elaborate on any strategies they used 
to remember the items after each recognition test. Also, rather than presenting all five 
study lists, only four of the five study lists were presented for each participant, and the 
lures associated with the non-presented study list were used as “unrelated lures” on the 
recognition tests. For example, this involved examining the four lure types from the 
TIME IS MONEY recognition test (e.g., the critical CM itself: “time is money”; critical 
consistent: “lend me a few minutes”; etc.), but when they are presented on the recognition 
test following another study list, such as IDEAS ARE FOOD. Presumably, false 
recognition should be much lower under these circumstances, and critically, there should 
be no differences in false recognition between the critical and control lures when they are 
all unrelated to the study list. If, for example, the critical consistent lures had a higher 
proportion of false recognition than the other lure types when all the lures were unrelated 
to the study list, it would suggest that Reid and Katz's (2018a) results were due to 
differences in the lures’ ability to evoke false recognition on there own and not due to 
these lures being consistent with the activated conceptual metaphor.  
The current study also improved the design of the final recognition test by including a 
category of previously untested critical CM lures (i.e., the label for the conceptual 
metaphor itself, such as “time is money”). These lures supposedly capture the broad, 
underlying cross-domain mapping and may therefore be analogous to a prototype for the 
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set of items (see Posner & Keele, 1970). Therefore, the memory traces for these lures 
may be more resistant to decay compared to the other lure types. This was not found in 
Reid and Katz (2018a); however, the final recognition test did not include any previously 
untested critical CM lures. Untested lures are the most informative as they would not 
have been seen until the final recognition test, and therefore, could not be contaminated 
from being tested previously. As such, that modification will be incorporated here. 
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Participants 
A total of 74 (55 female) native-English speaking participants from ages 17 to 41 (Mage 
= 18.53, SDage = 3.39) completed the study. Participants were psychology students at 
Western University who completed the study as a partial course requirement. Participants 
were recruited through the Psychology Department’s Sona system website.  
3.2.2 Materials 
3.2.2.1 Study lists 
The five study lists employed in Chapter 2 were used in the current study. Each 
participant saw only four of these five lists, yielding five different versions of the 
experiment based on which of the five lists was not presented. Participants were 
randomly assigned to the different versions. The number of participants assigned to each 
version are displayed in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1. Number of participants assigned to the different versions of the experiment. 
The different versions are based on the study list that was not presented. For instance, in 
the IDEAS ARE FOOD version, the IDEAS ARE FOOD study list was not presented. 
The lures associated with the non-presented list were used as unrelated lures on the 
recognition tests for the other four study lists. 
 Condition 
Version (non-presented study list) Strategy No Strategy Total 
IDEAS ARE FOOD 8 7 15 
LOVE IS A JOURNEY  6 7 13 
THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS 7 8 15 
UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING 9* 7 16 
TIME IS MONEY 7 8 15 
Total 37 37 74 
*Note: Due to an error by the experimenter, this version had one extra participant who 
should have been assigned to the LOVE IS A JOURNEY version.  
3.2.2.2 Distractor task 
The maths distractor task was the same as employed in Chapter 2. 
3.2.2.3 Initial recognition tests 
Each recognition test consisted of eight “old” (previously presented) items and eight or 
nine lures. The old items were taken from serial positions 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, and 15 of 
the study list. Four types of “related” lures were employed (identical to Chapter 2) in 
addition to a new category of “unrelated” lures, which did not share either the target or 
source domain with the study list.4 The lures associated with the recognition test of the 
unseen study list were used as unrelated lures on the four seen study lists. For example, if 
IDEAS ARE FOOD was the study list that was not presented to participants, the seven 
lures (one critical CM, two critical consistent, two control metaphor, and two control 
literal lures) that would be on this recognition test were spread across the recognition 
tests for the four study lists. Note that this led to an unequal division, therefore, three of 
the four recognition tests had two unrelated lures whereas one recognition test only had 
 
4 Note: For simplicity, in the results I refer to the “unrelated” lures as control lures as well, along 
with the two “related” control lures (control metaphor and control literal). All three of these types 
can be considered controls because the prediction is that the critical lures should be falsely 
recognized more often than all three.  
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one unrelated lure. Which recognition test contained only the single unrelated lure was 
counterbalanced across versions, such that for one version the TIME IS MONEY 
recognition test contained only one unrelated lure, for one version the LOVE IS A 
JOURNEY recognition test contained only one unrelated lure, etc.  
Also, to explore whether conceptual metaphor activation continued to the final 
recognition test, two of the four initial recognition tests did not include the critical CM 
lure. This was done to allow for observations of both previously tested and untested 
critical CM lures on the final recognition test. Overall, each recognition test included 0 or 
1 critical CM lures, 2 critical consistent lures, 2 control metaphor lures, 2 control literal 
lures, and 1 or 2 unrelated lures. An example of the four recognition tests for one version 
(non-presented study list: IDEAS ARE FOOD) of the experiment is presented in Table 
3.2 below. 
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Table 3.2. Breakdown of items on the four recognition tests for one version of the 
experiment. IDEAS ARE FOOD was the study list not presented for this version. 
Study list Item type N 
TIME IS MONEY Old items 8 
 Crit CM 0 
 Crit consistent 2 
 Cont metaphor 2 
 Cont literal 2 
 Unrelated 2 
 Total items 16 
 Total lures 8 
LOVE IS A JOURNEY Old items 8 
 Crit CM 1 
 Crit consistent 2 
 Cont metaphor 2 
 Cont literal 2 
 Unrelated 1 
 Total items 16 
 Total lures 8 
UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING Old items 8 
 Crit CM 1 
 Crit consistent 2 
 Cont metaphor 2 
 Cont literal 2 
 Unrelated 2 
 Total items 17 
 Total lures 9 
THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS Old items 8 
 Crit CM 0 
 Crit consistent 2 
 Cont metaphor 2 
 Cont literal 2 
 Unrelated 2 
 Total items 16 
 Total lures 8 
3.2.2.4 Final recognition test 
The final recognition test included both tested and untested old items, as well as tested 
and untested lures for each of the five lure types. All previously tested items were 
retested on this final recognition test. Additionally, 20 untested old items (5 from each 
study list; serial positions 2, 5, 7, 13, and 14), 2 untested critical CM lures, 4 untested 
critical consistent lures (1 for each study list), 4 untested control metaphor lures (1 for 
each study list), 8 untested control literal lures (2 for each study list), and 4 untested 
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unrelated lures were included on the final recognition test. Thus, a total of 107 items were 
included on the final recognition test. A breakdown of the items is displayed in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3. Breakdown of items on final recognition test. 
Previously tested Item type N 
Yes Old items 32 
 Crit CM 2 
 Crit consistent 8 
 Cont metaphor 8 
 Cont literal 8 
 Unrelated 7 
 Total previously tested 65 
No Old items 20 
 Crit CM 2 
 Crit consistent 4 
 Cont metaphor 4 
 Cont literal 8 
 Unrelated 4 
 Total not previously tested 42 
3.2.3 Procedure 
Testing was done on Intel (processor: intel core 2 quad; screen resolution: 1440 x 900) 
and Asus (processor: intel core i5-7500; screen resolution: 1440 x 900) desktop 
computers using the E-Prime 2.0 software package. Most of the procedure was similar to 
Chapter 2, so I will only detail the main alterations. Along with the main task 
instructions, a screen was added that explained what is meant by “remember,” “know,” 
and “guess” and what type of memory would fall under each category (adjusted from 
Gardiner, Ramponi, & Richardson-Klavehn, 1998, see Appendix C). On the recognition 
tests, participants first made an old/new judgment, and if the item was identified as old, 
they were asked to indicate whether the item was remembered, known, or guessed (if the 
item was identified as new, the program simply skipped to the next item). There was no 
time limit for either the old/new judgments or the remember/know/guess judgments. The 
final recognition test followed the same procedure. 
Half of the participants were asked to explain any strategies they used to remember the 
list. Following the recognition test for each study list, a prompt appeared on the screen 
that asked them to elaborate on any strategy they used, such as noticing a theme, paying 
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attention to certain words, or repeating the items mentally (see appendix D for full 
instructions). The prompt also indicated that there were no right or wrong answers, and if 
the participant did not use a strategy, they could simple type in “I did not use any 
conscious strategy.” Underneath the prompt was a textbox that allowed for an open-
response and there was no time limit. Only half of the participants were asked to 
elaborate on strategies because we did not know if consciously thinking about strategies 
would influence how participants performed. Therefore, for comparison the other half of 
participants were not asked about strategies. Participants were randomly assigned to the 
“strategy” and “no-strategy” conditions. The “strategy” group was only prompted after 
the initial recognition tests, and therefore, the final recognition test was identical for both 
groups.  
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Initial recognition tests 
3.3.1.1 Preliminary analysis 
I examined whether the critical CM, critical consistent, control literal, and control 
metaphor lures differed in false recognition when they were presented on unrelated study 
lists (e.g., examining a lure such as “that cost me a day,” which is associated with the 
TIME IS MONEY list, but when tested following another list such as IDEAS ARE 
FOOD).  
Overall, the proportion of false recognition was infrequent when the lures were not 
related to the study list (critical CM: .07 critical consistent: .07, control metaphor: .08, 
control literal: .02; average of the four types: .05. See Appendix E for full breakdown of 
remember, know, and guess judgments). A 2 x 4 ANOVA was conducted with condition 
(strategy vs. no-strategy) as a between-subjects factor and lure type as a within-subjects 
factor. Critically, there was no significant main effect of lure type, F(2.44, 175.42)5 = 
 
5 The assumption of sphericity was violated, therefore, the degrees of freedom were adjusted 
using the Greenhouse-Geisser correction. 
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1.59, p = .201. There was also no significant main effect of condition, F(1, 72) = 0.485, p 
= .488,  nor was the interaction between condition and lure type reliable, F(2.44, 175.42) 
= 2.54, p = .070. These findings confirm that the four lure types did not differ 
significantly in terms of baseline false recognition, and therefore, if the critical lures are 
falsely recognized more often in the following analyses, it is attributable to conceptual 
metaphor activation and not to differences in how likely the lures themselves are able to 
elicit false recognitions. 
3.3.1.2 Main analysis 
The main analysis is whether critical lures that further instantiate the conceptual 
metaphors used in the study lists (critical CM and critical consistent) are falsely 
recognized more often than control lures that do not instantiate the conceptual metaphor 
(control metaphor, control literal, unrelated). The proportions (and SD’s) of items 
identified as old, as well as the proportions (and SD’s) of remember, know, and guess 
judgments for the presented items and the five lure types are displayed in Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4. Proportion (and SD) of items identified as old, as well as proportion (and SD) 
of items remembered, known, and guessed for initial recognition tests of Chapter 3. Note: 
data are collapsed across condition, as there were no significant main effects nor 
interactions with condition. 
Item type Old Remember Know Guess 
Old 
 
.86(.09) .49(.23) .29(.23) .08(.08) 
Crit CM .14(.26) .04(.14) .05(.16) .05(.15) 
Crit consistent .28(.22) .08(.11) .07(.13) .13(.16) 
Cont metaphor .12(.16) .04(.09) .03(.06) .05(.10) 
Cont literal .15(.16) .03(.07) .04(.07) .08(.11) 
Unrelated .06(.10) .02(.05) .01(.04) .03(.07) 
Total false recognition .15(.13) .04(.06) .04(.06) .07(.07) 
Note: Remember, know, and guess proportions are across all items tested, including 
items identified as new. For percentages within items identified as old, see Table 3.5.  
A 2 x 5 ANOVA was conducted with lure type as a within-subjects factor and condition 
(strategy vs. no-strategy) as a between-subjects factor. The dependent variable was the 
proportion of false recognition. There was a main effect of lure type, F(2.96, 213.29)  = 
21.87, p < .001, η²ₚ = .233, but no main effect of condition, F(1, 72) = 0.05, p = .825, nor 
an interaction between lure type and condition, F(2.96, 213.29) = 1.18, p = .316. Planned 
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comparison t-tests (collapsed across condition) were conducted to compare the two 
critical lures (critical CM and critical consistent) to each of the three control lures 
(control metaphor, control literal, and unrelated). The alpha level was adjusted by 
dividing by two for these two sets of comparisons, resulting in an alpha of .025.6 This 
alpha level will be used in all subsequent analyses of critical lures vs. control lures, 
including in the following chapters. The critical consistent lures were falsely recognized 
more often than all three control lures, all t(73)’s > 4.8, p’s < .001, replicating Reid and 
Katz (2018a).  In contrast, the critical CM lures were falsely recognized more often than 
the unrelated lures, t(73) = 3.00, p = .004, but did not differ significantly from either the 
control metaphor or control literal lures, both t(73)’s < 0.8, p’s > .4. 
3.3.1.3 Phenomenological experience of false recognition 
The percentage of remember, know, and guess judgments within correct recognitions of 
presented items (actual old items) and false recognitions of lures are displayed in Table 
3.5. 
Table 3.5. Percentage of items attributed remember, know, and guess judgments within 
correct or false recognitions. Percentages are presented by item type. 
Item type % R % K % G 
Old (actual presented) 
 
57% 34% 9% 
Crit CM 29% 38% 33% 
Crit consistent 28% 26% 47% 
Cont metaphor 32% 23% 45% 
Cont literal 22% 23% 55% 
Unrelated 33% 20% 47% 
Total false recognition 28% 25% 48% 
A 3 (remember, know, or guess) by 5 (lure type) chi-square test was conducted to 
examine the percentage of remember, know, and guess judgments within the falsely 
 
6
 For the effect to be attributed to conceptual metaphor activation the critical lure would need to 
be falsely recognized significantly more often than all three control lures. Therefore, the error rate 
is not increased by these multiple comparisons, as all three need to reach significance for the 
effect to be valid. For this reason, alpha was only adjusted by dividing by two for the two critical 
lures.  
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recognized lures. The chi-square test revealed that the R/K/G percentages did not vary 
significantly by lure type, ꭓ²(8) = 6.15, p = .631. Therefore, although conceptual 
metaphor activation increased false recognitions for critical consistent lures, those lures 
did not differ reliably from the other lures with respect to the phenomenological 
experience of “remembering” them. 
A 2 (correct vs. false recognition) x 3 (remember, know, or guess) chi-square test was 
also conducted to examine the phenomenological experience of correct recognition for 
actually presented items vs. false recognition for lures (regardless of lure type). The chi-
square test was significant, ꭓ²(2) = 364.80, p < .001. Posthoc tests with Bonferroni 
corrections (alpha = .008) revealed that all cells deviated significantly from expected 
values, all z’s > 3.3, p’s < .001, indicating that false recognitions were attributed 
significantly more as guess responses and significantly less as remember and know 
responses than correct recognitions.  
3.3.1.4 Participant strategies 
There was a total of 148 strategy descriptions. Responses were categorized by two 
independent raters into four types depending on whether the participant reported 
attending to 1) just the target domain, 2) just the source domain, 3) both domains, or 4) 
neither domain. In their initial categorizations, the raters agreed on 88% (130 of 148) of 
the responses indicating high consistency. The categories of the remaining 12% (18 of 
148) were decided after discussion between the two raters.  
Examples of responses for each of the four categories are displayed in Table 3.6. Note 
that participants did not need to report the exact words used in the conceptual metaphor 
(e.g., LOVE or JOURNEY), but if they reported a theme closely related to one of the 
domains (e.g., “relationships”), it was categorized as attending to that domain. 
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Table 3.6. Examples of the four strategy types. Typos are left in. Note: not all examples 
were the participant’s full response, but I include the relevant section for making the 
classification. 
Strategy type Study list Examples 
Neither domain TIME IS 
MONEY 
“I tried to relate the sentences as I was reading 
them to my own life. If I link the sentences to 
something that I am experiencing/have 
experienced they should stick with me better 
than simply reading them.” 
 
 IDEAS ARE 
FOOD 
“I repeated the sentences over and over 
mentally infrequently. I also looked for specific 
words that I thought were memorable. For 
example, spoon-feed, learning, eating, and 
raw.”* 
 
Target domain TIME IS 
MONEY 
“I noticed that many of the sentences had the 
common theme of time (i.e. they references 
hours, minutes days etc)” 
 
 LOVE IS A 
JOURNEY 
“I looked for a theme and found on in this 
particular list, which was about love, dating, and 
relationships.” 
 
Source domain IDEAS ARE 
FOOD 
 
“all had a reoccuring theme of food” 
 
 THEORIES 
ARE 
BUILDINGS 
“all of the sentences were based on a theme of 
construction or were about some sort of a 
structural element” 
 
Both domains TIME IS 
MONEY 
 
“looking for a theme (in this case, time && 
money)” 
 
 LOVE IS A 
JOURNEY 
“All of these sentences were about 
relationships, so I thought about my own 
relationships that I have experienced while 
reading the sentences. I also realized that many 
of the sentences were using the analogy of a 
‘road or a car (i.i.e. bumps in the road, etc. so I 
was consciously not trying to be fooled by any 
sentences about cars when asked if I remember 
the new sentences.” 
*Note: Although these words are related to the two domains, they were all words actually 
contained in the presented sentences. Because the participant did not report extracting a 
theme, the strategy was categorized as “neither domain.” 
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Ninety-one of the 148 responses (61%) were categorized as attending to neither domain 
indicating that most of the time participants did not explicitly report consciously 
attending to either domain of the conceptual metaphor. The next most common response 
was attending to the target domain, but not mentioning the source domain (30 out of 148, 
or 20%). Lastly, it was fairly uncommon that the source domain (17 out of 148, or 11%) 
or both domains (10 out of 148, or 7%) were explicitly mentioned as a strategy. 
Because it was so infrequent that participants reported attending to either the source 
domain or to both domains, there were not enough observations to conduct meaningful 
analyses on whether the strategies affected false recognition. However, I did conduct an 
ANOVA that excluded the trials in which the cross-domain mapping was consciously 
noticed, that is, when the participant reported attending to both domains. Even with these 
trials removed, there was still a significant main effect of lure type, F(2.75, 98.92) = 
12.30, p < .001, η²ₚ = .255. Planned comparison t-tests revealed that the proportion of 
false recognition for the critical consistent lures (.29) was significantly higher than for the 
control metaphor (.10), control literal (.16), and unrelated (.05) lures, all t(36)’s > 2.9, p’s 
< .01. 
3.3.2 Final recognition test 
One participant identified every item as new on the final recognition test and was 
therefore removed from all subsequent analyses. Thus, the analyses reported below are 
based on 73 participants. 
3.3.2.1 Preliminary analysis 
The four related lure types (critical CM, critical consistent, control literal, and control 
metaphor) were examined to see if they differed in baseline false recognition. I first 
examined the previously tested lures7 using a 2 (condition: strategy vs. no-strategy) x 4 
 
7
 Previously tested and untested lures had to be analysed separately because there were no 
observations for previously untested critical CM lures unrelated to the study lists. Recall that 
there was only one critical CM lure for each study list, and if this study list was the one not 
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(lure type) ANOVA. The main effect of lure type approached significance, F(2.70, 
191.48) = 2.22, p = .094, which seemed to be driven by higher false recognition for the 
critical consistent and control metaphor lures (.23 and .22 respectively) compared to the 
critical CM and control literal lures (.16 and .14 respectively; see Appendix F for full 
breakdown of remember, know, and guess judgments). There was no significant main 
effect of condition, F(1, 71) = 0.00, p = .976, nor a significant interaction between 
condition and lure type, F(2.70, 191.48) = 0.58, p = .613.  
For the previously untested lures, there were only baseline false recognition data for three 
of the lure types (critical consistent: .05, control metaphor: .08, and control literal: .02). A 
2 x 3 ANOVA indicated that false recognition did not vary significantly by lure type, 
F(1.61, 114.06) = 1.47, p = .235, nor by condition, F(1, 71) = 1.90, p = .173, nor was 
there a significant interaction between the two factors, F(1.61, 114.06) = 0.20, p = .766. 
This confirms that the lure types did not differ significantly when they were not 
associated to any of the presented study lists. 
3.3.2.2 Main analysis 
The proportion (and SD) of items identified as old for actual old items as well as the five 
lure types for the final recognition test are displayed in Table 3.7, along with the 
proportion (and SD) of remember, know, and guess judgments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
presented to participants, then this critical CM lure would have been used as an unrelated lure on 
one of the initial recognition tests. 
50 
 
Table 3.7. Proportion (and SD) of items identified as old, as well as proportion (and SD) 
of items remembered, known, and guessed for final recognition test in Chapter 3. 
Proportions are presented by previous testing status (i.e., whether or not the lure had been 
tested in the initial recognition tests) and item type. Note: data are collapsed across 
condition, as there were no significant main effects nor interactions with condition. 
Previously 
Tested 
Item type Old Remember Know Guess 
Yes Old 
 
.80(.13) .46(.24) .26(.23) .08(.09) 
 Crit CM .39(.33) .17(.27) .12(.25) .10(.23) 
 Crit consistent .52(.23) .21(.20) .16(.18) .15(.16) 
 Cont metaphor .33(.25) .15(.20) .10(.14) .07(.10) 
 Cont literal .28(.25) .12(.17) .08(.16) .08(.11) 
 Unrelated .19(.23) .06(.14) .06(.12) .07(.11) 
 Total false recognition .34(.19) .14(.14) .11(.12) .09(.09) 
No Old 
 
.60(.17) .33(.18) .18(.16) .09(.09) 
 Crit CM .18(.28) .09(.21) .03(.15) .06(.17) 
 Crit consistent .22(.24) .09(.16) .05(.14) .08(.14) 
 Cont metaphor .10(.16) .04(.09) .02(.07) .04(.10) 
 Cont literal .05(.09) .01(.04) .01(.03) .03(.07) 
 Unrelated .04(.10) .02(.08) .01(.04) .02(.07) 
 Total false recognition .12(.11) .05(.08) .02(.06) .05(.07) 
For overall false recognition, a 2 x 2 x 5 ANOVA was conducted with condition (strategy 
vs. no-strategy) as a between-subjects factor and repetition (i.e., whether the item was 
previously tested; yes vs. no) and lure type as within-subjects factors. There were 
significant main effects of both lure type, F(2.80, 198.86) = 39.24, p < .001, η²ₚ = .356, 
and repetition, F(1, 71) = 154.15, p < .001, η²ₚ = .685. There was also a significant 
interaction between lure type and repetition, F(2.74, 194.48) = 2.94, p = .039, η²ₚ = .040. 
All other main effects and interactions failed to reach significance (all F’s < 2.7, p’s > 
.1).  
The interaction between lure type and repetition indicates that the effect of repetition 
varied across lure type. To examine this interaction, I subtracted the proportion of false 
recognition for non-repeated lures from repeated lures within each of the lure types for 
each participant. The difference can be interpreted as the effect of repetition on false 
recognition; the greater the value, the greater the increase in false recognition due to 
repetition. I then conducted paired t-tests to compare the differences across the lure types. 
Alpha was adjusted to .005 for ten comparisons. The t-tests revealed that the difference 
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was smaller for unrelated lures (.15) than for critical consistent lures (.29) and control 
literal lures (.23), both t(72)’s > 3.2, p’s < .003. This indicates that repetition led to a 
larger increase in false recognition for critical consistent and control literal lures than it 
did for unrelated lures. None of the other comparisons reached significance, t’s < 2.6, p’s 
> .01. Regarding the other two lure types, repetition led to a .21 increase in false 
recognition for critical CM lures and a .22 increase for control metaphor lures. Therefore, 
it seems that the more effective the lure is in evoking false recognition, the larger the 
effect of repetition. The lure with the highest proportion of false recognition (critical 
consistent) showed the largest increase in false recognition from repetition, and the lure 
with the lowest proportion of false recognition (unrelated) showed the smallest increase.  
Separate sets of planned comparison t-tests were conducted for repeated and non-
repeated lures to compare the critical lures to the three controls (alpha = .025). As there 
was no main effect of or interactions with condition (strategy vs. no-strategy), the data 
are collapsed across this variable. The critical consistent lures were falsely recognized 
significantly more often than all three control lures for both repeated [all t(72)’s > 6.3, p’s 
< .001] and non-repeated [t(72)’s > 3.6, p’s < .001] lures. For repeated lures, the critical 
CM lures were falsely recognized significantly more often than both the control literal 
and unrelated lures [both t(72)’s > 2.4, p’s < .02], but did not differ significantly from the 
control metaphor lures, t(72) = 1.61, p = .111. For non-repeated lures, the critical CM 
lures were falsely recognized significantly more often than all three control lures, all 
t(72)’s > 2.4, p’s < .02.  
3.3.2.3 Phenomenological experience of false recognition 
The percentages of remember, know, and guess judgments within correctly recognized 
presented items and falsely recognized lures are presented in Table 3.8.  
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Table 3.8. Percentage of items attributed remember, know, and guess judgments within 
correct or false recognitions for the final recognition test in Chapter 3. Percentages are 
presented by repetition (previously tested vs. untested) and by item type. 
Previously 
Tested 
Item Type % R % K % G 
Yes Old (actual presented) 
 
57% 33% 10% 
 Crit CM 44% 32% 25% 
 Crit consistent 41% 30% 29% 
 Cont metaphor 47% 32% 21% 
 Cont literal 43% 29% 28% 
 Unrelated 33% 31% 37% 
 Total false recognition 42% 31% 27% 
No Old (actual presented) 
 
55% 30% 16% 
 Crit CM 48% 19% 33% 
 Crit consistent 40% 23% 37% 
 Cont metaphor 37% 20% 43% 
 Cont literal 23% 13% 63% 
 Unrelated 38% 15% 46% 
 Total false recognition 38% 19% 43% 
The percentage of remember, know, and guess judgments within false recognitions were 
examined for both repeated and non-repeated lures. Chi-square analyses (3: remember, 
know, or guess; by 5: lure type) revealed that the R/K/G percentages within false 
recognitions did not vary significantly for either repeated lures, ꭓ²(8) = 10.67, p = .221, or 
non-repeated lures, ꭓ²(8) = 7.74, p = .459. These findings parallel the results from the 
initial recognition tests, suggesting that once lures are falsely recognized, they produce 
similar phenomenological experience of recognition.  
Chi-square analyses (2: correct vs. false recognition; by 3: remember, know, or guess) 
were also conducted to examine the phenomenological experience of correct recognition 
for presented items vs. false recognition for lures (regardless of lure type). The chi-square 
test was significant both for previously tested items, ꭓ²(2) = 146.86, p < .001, and 
untested items, ꭓ²(2) = 66.46, p < .001. Posthoc tests with Bonferroni corrections (alpha = 
.008) within the previously tested items indicated that the “remember” and “guess” cells 
for both correct and false recognition differed significantly from expected values, z’s > 
7.3, p’s < .001. This indicates that false recognitions were attributed a significantly higher 
percentage of guess responses and significantly lower percentage of remember responses 
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than correct recognitions. Within previously untested items, similar posthoc tests revealed 
that all six cells deviated significantly from expected values, z’s > 2.65, p’s < .008. This 
indicates that false recognitions were attributed a significantly higher percentage of guess 
responses and a significantly lower percentage of remember and know responses.  
3.4 Discussion 
Chapter 3 replicated the major findings described in Chapter 2. Once again, the critical 
consistent lures were falsely recognized significantly more often than all control lures. 
This finding was observed both on the initial and final recognition tests. Furthermore, this 
study ruled out the possibility that the conceptual metaphor false memory effect was due 
to differences in baseline false recognition by comparing the four related lure types when 
they were not associated to the presented study list.  
Notably, the critical consistent lures were falsely recognized more often than controls 
even for non-repeated expressions on the final recognition test. The non-repeated lures 
are analogous to the initial recognition test lures as neither set of lures had been seen 
before. This essentially replicated the conceptual metaphor false memory effect for the 
critical consistent lures with a second set of items, indicating that the effect is fairly 
robust and not just due to the particular lures used in the initial recognition task. It also 
suggests that the effect is relatively long lasting as it occurred after the presentation of 
several lists. 
The effect when the lure is the statement reflecting the CM itself is less robust. Unlike 
Chapter 2, the critical CM lures were not falsely recognized more often than control lures 
on the initial recognition tests. One can speculate on why these lures might induce less 
false recognitions than critical consistent lures. First, unlike the critical consistent lures, 
most of the CM lures are not conversational in nature and somewhat novel sounding. 
Arguably, the novelty of these expressions may be a cue to reject these items as “old.” 
Second, these items all use the “A is B” form. Although we included a few “A is B” 
expressions on each study list to try to minimize this as a potential cue for rejecting 
critical CM lures, the majority of the study list expressions did not use this form. 
Therefore, this could be another feature of critical CM lures that participants use to reject 
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these items as “old.” Finally, critical CM’s represent a superordinate category whereas 
the presented study list items and critical consistent lures are basic-level exemplars of the 
category. Lures at a different category level from study list items are known to be less 
effective than lures at the same category level (Park, Shobe, & Kihlstrom, 2005). For our 
stimuli, although some of the critical CM’s are also exemplar expressions of the 
mapping, such as “love is a journey” (Lakoff, 1993), most are not.8 Therefore, the finding 
that the conceptual metaphors themselves are not frequently falsely remembered is 
actually consistent with previous research on the DRM paradigm, though it remains 
unclear why it occurred in the data presented in Chapter 2.  
The results from the remember-know-guess judgments are both consistent and 
inconsistent with typical DRM studies employing word lists. False recognitions were 
attributed a significantly lower percentage of “remember” judgments than correct 
recognitions, which is typical of DRM studies (see Gallo, 2006, p. 79). However, unlike 
previous findings, the critical lures did not have a higher percentage of remember 
judgments within false recognitions than the control lures. Typically, false recognitions 
of critical lures have a higher percentage of remember judgments compared to false 
recognitions of unrelated lures in DRM studies (Gallo, 2006). Whereas some 
manipulations selectively influence either recollection or familiarity (e.g., Gardiner, 
1988; Rajaram, 1993; Rajaram & Geraci, 2000), it appears that conceptual metaphor 
activation increases both illusory recollection and familiarity.  
The observation here that the percentages of remember, know, and guess responses were 
similar across all lure types suggests that conceptual metaphor activation may be a 
weaker manipulation for inducing false memories that have the characteristics of “real” 
memories, compared to other manipulations, such as creating lists based on associative 
 
8 Lakoff (1993) points out that the conceptual metaphor labels, such as IDEAS ARE FOOD and 
LOVE IS A JOURNEY are “used as mnemonics to name the mappings” (p. 7). Therefore, these 
labels themselves are likely not part of any participant’s lexicon, except in cases like LOVE IS A 
JOURNEY and TIME IS MONEY in which the label of the mapping is also a conventional 
expression. It should be noted that the label is a name for the conceptual metaphor, which is a set 
of correspondences between two domains; the label itself is not the conceptual metaphor.  
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strength as in the classic DRM task (Roediger & McDermott, 1995; Roediger, Watson, 
McDermott, & Gallo, 2001), or employing lure sentences that capture the same meaning 
or idea as the presented sentences while also sharing many overlapping words (Bransford 
& Franks, 1971). Note that in the current study, the critical lures were full sentences not 
highly similar to their study lists in terms of word-based similarity, and that the presented 
items were displayed for a longer duration than is typical in DRM studies, which is a 
factor known to reduce false memories (Gallo & Roediger, 2002).9 For these reasons, the 
current study lists and lures may not induce the compelling false recollective effects that 
often occur with DRM word lists.  
Although the critical consistent lures did not differ from the control lures in terms of the 
remember-know-guess percentages, they were attributed a higher combined percentage of 
“know” and “guess” judgments than “remember” judgments. “Know” and “guess” 
judgments likely both tap into familiarity, albeit at different levels of confidence 
(Hirshman, 1998; Yonelinas, 2002). The high percentage of familiarity-based false 
recognitions are suggestive of automatic activation, which is consistent with the original 
CMT. This finding also supports a processing fluency explanation for the conceptual 
metaphor false memory effect (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; 
Kelley & Jacoby, 1998) which is consistent with automatic conceptual metaphor 
activation. In fact, fluency effects are eliminated when the participant is aware of the 
source of fluency (Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989). That being said, familiarity-based false 
recognition is also consistent with fuzzy-trace theory as false alarms are assumed to be 
based on gist-similarity (i.e., lures being consistent with the gist, or fuzzy meaning, of the 
presented items), which is thought to evoke feelings of familiarity (Brainerd, Reyna, & 
Mojardin, 1999). Although, on face, the high percentage of familiarity-based false 
recognitions is consistent with the original CMT, this should not be taken as definitive 
evidence as the low percentage of false “remembering” could be due to the 
methodological reasons outlined above. 
 
9 The longer presentation duration was necessary simply because full sentences take longer to 
read than single words.  
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The strategy descriptions provide more compelling evidence for CMT over DMT as they 
suggest that most of the time, participants do not report attending to either domain of the 
conceptual metaphor. Attending to both domains was infrequently reported (7%), and 
even when these trials were removed, there was still evidence of a conceptual metaphor 
false memory effect. This suggests that the effect does not depend on the participant 
consciously extracting the metaphorical mapping. This finding does not support Steen’s 
(2009) argument that cross-domain metaphor mappings only occur when participants are 
consciously aware a metaphor is being used, and instead aligns with the original 
assumption of CMT that most metaphorical cognition is unconscious (see Lakoff, 1993). 
Although the strategy questionnaire more strongly supports an automaticity basis for the 
conceptual metaphor false memory effect, the evidence is also indirect and non-
experimental. Therefore, in Chapter 4, I examine automaticity more directly by 
manipulating attention with a concurrent task administered at study.  
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Chapter 4  
4 Examining the automaticity of the conceptual metaphor 
false memory effect using a divided attention task 
4.1 Introduction 
Although the findings described in the previous two chapters support CMT, it remains 
unclear whether conceptual metaphors are activated automatically or require conscious 
processing. Neither the R/K/G judgments, nor the Chapter 3 strategy analysis provided 
definitive answers, though the high frequency of attending to “neither” the source or 
target domain in the strategy analysis is more suggestive of automatic processes. To 
directly test the role of automatic versus conscious processing in the conceptual metaphor 
false memory effect, participants engaged in a concurrent task to divide attention.  
Divided attention inhibits conscious and deliberate processing but typically has little to 
no detrimental effect on automatic processing (Jacoby, 1991; Yonelinas, 2001). Knott 
and Dewhurst (2007) examined the effects of divided attention on false memory with 
DRM lists and found that divided attention reduced false memories during the study 
phase, but increased them at test. Furthermore, these effects were isolated to “remember” 
responses; “know” responses were unaffected. Knott and Dewhurst argued that false “R” 
responses depend on the participants making semantic associations between the study 
words, and that dividing attention hinders making these associations. In contrast, dividing 
attention at test actually increases false “R” judgments because it inhibits controlled 
source monitoring decisions. Pimentel and Albuquerque (2013) divided attention during 
encoding of DRM lists using dichotic listening procedures and found that false memory 
for critical lures occurs even under minimal attention, suggesting also that the critical 
lures are activated automatically.  
Lakoff (1993, 2008) argues that conceptual metaphors are activated automatically upon 
encountering metaphorical expressions. If this is the case, the expressions from the study 
list should activate the corresponding conceptual metaphor even under divided attention. 
Therefore, for Chapter 4, half of the participants engaged in a concurrent task at study 
that divided their attention and half completed the study with full attention. The same 
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pattern of results for the two groups will suggest that conceptual metaphors are activated 
automatically, similar to the argument Pimentel and Albuquerque (2013) make for 
automatic activation of critical lures. However, if conceptual metaphors require deliberate 
and conscious processing, dividing attention should eliminate the conceptual metaphor 
false memory effect. 
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Participants 
One hundred and two participants (65 females; Sample Age: M = 19.87, SD = 4.67, range 
= 18-57) completed the experiment. Some participants (N = 64, 38 females; Sample Age: 
M = 18.45, SD = 0.82, range = 18-21) were recruited through the Psychology 
Department’s Sona systems website and participated in partial fulfillment of course 
credit. The other participants (N = 38, 27 females; Sample Age: M = 22.26, SD = 7.00, 
range = 18-57) were recruited via posters placed around the Western University campus 
and were compensated $5 for participating. Preliminary analyses indicated that whether 
the participant was paid or not did not significantly affect overall recognition 
performance or the pattern of false recognition, so the recruitment type variable will not 
be included in any subsequent analyses. Two participants (2 females; one 18-year-old 
paid participant and one 19-year-old Sona participant) from the divided attention 
condition were removed from analysis due to poor performance on the concurrent task. 
These participants were replaced by two other participants yielding a final sample of 100 
participants (N = 100, 63 females; Age: M = 19.90, SD = 4.71, range = 18-57) with 63 
Sona participants (37 females; Age: M = 18.44, SD = 0.82, range = 18-21) and 37 paid 
participants (26 females, Age: M = 22.38, SD = 7.06, range = 18-57). The full and 
divided attention conditions each included 50 participants. 
To ensure that the sample size was sufficiently large to detect an interactive effect of lure 
type and attention, a power analysis was conducted using G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, 
Lang, & Buchner, 2007). Based on the data from the initial recognition test in Chapter 3, 
the correlation among repeated measures was estimated at .40 and the non-sphericity 
correction ε was set to .741. The former value was based on the correlation of 
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participants’ false recognition proportions for the five different lure types and the latter 
value was based on the Greenhouse-Geisser correction. The power analysis indicated that 
given a total sample size of 100 and a medium effect size of f = .25 (Cohen, 1988), the 
likelihood of detecting a significant interaction was over 99%.   
4.2.2 Materials 
The same study lists and recognition tests employed in Chapter 3 were used in the current 
study.  
4.2.3 Procedure 
Testing was done on an Asus (processor: intel core i5-7500; screen resolution: 1440 x 
900) desktop computer using the E-Prime 2.0 software package. The study consisted of a 
between-subjects condition with two levels: full vs. divided attention. Due to the small 
number of lists in the current study, a between-subjects design was employed (as 
employed in Otgaar, Peters, & Howe, 2012; Pérez-Mata, Read, & Diges, 2002). 
Participants were randomly assigned to the full and divided attention conditions. The 
procedure for the full attention condition was identical to the procedure for the “no-
strategy” condition described in Chapter 3. For the divided attention condition, 
participants engaged in a task used by Dewhurst, Barry, Swannell, Holmes, and Bathurst 
(2007) in a DRM task, namely to generate and say aloud a string of random numbers 
between 1 and 20 on pace with a metronome that ticked every 1 second at the same time 
they were silently reading the study list items. In this random number generating (RNG) 
task, participants were told to keep the numbers as random as possible with no obvious 
patterns or repetition and they had the opportunity to first practice this without having to 
read a list at the same time. The experimenter monitored the participants throughout the 
experiment as they did the RNG task to ensure the participants stayed on beat with the 
metronome and did not continually produce obvious patterns or repetitions. For both 
conditions, remaining aspects of the procedure were the same as employed in Chapters 2 
and 3.  
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4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Preliminary analyses 
Two preliminary analyses were conducted. First, baseline false recognition for the four 
related lure types was examined in both conditions, as done in Chapter 3. Second, correct 
recognition of old items and false alarms for unrelated lures were examined between the 
attention conditions to ensure the divided attention task significantly influenced memory. 
4.3.1.1 Baseline false recognition 
4.3.1.1.1 Initial recognition tests 
The proportion of items falsely recognized for the four lure types when tested following 
an unrelated list are displayed in Table 4.1 (see Appendix G for proportion of items 
attributed remember, know, and guess judgments). 
Table 4.1. Proportion (and SD) of false recognition by lure type when lures followed an 
unrelated study list on the initial recognition tests of Chapter 4. 
Condition Lure type Old 
Full Crit CM .04(.20) 
attention Crit consistent .07(.20) 
 Cont metaphor .05(.15) 
 Cont literal .05(.15) 
 Total full attention .05(.09) 
Divided Crit CM .20(.40) 
attention Crit consistent .30(.34) 
 Cont metaphor .31(.33) 
 Cont literal .24(.29) 
 Total divided attention .26(.17) 
Note: Totals represent the average of the four unrelated lure types’ averages. 
A 2 (between-subjects condition: full vs. divided attention) by 4 (within-subjects: lure 
type) ANOVA indicated that false recognition did not vary significantly by lure type, 
F(3, 294) = 1.27, p = .285. There was however a significant main effect of condition, F(1, 
98) = 58.26, p < .001, η²ₚ = .37, as the proportion of false recognition across all lure types 
was significantly higher for the divided attention group (.26) than for the full attention 
group (.05). However, the interaction between condition and lure type was not 
significant, F(3, 294) = 0.65, p = .583, indicating that there was no facilitated false 
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recognition for any of the lure types when the conceptual metaphor was not primed at 
study.  
4.3.1.1.2 Final recognition test 
The proportions of false recognition for unrelated lures are displayed in Table 4.2 (see 
Appendix H for full breakdown of remember, know, and guess responses). 
Table 4.2. Proportion (and SD) of false recognition by lure type for the final recognition 
test when lures were unrelated to any of the presented study lists. Proportions are broken 
down by previous testing status and condition. 
Previously 
tested 
Condition Lure type Old 
Yes Full Crit CM .12(.33) 
 attention Crit consistent .26(.34) 
  Cont metaphor .21(.32) 
  Cont literal .22(.32) 
  Total full attention .20(.22) 
 Divided Crit CM .36(.48) 
 attention Crit consistent .35(.37) 
  Cont metaphor .48(.38) 
  Cont literal .40(.40) 
  Total divided attention .40(.25) 
No Full Crit consistent .04(.20) 
 attention Cont metaphor .12(.33) 
  Cont literal .02(.10) 
  Total full attention .06(.13) 
 Divided Crit consistent .12(.33) 
 attention Cont metaphor .26(.44) 
  Cont literal .16(.28) 
  Total divided attention .18(.24) 
Note: Totals represent the average of the unrelated lure types’ averages. 
For the previously tested lures, a 2 (between-subjects condition: full vs. divided attention) 
by 4 (within-subjects: lure type) ANOVA revealed a main effect of condition, F(1, 98) = 
17.58, p < .001, η²ₚ = .15, as the divided attention group had a higher proportion of false 
recognitions than the full attention group (.40 vs. .20 respectively). However, once again 
false recognition did not vary significantly by lure type, F(3, 294) = 1.71, p = .165, and 
condition and lure type did not interact, F(3, 294) = 1.41, p = .241. 
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For the previously untested lures, a 2 by 3 (lure type; no previously untested critical CM 
lures) ANOVA indicated significant main effects of lure type, F(1.69, 165.45) = 4.77, p = 
.014, η²ₚ = .05, and attention, F(1, 98) = 9.54, p = .003, η²ₚ = .089, as there was a higher 
proportion of false recognition for the divided attention condition (.18) than the full 
attention condition (.06). Attention and lure type did not interact, F(1.69, 165.45) = 0.39, 
p = .644. Least Significant Difference posthoc tests comparing the lure types revealed 
that the proportion of false recognition was significantly higher for the control metaphor 
lures (.19) than both the critical consistent lures (.09) and control literal lures (.08), both 
p’s < .025. The critical consistent lures and the control literal lures did not differ 
significantly (p = .770).  
In summary, the critical lures were not more likely to induce false recognitions at 
baseline (when unrelated to any of the presented study lists) than the control lures. 
Therefore, in the following analyses for both the initial and final recognition tests, if the 
critical lures induce more false recognitions than the control lures, it can be attributed to 
the presence of conceptual metaphors and cannot be attributed to pre-existing differences 
in the lures’ abilities to evoke false recognitions, regardless of conceptual metaphor 
activation.  
4.3.1.2 Overall recognition performance 
To examine the effects of the divided attention manipulation, analyses were conducted on 
correct recognition of presented items and false alarms to unrelated lures. Divided 
attention typically has a negative influence on memory, and especially on recollection 
(Jacoby, 1991; Yonelinas, 2001), so both recognition and remember, know, and guess 
judgments were examined to determine if the RNG task significantly affected memory in 
the standard way. 
4.3.1.2.1 Initial recognition tests 
The proportion of items categorized as old for presented items (correct recognitions) and 
unrelated lures (false alarms) by condition are displayed in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3. Proportion of correct recognitions for presented items and false alarms for 
unrelated lures by condition (full vs. divided attention) for the initial recognition tests. 
Item type Condition Old 
Presented Full attention .85(.10) 
 Divided attention .60(.13) 
Unrelated10 Full attention .05(.10) 
 Divided attention .27(.17) 
Note: Unrelated proportions are the average collapsed across lure type.  
A 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted with attention condition (full vs. divided) as a between-
subjects factor, item type (presented vs. unrelated) as a within-subjects factor, and 
proportion identified as “old” as the dependent variable. There was a significant main 
effect of item type, F(1, 98) = 868.60, p < .001, η²ₚ = .90, but more critically, there was a 
significant interaction, F(1, 98) = 154.08, p < .001, η²ₚ = .61. Simple t-tests with 
Bonferroni corrections (alpha = .025) revealed that divided attention both significantly 
decreased correct recognitions, t(98) = -11.13, p < .001, d = 2.23, and increased unrelated 
false alarms, t(77.30)11 = 7.92, p < .001, Glass’s Δ = 2.28, indicating that the 
manipulation had the strong expected detrimental effect on memory performance. 
Within correct recognitions, the phenomenological experience differed significantly 
between the attention conditions. A 2 (condition: divided vs. full attention) x 3 (response: 
remember, know, or guess) chi-square test revealed that the percentage of remember, 
know, and guess responses differed significantly between the two conditions (full 
 
10
 Note that the unrelated proportions from Table 4.3 differ slightly from the totals in 
Table 4.1. This is because the totals in Table 4.1 are the average of the averages for the 
four unrelated subtypes. This makes the most sense for analysing differences between the 
unrelated types; however, because there were no main effects or interactions with lure 
type for unrelated lures, in the main recognition analyses the unrelated lures are collapsed 
across type (in other words, the average from all the unrelated lures, regardless of type). 
This leads to slightly different values because there are an unequal number of unrelated 
lure subtypes. There is only one unrelated critical CM lure, but two lures each for the 
other unrelated types. 
11 Degrees of freedom adjusted due to unequal variances between groups. For this reason, 
Glass’s Δ was used to measure effect size rather than Cohen’s d, the latter of which 
assumes equal variances between groups. Glass’s Δ uses only the standard deviation from 
the control group, which in this case was the full attention group.  
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attention: R = 54%, K = 35%, and G = 11%; divided attention: R = 47%, K = 30%, G = 
23%), ꭓ²(2) = 56.03, p < .001. Posthoc tests with Bonferroni corrections (alpha = .008 for 
examining 6 cells) revealed that the “remember” and “guess” cells in both conditions 
significantly deviated from the expected counts (z’s > 3.1, p’s < .008), meaning that 
divided attention led to an increased percentage of guesses and a decreased percentage of 
remember responses attributed to correctly recognized items.  
4.3.1.2.2 Final recognition test 
The proportion of items categorized as old for presented items and unrelated lures on the 
final recognition test are displayed in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4. Proportion of correct recognition and false alarms for unrelated lures by 
condition (full vs. divided attention) and repetition (whether or not the item had been 
tested on one of the initial recognition tests). 
Item Type Repeated Attention Old 
Presented Yes Full .77(.17) 
  Divided .50(.21) 
 No Full .60(.18) 
  Divided .29(.18) 
Unrelated Yes Full .21(.22) 
  Divided .40(.25) 
 No Full .05(.11) 
  Divided .18(.23) 
A 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted with condition (full vs. divided attention) as a 
between-subjects factor and repetition (previously tested: yes vs. no) and item type 
(presented item vs. unrelated lure) as within-subjects factors. The ANOVA revealed 
significant main effects of condition: F(1, 98) = 5.76, p = .018, η²ₚ = .06; repetition: F(1, 
98) = 158.75, p < .001, η²ₚ = .62; and item type, F(1, 98) = 291.47, p < .001, η²ₚ = .75, 
and a marginally significant interaction between repetition and condition, F(1, 98) = 3.62, 
p = .060, η²ₚ = .04. More critically however, there was a significant interaction between 
item type and condition, F(1, 98) = 136.00, p < .001, η²ₚ = .58. Simple t-tests with 
Bonferroni corrections (alpha = .013) revealed that divided attention significantly 
decreased correct recognitions for presented items that were both repeated, t(98) = -6.95, 
p < .001, d = 1.39, and non-repeated, t(98) = -8.79, p < .001, d = 1.76, but increased false 
alarms for both repeated unrelated lures, t(98) = 4.07, p < .001, d = 0.81, and for non-
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repeated unrelated lures, t(70.85) = 3.42, p = .001, Glass’s Δ = 1.11.12 Similar to the 
initial recognition tests, the decrease in correct recognition and the increase in false 
alarms indicates that divided attention led to significantly poorer memory. None of the 
other interactions reached significance (all F’s < 1, p’s > .7). 
Within the correct recognitions, a 2 (condition) x 3 (response: remember, know, or guess) 
chi-square test revealed that the percentage of remember, know, and guess responses 
differed significantly between the two conditions (full attention: R = 55%, K = 34%, and 
G = 11%; divided attention: R = 49%, K = 27%, G = 24%), ꭓ²(2) = 84.47, p < .001. 
Posthoc tests with Bonferroni corrections (alpha = .008) revealed that all six cells differed 
significantly from the expected values, all z’s > 2.7, p’s < .008. This indicates that 
dividing attention decreased the percentage of both remember and know judgments and 
increased the percentage of guess judgments. Both remember and know judgments are 
indicative of greater confidence in memory judgments, and therefore, the decrease in 
these judgments and increase in guesses suggests that even when participants were 
correct, they were less sure of their judgments when attention was divided. 
4.3.2 Main analyses 
4.3.2.1 Initial recognition tests 
The proportion (and SD) of items falsely identified as old for the five lure types, and the 
proportion (and SD) of remember (R), know (K), and guess (G) judgments are displayed 
in Table 4.5.  
 
 
 
 
12 Degrees of freedom adjusted and Glass’s Δ used for effect size due to unequal variances.  
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Table 4.5. Proportion of false recognition and remember, know, and guess judgments by 
attention condition and lure type for initial recognition tests. 
Condition Item type Old R K G 
Full Crit CM .19(.28) .08(.19) .06(.19) .05(.15) 
attention Crit consistent .28(.21) .07(.12) .08(.12) .14(.16) 
 Cont metaphor .14(.15) .03(.07) .04(.09) .07(.11) 
 Cont literal .11(.13) .03(.07) .02(.05) .06(.09) 
 Unrelated .05(.10) .01(.05) .01(.04) .03(.08) 
 Total .16(.12) .04(.07) .04(.06) .07(.07) 
Divided Crit CM .37(.36) .17(.28) .11(.21) .09(.19) 
attention Crit consistent .49(.21) .18(.15) .14(.15) .17(.16) 
 Cont metaphor .37(.22) .12(.14) .10(.16) .15(.16) 
 Cont literal .38(.23) .14(.14) .08(.11) .16(.15) 
 Unrelated .27(.17) .10(.14) .06(.10) .11(.13) 
 Total .38(.15) .14(.10) .10(.10) .14(.09) 
The false recognition data here follows a trend similar to those presented in Chapters 2 
and 3. For full attention, the critical consistent lures again had about twice as many false 
recognitions as the control metaphor and literal lures. For divided attention, the critical 
consistent lures were also falsely recognized more often than controls, but divided 
attention increased false recognitions for all lure types. Nonetheless, even with increased 
false recognition for controls, the proportion of false recognition for the critical consistent 
lures was still .12 higher than the control metaphor lures and .11 higher than the control 
literal lures, which is comparable to all three full attention studies (Chapter 2, 3, and the 
full attention condition in the current chapter).  
A 2 (between-subjects: condition) x 5 (within-subjects: lure type) ANOVA with false 
recognition as the dependent variable revealed significant main effects of lure type, 
F(2.79, 273.77) = 18.24, p < .001, η²ₚ = .16, and condition, F(1, 98) = 63.49, p < .001, η²ₚ 
= .39. Critically, there was not a significant interaction, F(2.79, 273.77) = 0.71, p = .539, 
confirming that the pattern of false recognition across lure types did not differ 
appreciably in the divided and full attention conditions.  
The pattern of false recognition was examined further with separate sets of planned 
comparisons within the two attention conditions. Alpha was divided by two for 
comparing the two critical lures against each of the three control lures (literal, metaphor, 
and unrelated), yielding an adjusted alpha of .025. The critical consistent lures were 
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falsely recognized significantly more often than each of the three control lures for both 
full attention [all t(49)’s > 4.9, p’s < .001] and divided attention [all t(49)’s > 3.2, p’s < 
.002]. The critical CM lures were falsely recognized significantly more often than the 
unrelated lures under full attention, t(49) = 3.63, p < .001, but did not differ significantly 
from the control metaphor or control literal lures, both t(49)’s < 2.0, p’s > .06. Under 
divided attention, the critical CM lures did not differ significantly from any of the three 
control lures, all t(49)’s < 1.9, p’s > .06. The critical finding here is that under both full 
and divided attention, the critical consistent lures were falsely recognized more often than 
all three controls, suggesting that the conceptual metaphor false memory effect was still 
evident even when conscious processing was limited. 
4.3.2.1.1 Phenomenological experience of false recognition 
The percentages of remember, know, and guess judgments within correctly recognized 
presented items and falsely recognized lures by condition are displayed in Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6. Percentage of items attributed remember, know, and guess judgments within 
correct or false recognitions for the initial recognition tests in Chapter 4. Percentages are 
presented by attention condition (full vs. divided) and item type. 
Condition Item type % R % K % G 
Full attention Old (actual presented) 
 
54% 35% 11% 
 Crit CM 42% 32% 26% 
 Crit consistent 23% 28% 49% 
 Control metaphor 23% 25% 52% 
 Control literal 30% 20% 50% 
 Unrelated 26% 21% 53% 
 Total false recognition 26% 26% 48% 
Divided attention Old (actual presented) 
 
47% 30% 23% 
 Crit CM 46% 30% 24% 
 Crit consistent 37% 28% 35% 
 Control metaphor 32% 27% 41% 
 Control literal 37% 20% 43% 
 Unrelated 36% 22% 42% 
 Total false recognition 36% 25% 39% 
Separate 3 (remember, know, or guess) by 5 (lure types) chi-square tests for both 
attention conditions revealed that the five lure types did not differ in terms of R/K/G 
percentages for either full attention, ꭓ²(8) = 6.01, p = .646, or divided attention, ꭓ²(8) = 
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9.37, p = .312. This suggests that when lures were falsely recognized, the 
phenomenological experience of the false recognition did not differ significantly between 
the different lures types. Compared to correct recognitions however, 2 (false vs. correct 
recognition) x 3 (remember, know, and guess) chi-square tests revealed that the R/K/G 
percentages differed significantly for correct recognition and false recognition under both 
full attention, ꭓ²(2) = 212.70, p < .001, and divided attention, ꭓ²(2) = 48.21, p < .001. For 
full attention, posthoc tests with Bonferroni corrections (alpha = .008) revealed that all 
six cells differed significantly from expected values, all z’s > 2.7, p’s < .008. This 
indicates that false recognitions were attributed a significantly higher percentage of 
guesses and a significantly lower percentage of both remember and know responses than 
correct recognitions. For divided attention, similar posthoc tests revealed that the 
“remember” and “guess” cells for both full attention and divided attention differed 
significantly from expected values, all z’s > 4.4, p’s < .001, but that the “know” cells did 
not, both z’s = 2.11, p’s = .035. This indicates that false recognitions were attributed a 
significantly higher percentage of guesses and a significantly lower percentage of 
remember judgments compared to correct recognitions. Therefore, relative to false 
recognitions and under both full attention and divided attention, correct recognitions were 
more based on recollection, which is consistent with previous DRM findings (Gallo, 
2006). 
4.3.2.2 Final recognition test 
The proportion of false recognition and remember, know, and guess judgments for the 
final recognition test are displayed in Table 4.7. 
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Table 4.7. Proportion of false recognition and remember (R), Know (K), and Guess (G) 
judgments, by condition, repetition (previously tested vs. untested), and lure type. 
Condition Repeated Item type Old R K G 
Full Yes Crit CM .44(.41) .24(.34) .11(.25) .09(.22) 
attention  Crit consistent .55(.26) .20(.21) .20(.20) .16(.16) 
  Cont metaphor .37(.22) .15(.19) .11(.15) .11(.16) 
  Control literal .27(.23) .10(.15) .10(.16) .07(.12) 
  Unrelated .21(.22) .08(.11) .06(.09)  .07(.12) 
  Total .37(.19) .15(.14) .11(.12) .10(.09) 
 No Crit CM .21(.37) .06(.16) .05(.21) .10(.25) 
  Crit consistent .27(.24) .04(.09) .12(.17) .12(.17) 
  Cont metaphor .10(.15) .03(.08) .03(.08) .05(.10) 
  Control literal .05(.12) .01(.05) .03(.10) .01(.03) 
  Unrelated .05(.11) .01(.04) .02(.07) .03(.09) 
  Total .14(.12) .03(.05) .05(.08) .06(.09) 
Divided Yes Crit CM .37(.40) .18(.30) .10(.23) .09(.22) 
attention  Crit consistent .47(.28) .21(.21) .12(.12) .15(.17) 
  Cont metaphor .44(.21) .22(.18) .09(.12) .14(.15) 
  Control literal .40(.23) .18(.17) .10(.14) .11(.15) 
  Unrelated .40(.25) .20(.20) .08(.14) .12(.15) 
  Total .42(.21) .20(.15) .10(.12) .12(.10) 
 No Crit CM .21(.29) .10(.23) .02(.10) .09(.22) 
  Crit consistent .28(.24) .11(.17) .11(.18) .07(.12) 
  Cont metaphor .17(.21) .04(.09) .03(.09) .11(.18) 
  Control literal .12(.16) .04(.09) .02(.05) .07(.12) 
  Unrelated .18(.23) .05(.12) .03(.10) .10(.18) 
  Total .19(.16) .07(.09) .04(.07) .09(.11) 
A 2 (between-subjects condition: full vs. divided attention) x 2 (within-subjects: repeated 
vs. non-repeated) x 5 (within-subjects: lure type) ANOVA revealed significant main 
effects of both repetition, F(1, 98) = 200.87, p < .001, η²ₚ = .67, and lure type, F(2.89, 
282.95) = 24.17, p < .001, η²ₚ = .20, as well as a significant two-way interaction between 
condition and lure type, F(2.89, 282.95) = 7.62, p < .001, η²ₚ = .07. The main effect of 
condition and the other interactions did not reach significance, all F’s < 2.9, p’s > .09.  
Separate sets of planned comparison t-tests (alpha = .025) between the critical and control 
lures were conducted for each of the four combinations (full attention repeated, full 
attention non-repeated, divided attention repeated, and divided attention non-repeated). 
For full attention, the critical consistent lures were falsely recognized more often than all 
three control lures when both repeated [all t(49)’s > 5.1, p’s < .001] and non-repeated [all 
t(49)’s > 5.3, p’s < .001]. The repeated critical CM lures were falsely recognized more 
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often than the repeated control literal and unrelated lures [both t(49)’s > 2.8, p < .01], but 
did not differ significantly from the repeated control metaphor lures, t(49) = 1.22, p = 
.229. The non-repeated critical CM lures also were falsely recognized significantly more 
often than the non-repeated control literal and unrelated lures [both t(49)’s > 2.8, p < .01], 
but did not differ significantly from the non-repeated control metaphor lures, t(49)’s = 
2.13, p = .038. In summary, under full attention the critical consistent lures were again 
falsely recognized more often than all three control lures, replicating the findings from 
Chapters 2 and 3.  
In the divided attention condition, for repeated lures, the critical consistent lures were not 
falsely recognized significantly more often than any of the three control lures, all t(49)’s 
< 1.9, p’s > .05. Similarly, the repeated critical CM lures were not falsely recognized 
significantly more often than any of the three repeated control lures [all t(49)’s < 0]13. 
For non-repeated lures however, the critical consistent lures were falsely recognized 
significantly more often than all three control lures [all t(49)’s > 2.6, p’s < .02]. The non-
repeated critical CM lures were falsely recognized more often than the non-repeated 
control literal lures, t(49) = 2.39, p = .021, but did not differ significantly from either the 
non-repeated control metaphor or unrelated lures [both t(49)’s < 1.0, p’s > .3]. 
Overall, these findings replicate the previous findings from Chapters 2 and 3 that 
expressions that further instantiate study list conceptual metaphors (“critical consistent” 
lures) are falsely recognized more often than control lures. The only case in which this 
was not replicated was for the previously tested lures on the final recognition test in the 
divided attention condition, which will be considered further in the Discussion. However, 
in all other cases the conceptual metaphor false memory effect emerged, which highlights 
again the robustness of the effect, even under divided attention in which conscious 
processing is diminished.  
 
13 t-values here were actually negative as the critical CM lures were falsely recognized less often 
than the controls lures.  
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4.3.2.2.1 Phenomenological experience of false recognition 
The percentage of remember, know, and guess judgments within correct recognitions of 
old items and false recognitions of lures are displayed in Table 4.8. 
Table 4.8. Percentage of items attributed remember, know, and guess judgments within 
correct or false recognitions for the final recognition test in Chapter 4. Percentages are 
presented by repetition (previously tested vs. untested), attention conditions (full vs. 
divided), and item type. 
Condition Previously 
tested 
Item Type % R % K % G 
Full attention Yes Old (actual presented) 
 
57% 34% 10% 
  Crit CM 55% 25% 20% 
  Crit consistent 36% 36% 28% 
  Cont metaphor 40% 29% 31% 
  Cont literal 38% 38% 25% 
  Unrelated 39% 27% 35% 
  Total false recognition 39% 33% 28% 
 No Old (actual presented) 
 
50% 34% 15% 
  Crit CM 29% 24% 48% 
  Crit consistent 15% 43% 43% 
  Cont metaphor 30% 25% 45% 
  Cont literal 25% 55% 20% 
  Unrelated 10% 40% 50% 
  Total false recognition 21% 38% 41% 
Divided attention Yes Old (actual presented) 
 
50% 29% 21% 
  Crit CM 49% 27% 24% 
  Crit consistent 44% 25% 31% 
  Cont metaphor 49% 21% 31% 
  Cont literal 46% 26% 28% 
  Unrelated 49% 21% 30% 
  Total false recognition 47% 23% 30% 
 No Old (actual presented) 
 
46% 21% 33% 
  Crit CM 48% 10% 43% 
  Crit consistent 38% 38% 24% 
  Cont metaphor 24% 15% 62% 
  Cont literal 33% 14% 53% 
  Unrelated 26% 17% 57% 
  Total false recognition 33% 21% 46% 
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Separate 3 (remember, know, and guess) x 5 (lure type) chi-square tests were conducted 
on the false recognitions within each of the four combinations of attention and repetition 
(full-repeated, full-non-repeated, divided-repeated, divided-non-repeated). Alpha was 
adjusted to .013 (.05/4) for the four separate analyses. The only case in which the chi-
square test reached significance was for non-repeated lures under divided attention, ꭓ²(8) 
= 23.58, p = .003 [all other ꭓ²(8)’s < 9.7, p’s > .2]. Posthoc tests with Bonferroni 
corrections (alpha = .003 for examining 15 cells) revealed that the “know” and “guess” 
cells for the critical consistent lures differed significantly from the expected values. This 
indicates that false recognitions of critical consistent lures were attributed a significantly 
higher percentage of “know” judgments and a significantly lower percentage of “guess” 
judgments compared to the other lure types, possibly suggesting an increased level of 
confidence or familiarity. However, it is unclear why this was the case only for non-
repeated lures under divided attention, but none of the other combinations.  
Separate 2 (false vs. correct recognition) x 3 (remember, know, or guess) chi-square tests 
(alpha = .013) revealed that the R/K/G percentages differed significantly between correct 
and false recognition in all four combinations, all ꭓ²(8)’s > 9.8, p’s < .01. Posthoc tests 
with Bonferroni corrections (alpha = .008) revealed that in three of the combinations (full 
attention/repeated, full attention/non-repeated, and divided attention/non-repeated) false 
recognitions were attributed a significantly lower percentage of “remember” judgments 
and a significantly higher percentage of “guess” judgments than correct recognitions (all 
z’s > 2.7, p’s < .008). For repeated items under divided attention, only the “guess” cells 
significantly deviated from expected values (z’s > 3.9, p’s < 001), indicating that false 
recognitions were attributed a significantly higher percentage of “guess” judgments 
compared to correct recognitions.  
4.4 Discussion 
The main finding from this study is that the critical consistent lures were falsely 
recognized more often than controls even under divided attention. In fact, on the initial 
recognition tests, there was no significant interaction between the type of lure and 
attention, suggesting that the pattern of false recognition for the different lures did not 
vary by level of attention. These data are consistent with the argument that the conceptual 
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metaphor false memory effect does not depend on conscious, effortful processing of the 
sentences, at least during study. This finding converges with the finding described in 
Chapter 3 that participants very infrequently reported consciously attending to the 
metaphor mappings in their strategy descriptions. Taken together, this strongly suggests 
that conceptual metaphors are automatically activated, and their arousal does not require 
conscious and deliberate attention. 
The results from the final recognition test paralleled the initial recognition test except in 
one case – the repeated lures under divided attention. For this group of lures, the critical 
consistent lures were not recognized significantly more often than control lures, thus 
eliminating the conceptual metaphor false memory effect. Although the lack of an effect 
under these circumstances was unexpected, I offer some speculation on why this was the 
case. The repeated lures were seen on the initial recognition tests, and therefore, although 
they are considered “lures” in this study, they are not truly “new” items in the sense that 
they were encountered previously in the experiment (albeit, not on a study list). Rejecting 
repeated lures is somewhat like rejecting misleading information in studies on the 
“misinformation effect” (Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978; Cann & Katz, 2005). In this 
paradigm, participants first witness an event (e.g., an automobile accident) and then are 
asked leading questions about the event that contain incorrect information. On a 
following memory test, participants often attribute the misleading information from the 
questions to the witnessed event. This can be considered a “source monitoring” error 
(Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993) because the information from the follow-up 
questions was attributed to an incorrect source (i.e., the witnessed event).  
Applied to the current study, the repeated lures could be falsely recognized due to either 
relatedness or to failures in source monitoring, that is, misattributing the source of the 
lure to the study list. Divided attention has been found to reduce monitoring (Pérez-Mata 
et al., 2002), so it is possible that in this anomalous finding, source monitoring errors had 
a larger influence on false recognition and drowned out the influence of relatedness. 
However, within full attention, participants may have been more aware of the source of 
the items and better able to reject the repeated control lures. As a result, relatedness may 
have played a larger role in recognition decisions than when attention was divided. This 
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may be why the conceptual metaphor false memory effect was observed only under full 
attention, but not under divided attention for repeated lures. Furthermore, with non-
repeated lures, previously seeing the lure was not an issue as none of these lures were 
tested until this point. With non-repeated lures, the conceptual metaphor false memory 
effect was observed even under divided attention. Therefore, for this category of lures, 
relatedness likely also played a larger role in recognition decisions as there was not a 
more salient factor (i.e., having actually seen the lures) to take precedence.  
Regardless of the reasons for differences between repeated and non-repeated lures, the 
non-repeated lures are the most informative items on the final recognition test as they 
were a new set of lures not yet seen, and therefore, uncontaminated by any prior testing. 
Under both divided and full attention, the non-repeated critical consistent lures were 
falsely recognized more often than the non-repeated control lures. This suggests that even 
under divided attention, the conceptual metaphor false memory effect is fairly long 
lasting, persisting after the presentation of intervening study lists.  
In contrast to the critical consistent lures, the critical CM lures, that is, the labels for the 
non-presented conceptual metaphors themselves, were not consistently falsely recognized 
more often than controls. Of course, there were fewer observations of these lures per 
participant than the other lures as there can only be one critical CM lure per list (unlike 
the other lures where multiple items can be used), which makes it harder to detect 
significant differences in the planned comparisons. Nonetheless, in both Chapter 3 and 
the current study these lures were not consistently better at inducing false recognition 
than control lures, so it is likely they simply are not as effective as the critical consistent 
lures.  
In terms of the phenomenological experience of false recognition, the five lure types did 
not consistently differ in terms of the percentage of remember, know and guess 
judgments. Thus, it seems that conceptual metaphor activation increases false recognition 
in general, but once a lure is falsely recognized, the experience is the same regardless of 
the type of lure it is. This is neither consistent nor inconsistent with CMT as the theory 
does not make specific predictions about recollection and familiarity, although the high 
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percentage of combined “know” and “guess” judgments is suggestive of automatic 
activation. Unlike some manipulations that selectively affect only recollection or 
familiarity, it seems that conceptual metaphor activation just increases false recognition 
overall rather than only affecting one type of memory. 
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Chapter 5  
5 Divided attention at study and test 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of Chapter 5 was to further examine the automaticity of conceptual 
metaphor activation, particularly at retrieval. In Chapter 4, attention was divided at study, 
when participants were reading and encoding the sentences, but attention was full at test, 
when participants were retrieving the sentences from memory and making decisions 
whether they thought they had seen each sentence or not. Therefore, it is possible that the 
conceptual metaphors were consciously brought to mind at test. Perhaps conceptual 
metaphors are encoded unconsciously, but retrieval depends on conscious access. 
Furthermore, at test an actual response is required, and it is possible that the conceptual 
metaphors need to be consciously accessed when making a response decision to show 
effects on cognition. 
The original CMT and DMT do not make specific predictions about encoding and 
retrieval. However, Glucksberg and colleagues (Glucksberg, Brown, & McGlone, 1993; 
Glucksberg & McGlone, 1999) have argued that in other psychological tasks, effects 
supportive of CMT may be due to deliberate judgments. In particular, they mention 
Nayak and Gibbs’s (1990) idiom choice task in which participants read short paragraphs 
that instantiated a conceptual metaphor (e.g., ANGER IS HEAT) and then selected 
between two idioms to finish the paragraph, one of which was consistent with the 
instantiated conceptual metaphor (e.g., “blew her top”)  and one of which was 
inconsistent (e.g., “bit his head off”; based on the ANGER IS ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR 
conceptual metaphor). Nayak and Gibbs found that participants more often selected the 
consistent idiom to finish the paragraph. This suggested that participants were sensitive to 
the conceptual metaphor instantiated in the preceding paragraph, providing evidence for 
the psychological reality of conceptual metaphors. However, Glucksberg and colleagues 
(Glucksberg et al., 1993; Glucksberg & McGlone, 1999) argued that the effect may 
depend on the participant having enough time to make a deliberate judgment about the 
“fit” of the idiom. In other words, conceptual metaphors may not influence online 
77 
 
comprehension, but participants may consciously attend to the conceptual metaphors 
when making post-comprehension decisions and judgments about the appropriateness of 
idioms. Roughly mapped onto the current memory task, the implication may be that 
effects supportive of conceptual metaphor activation depend on conscious attention at 
retrieval, when recognition judgments are made.  
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Participants 
There were 172 participants (122 female) aged 17 to 44 (M = 20.69, SD = 4.27) recruited 
for this study. Of this number, 101 participated for $10 compensation whereas the other 
71 were recruited through the Psychology Department’s Sona system website and 
participated in partial fulfillment of course requirements. Of the 172 participants, 2 
participants did not complete the study as one paid participant withdrew from the study 
and for one Sona participant, the fire alarm for the building went off during the study. 
These participants were still compensated ($10 for the paid participant and the course 
participation credit for the Sona participant). Two participants were removed because 
they completed a previous study in our lab that used similar stimuli. Two additional 
participants were removed due to errors by the experimenter.14 Also, six participants 
were removed for poor performance on the random number generation task (two 
participants each from the divided attention at study, divided attention at test, and divided 
attention at both study and test conditions). All of these participants were replaced. 
However, after recruitment was completed, two additional participants (one from the 
divided attention at study condition and one from the full attention condition) were 
removed from analyses due to their performance on the recognition tests (see Results). 
Therefore, the final analysed sample consisted of 158 participants (112 female) aged 17 
to 44 (M = 20.67, SD = 4.30), 93 of whom were compensated $10 and 65 of whom 
 
14 In one case, the experimenter did not explain the instructions for the remember-know-guess 
task to the participant. In the other case, the participant accidently heard the experimenter debrief 
the preceding participant, and therefore, knew that the study was dealing with metaphors.  
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completed the study for course credit. As described below, there were four independent 
groups and the Ns in each group ranged from 39 to 40 (see Table 5.1 below). 
I conducted a similar power analysis to that in Chapter 4, but the correlation among 
repeated measures was updated to .43 and the non-sphericity correction ε was updated to 
.720. These estimates were based on averages between Chapters 3 and 4. The power 
analysis indicated that given a total sample size of 156 and a medium effect size of f = 
.25, the likelihood of detecting a significant interaction was over 99%.15 
5.2.2 Materials 
The same study lists and recognition items used in Chapters 3 and 4 were used in the 
current Chapter. 
5.2.3 Procedure 
A similar procedure as Chapter 4 was employed with the main difference being the 
recognition test. Rather than first making an old/new judgment and then, if the response 
was deemed “old,” making a remember/know/guess judgment (two-step procedure), the 
participant was instructed that if they thought the item was old, to press either 
“remember,” “know,” or “guess” directly, depending on their type of memory for the lure 
(one-step procedure). In other words, there was no preceding old/new judgment. If the 
participant thought the item was new, they were instructed to not press anything and wait 
for the next item to appear (as done by Knott and Dewhurst, 2007). Each recognition item 
was displayed for 5 seconds following a 500ms fixation cross. The time limit was 
imposed so that the participants under divided attention at test conditions could not 
compensate for the concurrent task by looking at the item for a very long time, which 
could allow for conscious processing. However, to maintain consistency, the one-step, 
timed recognition test was applied to all conditions. 
 
15
 The sample size was reduced to a more conservative total of 156 because the power analysis 
assumes equal N’s in all groups. 
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There were two between-subjects conditions: attention at study (full vs. divided) and 
attention at test (full vs. divided). The resulting four combinations are shown in Table 
5.1. Note that Group 1 is a replication of the studies reported in Chapters 2 and 3, 
whereas Group 2 is a replication of the study described in Chapter 4. The same RNG task 
as Chapter 4 was employed for dividing attention and participants were randomly 
assigned to conditions. 
Table 5.1. Design for Chapter 5 study with divided attention at study and test. Note: 
Number of participants refers to the number retained in the analyses. 
 Concurrent task at Study Concurrent task at Test Number of Participants 
Group 1 No No 39 
Group 2 Yes No 39 
Group 3 No Yes 40 
Group 4 Yes Yes 40 
The final recognition test was divided into six blocks of 18 items each to allow 
participants a short break in between blocks. The same 107 items used in Chapters 3 and 
4 were employed with the addition of one filler item (“the surprise was a hawk’s cry”) 
taken from Cardillo, Schmidt, Kranjec, and Chatterjee (2010) so that each block included 
exactly 18 items (the filler item will not be analysed). The 18 items for each block were 
drawn randomly from the pool of 108 items. 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Preliminary analyses 
Similar preliminary analyses as conducted in Chapter 4 were conducted for baseline false 
recognition and correct vs. false recognition. On the initial recognition tests, one 
participant in the full attention condition identified every item as old and one participant 
from the divided attention at study condition identified all items but one (64 of 65) as old. 
These two participants were removed from all subsequent analyses. 
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5.3.1.1 Baseline false recognition 
5.3.1.1.1 Initial recognition tests 
The proportion of false recognition for the four lure types when unrelated to the study list 
by condition are presented in Table 5.2 (see Appendix I for full breakdown of remember, 
know, and guess judgments). 
Table 5.2. Proportion of false recognition for unrelated lures by lure type and attention 
conditions for the initial recognition tests. 
Study condition Test condition Lure type Old 
Full attention Full attention Crit CM .18(.39) 
  Crit consistent .18(.27) 
  Cont metaphor .09(.19) 
  Cont literal .06(.20) 
  Total  .13(.18) 
 Divided attention Crit CM .08(.27) 
  Crit consistent .15(.26) 
  Cont metaphor .10(.20) 
  Cont literal .08(.21) 
  Total .10(.16) 
Divided attention Full attention Crit CM .15(.37) 
  Crit consistent .32(.35) 
  Cont metaphor .32(.39) 
  Cont literal .17(.26) 
  Total .24(.20) 
 Divided attention Crit CM .25(.44) 
  Crit consistent .33(.33) 
  Cont metaphor .35(.36) 
  Cont literal .24(.34) 
  Total .29(.25) 
A 2 (attention at study: full vs. divided) x 2 (attention at test: full vs. divided) x 4 (lure 
type) ANOVA with attention at study and attention at test as between-subjects factors 
and lure type as a within-subjects factor revealed a significant main effect of lure type, 
F(2.77, 426.80) = 4.93, p = .003, ηₚ² = .03. There was also a significant main effect of 
attention at study, F(1, 154) = 22.48, p < .001, ηₚ² = .13, as false recognition was higher 
when attention was divided at study vs. full (.27 vs. .11, respectively). The interaction 
between divided attention at study and lure type was not reliable, F(2.77, 426.80) = 2.46, 
p = .067, ηₚ² = .02, and none of the other main effects nor interactions approached 
significance, all F’s < 1.6, p’s > .2. Least significant difference posthoc tests comparing 
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the lure types collapsed across attention conditions revealed that the proportion of false 
recognition for both the critical consistent (.24) and control metaphor (.22) lures was 
significantly higher than for the control literal lures (.14), both p’s < .01. Also, the critical 
consistent lures were falsely recognized more often than the critical CM lures (p = .029). 
This was likely because the critical consistent lures and control metaphor lures, like the 
study lists, consist of metaphorical expressions, whereas the control literal lures are literal 
sentences, and thus, are a different category of language from the study lists. 
Nonetheless, this limits the strength of any conclusions made by directly comparing these 
lure types in the main false recognition analyses. For this reason, comparisons will also 
be conducted on the adjusted false recognition scores for the critical consistent and 
control literal lures using the “high-threshold correction procedure,” as employed by 
Gallo and Roediger (2002), Gallo, Roediger, and McDermott (2001), Schacter, 
Verfaellie, and Pradere (1996), and Seamon, Luo, and Gallo (1998; see also Gallo, 2006, 
p. 31-32). The procedure is described in Appendix K. 
5.3.1.1.2 Final recognition test 
The proportion of false recognition for the four unrelated lure types for the final 
recognition test is displayed in Table 5.3 (see Appendix J for a full breakdown of 
remember, know, and guess judgments for the unrelated lures). 
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Table 5.3. Proportion of false recognition for unrelated lures by lure type, repetition 
(previously tested or untested), and attention conditions for the final recognition test in 
Chapter 5. 
Previously 
tested 
Attention 
at study 
Attention 
at test 
Lure Type Old 
Yes Full Full Crit CM .49(.51) 
   Crit consistent .38(.42) 
   Cont metaphor .33(.42) 
   Cont literal .36(.40) 
   Total .39(.33) 
  Divided Crit CM .38(.49) 
   Crit consistent .35(.38) 
   Cont metaphor .36(.36) 
   Cont literal .25(.36) 
   Total .33(.27) 
 Divided Full Crit CM .54(.51) 
   Crit consistent .58(.34) 
   Cont metaphor .50(.38) 
   Cont literal .33(.37) 
   Total .49(.27) 
  Divided Crit CM .53(.51) 
   Crit consistent .45(.39) 
   Cont metaphor .46(.43) 
   Cont literal .45(.39) 
   Total .47(.31) 
No Full Full Crit consistent .05(.22) 
   Cont metaphor .10(.31) 
   Cont literal .08(.22) 
   Total .08(.20) 
  Divided Crit consistent .20(.41) 
   Cont metaphor .08(.27) 
   Cont literal .10(.26) 
   Total .13(.19) 
 Divided Full Crit consistent .15(.37) 
   Cont metaphor .28(.46) 
   Cont literal .13(.30) 
   Total .19(.26) 
  Divided Crit consistent .25(.44) 
   Cont metaphor .30(.46) 
   Cont literal .19(.33) 
   Total .25(.31) 
As there were no observations for non-repeated (not previously tested) unrelated critical 
CM lures, separate ANOVAs were conducted for the repeated and non-repeated lures. A 
2 (attention at study: full vs. divided) x 2 (attention at test: full vs. divided) x 4 (lure type) 
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ANOVA conducted on the previously tested lures revealed significant main effects of 
both lure type, F(2.61, 401.53) = 4.24, p = .008, ηₚ² = .03, and attention at study, F(1, 
154) = 6.17, p = .014, ηₚ² = .04, the latter of which was driven by a higher overall 
proportion of false recognition for divided attention (.48) than full attention (.36). None 
of the other main effects nor interactions reached significance, all F’s < 1.9, p’s > .1. 
The main effect for lure type was examined further. Least significance difference posthoc 
tests revealed that both the critical consistent (.44) and critical CM lures (.48) had a 
significantly higher proportion of false recognition than the control literal lures (.35), 
both p’s < .01. As such, adjusted false recognition proportions will also be compared for 
these lure types in the main analyses. 
A 2 (attention at study: full vs. divided) x 2 (attention at test: full vs. divided) x 3 (lure 
type) ANOVA on the non-repeated lures revealed a significant main effect of attention at 
study, F(1, 154) = 8.78, p = .004, ηₚ² = .05, as the proportion of false recognition was 
higher for divided attention (.22) than full attention (.10). None of the other main effects 
nor interactions were reliable, all F’s < 2.5, p’s > .05, and critically, there was no 
significant main effect of lure type, F(1.87, 288.01) = 1.99, p = .142. Therefore, the non-
repeated lures can be compared directly in the main false recognition analyses without 
requiring adjusted proportions.  
5.3.1.2 Correct vs. false recognition 
5.3.1.2.1 Initial recognition tests 
The proportion of correct recognition and false alarms for unrelated lures by attention 
conditions are displayed in Table 5.4. 
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Table 5.4. Proportion of items categorized as old for both presented items (correct 
recognitions) and unrelated lures (false alarms) by attention at study and test. 
Item Type Study attention Test attention Proportion 
categorized as Old 
Presented Full Full .87(.09) 
  Divided .77(.14) 
 Divided Full .69(.12) 
  Divided .74(.12) 
Unrelated Full Full .12(.16) 
  Divided .10(.16) 
 Divided Full .25(.20) 
  Divided .30(.25) 
A 2 (attention at study: full vs. divided) x 2 (attention at test: full vs. divided) x 2 (item 
type: presented vs. unrelated lure) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of item 
type, F(1, 154) = 1052.60, p < .001, ηₚ² = .87, as, unsurprisingly, presented items were 
more often categorized as old than unrelated lures (.77 vs. .19, respectively). More 
critically, there was a significant interaction between attention at study and item type, 
F(1, 154) = 57.57, p < .001, ηₚ² = .27, as dividing attention decreased correct recognition 
(.82 vs. .71) but increased false alarms (.11 vs. .28). This indicates that dividing attention 
at study has a strong negative influence on recognition performance. The only other 
interaction that reached significance was the interaction between attention at study and 
attention at test, F(1, 154) = 8.25, p = .005, ηₚ² = .05. This interaction suggests that when 
there was a match between study and test in terms of attention (e.g., full-full or divided-
divided), participants were more likely to categorize items as old, regardless of item type, 
than when there was a mismatch (e.g., full-divided or divided-full). None of the other 
interactions reached significance, which suggests that unlike dividing attention at study, 
dividing attention at test did not have detrimental effects on recognition performance in 
this task.  
The percentage of correct recognitions attributed remember, know, and guess judgments 
by attention conditions is displayed in Table 5.5. 
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Table 5.5. Percentage of items attributed remember, know, and guess responses within 
correctly recognized items for the initial recognition tests of Chapter 5. Percentages are 
presented by attention conditions at study and test. 
Attention at study Attention at test % R % K % G 
Full Full 66% 22% 12% 
 Divided 77% 15% 8% 
 Total 71% 19% 10% 
Divided Full 39% 32% 29% 
 Divided 50% 28% 22% 
 Total 45% 30% 25% 
Total Full 54% 27% 19% 
 Divided 64% 21% 15% 
 Total 59% 24% 17% 
Separate 2 (attention: divided vs. full) x 3 (remember, know, or guess) chi-square tests 
were conducted to examine the effects of dividing attention at study (collapsed across 
attention at test) and dividing attention at test (collapsed across attention at study). Both 
chi-square tests were significant, ꭓ²(2)’s > 41, p’s < .001, and in both cases, all six cells 
deviated significantly from expected values (all z’s > 3.8, p’s < .001). Dividing attention 
at study significantly decreased the percentage of remember judgments but increased the 
percentage of know and guess judgments. In contrast, divided attention at test 
significantly increased the percentage of remember judgments and decreased the 
percentage of know and guess judgments. These findings will be considered further in the 
Discussion.  
5.3.1.2.2 Final recognition test 
The proportion of items categorized as old for presented items (correct recognition) and 
unrelated lures (false alarms) on the final recognition test are displayed in Table 5.6. 
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Table 5.6. Proportion of items categorized as old for both presented items (correct 
recognition) and unrelated lures (false alarms) for the final recognition test in Chapter 5. 
Proportions are presented by repetition (previously tested vs. untested), and attention 
conditions (full vs. divided) at study and test. 
Item type Repeated Study attention Test attention Proportion categorized as old 
Presented Yes Full Full .81(.19) 
   Divided .76(.13) 
  Divided Full .68(.15) 
   Divided .70(.16) 
 No Full Full .65(.20) 
   Divided .64(.18) 
  Divided Full .41(.20) 
   Divided .51(.21) 
Unrelated lure Yes Full Full .38(.33) 
   Divided .33(.26) 
  Divided Full .48(.27) 
   Divided .46(.30) 
 No Full Full .08(.20) 
   Divided .12(.19) 
  Divided Full .17(.25) 
   Divided .23(.30) 
A 2 (attention at study: full vs. divided) x 2 (attention at test: full vs. divided) x 2 
(repeated: yes vs. no) x 2 (item type: presented vs. unrelated lure) ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect of item type, F(1, 154) = 434.63, p < .001, ηₚ² = .74, as the 
presented items were more often categorized as “old” than the unrelated lures (.65 vs. .28, 
respectively). There was also a significant main effect of repetition, F(1, 154) = 260.72, p 
< .001, ηₚ² = .63, as previously tested items were more likely to be categorized as “old” 
than previously untested items (.57 vs. .35, respectively). There was a significant 
interaction between attention at study and item type, F(1, 154) = 52.58, p < .001, ηₚ² = 
.25. Dividing attention decreased correct recognition of presented items (full: .72; 
divided: .57) but increased false alarms for unrelated lures (full: .23; divided: .34). There 
was also a significant interaction between attention at test and repetition, F(1, 154) = 
6.72, p = .010, ηₚ² = .04. Dividing attention at test decreased the proportion of repeated 
items categorized as old (.59 vs .56) but increased the proportion of non-repeated items 
categorized as old (.33 vs. .38). Finally, there was an interaction between item type and 
repetition, F(1, 154) = 13.27, p < .001, ηₚ² = .08. Repetition caused a greater increase in 
the proportion of items categorized as old for unrelated lures (.15 vs. .41; a .26 increase) 
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than for presented items (.55 vs. .74, a .18 increase [some discrepancy due to rounding]). 
None of the other main effects, nor interactions reached significance, all F’s < 3.5, p’s > 
.05.   
5.3.1.2.3 Phenomenological experience of correct recognition 
for final recognition test 
The percentage of remember, know, and guess judgments within correct recognitions by 
attention conditions for the final recognition test are displayed in Table 5.7. 
Table 5.7. Percentage of items attributed remember, know, and guess responses within 
correctly recognized items for the final recognition test in Chapter 5. Percentages are 
presented by attention conditions at study and test. 
Attention at study Attention at test % R % K % G 
Full Full 59% 24% 17% 
 Divided 67% 20% 13% 
 Total 63% 22% 15% 
Divided Full 30% 33% 38% 
 Divided 41% 30% 29% 
 Total 36% 31% 33% 
Total Full 46% 28% 26% 
 Divided 55% 25% 20% 
 Total 51% 26% 23% 
Similar chi-square tests as conducted for the initial recognition tests revealed significant 
effects of attention at both study and test, both ꭓ²(2)’s > 47, p’s < .001. At study, divided 
attention significantly decreased the percentage of remember judgments and increased the 
percentage of know and guess judgments (all z’s > 8.0, p’s < .001). At test, divided 
attention significantly increased the percentage of remember judgments and decreased the 
percentage of guess judgments (z’s > 5.4, p’s < .001).  
5.3.2 Main analysis 
5.3.2.1 Initial recognition tests 
The proportion of false recognition, as well as proportions remembered, known, and 
guessed, for the five different lure types by attention conditions is displayed in Table 5.8. 
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Table 5.8. Proportion of false recognition and remember (R), Know (K), and Guess (G) 
judgments for the initial recognition tests in Chapter 5. Proportions are presented by 
attention conditions (full vs. divided) at study and test and by lure type. 
Attention 
at study 
Attention 
at test 
Item type Old R K G 
Full Full Crit CM .22(.34) .06(.20) .04(.13) .12(.27) 
  Crit consistent .29(.24) .06(.12) .11(.13) .13(.15) 
  Cont metaphor .18(.22) .04(.08) .03(.08) .11(.15) 
  Cont literal .18(.20) .04(.09) .03(.06) .11(.13) 
  Unrelated .12(.16) .02(.05) .04(.10) .07(.10) 
  Total .20(.19) .04(.08) .05(.06) .11(.12) 
 Divided Crit CM .35(.36) .14(.28) .10(.20) .11(.21) 
  Crit consistent .33(.23) .14(.17) .09(.13) .10(.15) 
  Cont metaphor .20(.20) .09(.14) .03(.07) .08(.10) 
  Cont literal .16(.19) .07(.12) .03(.07) .07(.10) 
  Unrelated .10(.16) .06(.14) .02(.05) .03(.05) 
  Total .23(.16) .10(.12) .05(.07) .08(.08) 
Divided Full Crit CM .36(.36) .05(.15) .18(.29) .13(.25) 
  Crit consistent .54(.22) .09(.13) .16(.15) .29(.16) 
  Cont metaphor .38(.24) .07(.12) .13(.15) .18(.16) 
  Cont literal .36(.26) .03(.06) .17(.20) .15(.15) 
  Unrelated .25(.20) .02(.06) .09(.12) .14(.13) 
  Total .38(.19) .05(.07) .15(.13) .18(.11) 
 Divided Crit CM .44(.38) .16(.26) .16(.26) .11(.21) 
  Crit consistent .52(.26) .17(.18) .18(.18) .18(.14) 
  Cont metaphor .43(.25) .14(.17) .14(.15) .15(.16) 
  Cont literal .36(.24) .09(.14) .10(.13) .17(.17) 
  Unrelated .30(.25) .04(.09) .11(.14) .14(.14) 
  Total .41(.20) .12(.13) .14(.12) .15(.09) 
A 2 (attention at study: full vs. divided) by 2 (attention at test: full vs. divided) x 5 (lure 
type) ANOVA revealed significant main effects of lure type, F(2.76, 424.45) = 30.55, p < 
.001, ηₚ² = .17, and attention at study, F(1, 154) = 35.15, p < .001, ηₚ² = .19, the latter of 
which was driven by a higher proportion of false recognition overall when, relative to full 
attention, attention was divided (.39 vs. .21 respectively). None of the other main effects 
or interactions reached significance (all F’s < 2.1, p’s > .1). Critically, the lack of 
significant interactions suggests that attention, either at study or test, did not influence the 
pattern of false recognition. 
Planned t-test comparisons were conducted within each of the four combinations of 
attention (full-full, full-divided, divided-full, and divided-divided) to compare false 
recognition proportions for the critical lures against the control lures (alpha = .025). In all 
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four combinations, the critical consistent lures were falsely recognized more often than 
the three control lures, all t’s > 2.3, p’s < .025. In contrast, the critical CM lures only 
differed from the three controls when attention was full at study but divided at test, all 
t(39)’s > 2.6, p’s < .02. In all other combinations, the critical CM lures did not differ 
significantly from either the control metaphor or literal lures (t’s < 2.3, p’s > .025). In 
summary, the conceptual metaphor false memory effect replicated under both divided and 
full attention conditions for the critical consistent lures.  
5.3.2.1.1 Adjusted comparisons 
Because the critical consistent and control literal lures differed in baseline false 
recognition, these two lure types were compared using adjusted false recognition values 
(see Appendix K for more details). A 2 (attention at study: full vs. divided) x 2 (attention 
at test: full vs. divided) x 2 (lure type: critical consistent vs. control literal) ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of lure type, F(1, 154) = 6.40, p = .012, ηₚ² = .04, as the 
critical consistent lures had a higher proportion of false recognition than the control 
literal lures even after adjustments (.18 vs. .13 respectively). There was also a significant 
main effect of attention at study, F(1, 154) = 40.24, p < .001, ηₚ² = .21, as the proportion 
of false recognition was significantly higher under divided attention (.25) than full 
attention (.05). None of the other main effects nor interactions reached significance, all 
F’s < 1.2, p’s > .2.  
Simple t-tests were conducted to examine whether the critical consistent lures were 
falsely recognized more often than the control literal lures in each of the four attention 
combinations after adjustments. The difference did not reach significance in any of the 
individual combinations, all t’s < 1.8, p’s > .05. Therefore, the difference between the 
critical consistent lures and control literal lures was only significant when examining 
across all four conditions, but the difference was not robust within any single condition 
on its own.  
90 
 
5.3.2.1.2 Phenomenological experience of false recognition 
The percentage of remember, know, and guess judgments within correct recognitions of 
actual old items and false recognitions of lures by attention conditions are displayed in 
Table 5.9. 
Table 5.9. Percentage of items attributed remember, know, and guess judgments within 
correct or false recognitions for the initial recognition tests in Chapter 5. Percentages are 
presented by attention conditions (full vs. divided) at study and test and by item type. 
Attention 
at Study 
Attention 
at Test 
Item Type  % R % K % G 
Full Full Old 
 
66% 22% 12% 
  Crit CM 29% 18% 53% 
  Crit consistent 20% 37% 43% 
  Cont metaphor 21% 18% 61% 
  Cont literal 25% 18% 58% 
  Unrelated 15% 30% 55% 
  Total false recognition 21% 26% 53% 
 Divided Old 
 
77% 15% 8% 
  Crit CM 39% 29% 32% 
  Crit consistent 43% 26% 31% 
  Cont metaphor 44% 17% 39% 
  Cont literal 42% 17% 40% 
  Unrelated 59% 17% 24% 
  Total false recognition 44% 22% 34% 
Divided Full Old 
 
39% 32% 29% 
  Crit CM 14% 50% 36% 
  Crit consistent 16% 29% 54% 
  Cont metaphor 19% 33% 48% 
  Cont literal 9% 48% 43% 
  Unrelated 7% 36% 57% 
  Total false recognition 14% 37% 49% 
 Divided Old 
 
50% 28% 22% 
  Crit CM 37% 37% 26% 
  Crit consistent 33% 34% 34% 
  Cont metaphor 32% 32% 35% 
  Cont literal 26% 28% 46% 
  Unrelated 13% 39% 48% 
  Total false recognition 28% 33% 38% 
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Separate 3 (remember, know, or guess) x 5 (lure type) chi-square tests were conducted 
within each of the attention combinations (alpha = .0125 for four tests). None of the chi-
square tests reached significance [all ꭓ²(8)’s < 20.0, p’s > .0125].  
Separate 2 (correct vs. overall false recognition) by 3 (remember, know, or guess) chi-
square tests were also conducted within the four attention combinations to compare 
correct and false recognition. All four tests were significant, ꭓ²(2)’s > 75.0, p’s < .001. In 
all combinations, false recognitions were attributed a higher percentage of guess 
responses and a lower percentage of remember responses than correct recognitions (all 
z’s > 6.8, p’s < .001). Additionally, in the divided attention at test only condition, false 
recognitions were attributed a higher percentage of know responses than correct 
recognitions, but the difference was only marginally significant, z’s = 2.64, p’s = .008 
(alpha = .008 for six cells). In the other three attention combinations, the know cells did 
not deviate significantly from expected values, all z’s < 2.2, p’s > .03.  
5.3.2.2 Final recognition test 
The proportion of false recognition for the five lure types by attention conditions and 
repetition (previously tested vs. untested) is displayed in Table 5.10.   
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Table 5.10. Proportion of false recognition and remember (R), Know (K), and Guess (G) 
judgments for the final recognition test in Chapter 5. Proportions are presented by 
repetition (previously tested vs. untested), attention conditions (full vs. divided) at study 
and test, and lure type. 
Previously 
tested 
Attention 
at study 
Attention 
at test 
Lure Type Old R K G 
Yes Full Full Crit CM .47(.41) .23(.38) .14(.26) .10(.26) 
   Crit consistent .61(.28) .25(.29) .16(.18) .19(.17) 
   Cont metaphor .45(.32) .20(.27) .14(.15) .11(.11) 
   Cont literal .36(.31) .13(.23) .11(.17) .12(.18) 
   Unrelated .38(.33) .13(.23) .12(.17) .12(.15) 
   Total .45(.28) .19(.25) .13(.13) .13(.13) 
  Divided Crit CM .64(.34) .30(.41) .19(.31) .15(.23) 
   Crit consistent .60(.25) .28(.25) .13(.14) .18(.19) 
   Cont metaphor .42(.22) .22(.20) .10(.14) .10(.13) 
   Cont literal .29(.26) .14(.22) .05(.09) .10(.15) 
   Unrelated .33(.26) .12(.19) .08(.14) .13(.15) 
   Total .46(.18) .21(.20) .11(.10) .13(.11) 
 Divided Full Crit CM .54(.42) .10(.23) .23(.32) .21(.34) 
   Crit consistent .73(.20) .13(.18) .31(.25) .29(.22) 
   Cont metaphor .58(.23) .14(.18) .20(.18) .24(.18) 
   Cont literal .47(.23) .08(.14) .16(.16) .24(.17) 
   Unrelated .48(.27) .11(.18) .13(.14) .23(.20) 
   Total .56(.19) .11(.14) .21(.14) .24(.13) 
  Divided Crit CM .73(.28) .24(.32) .23(.30) .26(.34) 
   Crit consistent .69(.23) .25(.22) .22(.19) .22(.23) 
   Cont metaphor .64(.21) .21(.20) .22(.14) .22(.18) 
   Cont literal .50(.27) .13(.16) .16(.17) .20(.18) 
   Unrelated .46(.30) .14(.20) .11(.14) .21(.21) 
   Total .60(.18) .19(.18) .19(.11) .22(.16) 
No Full Full Crit CM .27(.38) .05(.15) .04(.13) .18(.31) 
   Crit consistent .26(.26) .06(.13) .06(.12) .13(.21) 
   Cont metaphor .17(.24) .03(.10) .03(.08) .12(.18) 
   Cont literal .08(.16) .01(.05) .00(.02) .07(.15) 
   Unrelated .08(.20) .03(.11) .00(.00) .05(.13) 
   Total .17(.19) .03(.09) .03(.04) .11(.13) 
  Divided Crit CM .30(.35) .15(.28) .00(.00) .15(.26) 
   Crit consistent .46(.29) .18(.27) .10(.18) .18(.24) 
   Cont metaphor .18(.23) .08(.20) .03(.08) .07(.13) 
   Cont literal .11(.19) .07(.16) .02(.05) .03(.08) 
   Unrelated .12(.19) .04(.11) .01(.04) .08(.14) 
   Total .24(.17) .10(.16) .03(.05) .10(.10) 
 Divided Full Crit CM .33(.37) .08(.24) .14(.26) .12(.24) 
   Crit consistent .33(.25) .04(.10) .12(.18) .16(.21) 
   Cont metaphor .23(.25) .03(.08) .04(.11) .17(.21) 
   Cont literal .16(.19) .01(.03) .04(.08) .11(.15) 
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   Unrelated .17(.25) .02(.07) .03(.08) .12(.22) 
   Total .24(.17) .03(.07) .08(.08) .13(.14) 
  Divided Crit CM .44(.40) .14(.28) .11(.21) .19(.27) 
   Crit consistent .42(.29) .13(.21) .09(.14) .21(.20) 
   Cont metaphor .26(.27) .04(.15) .08(.18) .13(.22) 
   Cont literal .23(.25) .05(.13) .07(.08) .12(.18) 
   Unrelated .23(.30) .07(.20) .06(.14) .11(.20) 
   Total .32(.23) .08(.16) .08(.09) .15(.14) 
A 2 (attention at study: full vs. divided) x 2 (attention at test: full vs. divided) x 2 
(repeated: yes vs. no) x 5 (lure type) ANOVA revealed significant main effects of 
attention at study [F(1, 154) = 12.45, p < .001, ηₚ² = .07] and repetition [F(1, 154) = 
371.69, p < .001, ηₚ² = .71] as false recognition was higher overall under divided 
attention and for repeated lures. There was also a main effect of lure type, F(2.88, 
443.97) = 72.05, p < .001, ηₚ² = .32, and a significant interaction between attention at test 
and lure type, F(2.88, 443.97) = 3.67, p = .013, ηₚ² = .02. The interaction seemed to be 
due to divided attention at test increasing false recognition for the critical CM lures (.40 
to .53, a .12 increase [discrepancy due to rounding]) and the critical consistent lures (.48 
to .54, a .6 increase) to a greater extent than for the control metaphor (.36 to .37, a .02 
increase [discrepancy due to rounding]), control literal (.27 to .28, a .01 increase) and 
unrelated lures (.28 to .29, a .01 increase). Simple t-tests comparing across test conditions 
(and using the false recognition proportions averaged between repeated and non-repeated 
items) revealed that this increase was only significant for the critical CM lures, 
t(149.67)16 = 2.62, p = .01, but was not significant for any of the other types of lures, all 
t’s < 1.9, p’s > .05. There was also a significant three-way interaction between study at 
test, repetition, and lure type, F(2.81, 432.82) = 4.93, p = .003, ηₚ² = .03. This interaction 
is more difficult to interpret, but it suggests that attention at test and repetition interacted 
differently depending on the lure type.  
Planned t-tests were conducted to compare each critical lure against the three control 
lures within each of the combinations of attention and repetition (alpha = .025). In six of 
 
16 Levene’s test indicated unequal variances, F = 6.67, p = .011, therefore, the degrees of 
freedom were adjusted.  
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the eight combination, the critical consistent lures were falsely recognized significantly 
more often than all three controls (t’s > 3.7, p’s < .001). The two exceptions were that the 
critical consistent lures did not differ significantly from the control metaphor lures for 
repeated lures with divided attention at both study and test [t(39) = 1.03, p = .308] and for 
non-repeated lures with full attention at both study and test [t(38) = 1.92, p = .062]. Even 
in these cases, the differences were treading in the predicted direction and the critical 
consistent lures were falsely recognized significantly more often than the other two 
control lures (t’s > 4.6, p’s < .001). In contrast, the critical CM lures only differed 
significantly from all three controls in two combinations: repeated lures with divided 
attention at test only [t(39)’s > 3.9, p’s < .001] and non-repeated lures with divided 
attention at study and test [t(39)’s > 2.9, p’s < .01]. In all other combinations, the critical 
CM lures did not differ significantly from the control metaphor lures, t’s < 2.3, p’s > .03.  
5.3.2.2.1 Adjusted comparisons 
A 2 (attention at study: full vs. divided) x 2 (attention at test: full vs. divided) x 2 (lure 
type: critical consistent vs. control literal) ANOVA was conducted on the adjusted 
proportions of false recognition for the repeated critical consistent and control metaphor 
lures (see Appendix K for more detail about the adjustment procedure employed). There 
was a significant main effect of attention at study, F(1, 154) = 14.42, p < .001, ηₚ² = .09, 
as the overall proportion of false recognition was higher under divided attention (.20) 
than under full attention conditions at study (.07). More critically, there was a significant 
main effect of lure type, F(1, 154) = 55.31, p < .001, ηₚ² = .26, as the critical consistent 
lures had a higher proportion of false recognition than the control literal lures even after 
adjustments (.22 vs. .06). None of the other main effects or interactions reached 
significance, all F’s < 2.1, p’s > .15. In all four combinations of attention, the critical 
consistent lures were falsely recognized more often than the control literal lures, all t’s > 
2.4, p’s < .025.  
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5.3.2.2.2 Phenomenological experience of false recognition 
The percentage of remember, know, and guess judgments within correct recognitions of 
actual old items and false recognitions of lures for the final recognition test are displayed 
in Table 5.11. 
Table 5.11. Percentage of items attributed remember, know, and guess judgments within 
correct or false recognitions for the final recognition test in Chapter 5. Percentages are 
presented by repetition (previously tested vs. untested), attention conditions (full vs. 
divided) at study and test, and item type. 
Previously 
tested 
Attention 
at study 
Attention 
at test 
Item type % R % K % G 
Yes Full Full Old (actual presented) 
 
64%* 21%* 15%* 
   Crit CM 49% 30% 22% 
   Crit consistent 41% 27% 32% 
   Cont metaphor 44% 31% 25% 
   Cont literal 37% 30% 33% 
   Unrelated 35% 32% 33% 
   Total false recognition 40%* 30%* 30%* 
  Divided Old (actual presented) 
 
69%* 19% 12%* 
   Crit CM 47% 29% 24% 
   Crit consistent 47% 22% 31% 
   Cont metaphor 53% 23% 24% 
   Cont literal 48% 17% 35% 
   Unrelated 36% 25% 39% 
   Total false recognition 47%* 23% 31%* 
 Divided Full Old (actual presented) 
 
32%* 34% 34%* 
   Crit CM 19% 43% 38% 
   Crit consistent 18% 43% 40% 
   Cont metaphor 24% 34% 42% 
   Cont literal 16% 34% 50% 
   Unrelated 24% 27% 49% 
   Total false recognition 20%* 36% 44%* 
  Divided Old (actual presented) 
 
44%* 30% 26%* 
   Crit CM 33% 31% 36% 
   Crit consistent 36% 32% 32% 
   Cont metaphor 33% 33% 34% 
   Cont literal 26% 33% 41% 
   Unrelated 31% 24% 45% 
   Total false recognition 32%* 31% 37%* 
No Full Full Old (actual presented) 50%* 29%* 22%* 
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   Crit CM 19% 14% 67% 
   Crit consistent 23% 25% 53% 
   Cont metaphor 15% 15% 70% 
   Cont literal 15% 4% 81% 
   Unrelated 33% 0% 67% 
   Total false recognition 20%* 14%* 66%* 
  Divided Old (actual presented) 
 
64%* 23% 13%* 
   Crit CM 50% 0% 50% 
   Crit consistent 39% 22% 39% 
   Cont metaphor 45% 17% 38% 
   Cont literal 61% 14% 25% 
   Unrelated 32% 5% 63% 
   Total false recognition 45%* 15% 40%* 
 Divided Full Old (actual presented) 
 
23%* 28% 49% 
   Crit CM 23% 42% 35% 
   Crit consistent 14% 37% 49% 
   Cont metaphor 11% 17% 72% 
   Cont literal 4% 28% 68% 
   Unrelated 11% 19% 70% 
   Total false recognition 12%* 29% 59% 
  Divided Old (actual presented) 
 
34% 32% 34%* 
   Crit CM 31% 26% 43% 
   Crit consistent 30% 21% 49% 
   Cont metaphor 17% 32% 51% 
   Cont literal 20% 30% 50% 
   Unrelated 30% 24% 46% 
   Total false recognition 25% 26% 48%* 
*Percentage deviates significantly from expected value (p < .008).  
Separate 3 (remember, know, or guess) x 5 (lure type) chi-square tests were conducted 
within each of the eight combinations of attention at study, attention at test, and repetition 
(alpha = .006 for eight tests). None of the chi-square tests reached significance, all ꭓ²(8) < 
17.2, p’s > .02.  
Separate 2 (correct vs. false recognition) x 3 (remember, know, or guess) chi-square tests 
were also conducted within the different combinations (alpha = .006). In all eight cases, 
the chi-square test was significant, all ꭓ²(2)’s > 11.0, p’s < .005. The cells that deviated 
significantly from expected values in the posthoc analyses (alpha = .008) are marked with 
a ‘*’ in Table 5.14 above.  
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Within repeated items, a consistent pattern emerged across all combinations: false 
recognitions were attributed a significantly higher percentage of guess responses and a 
significantly lower percentage of remember responses (z’s > 4.1, p’s < .001). Within 
repeated items under full attention at both test and study, false recognitions were also 
attributed a significantly higher percentage of know responses than was observed for 
correct recognitions, z’s = 3.80, p’s < .001.  
For non-repeated items, a different pattern emerged for each attention combination. 
When attention was full at study and test, false recognitions were attributed a 
significantly higher percentage of guess responses and a significantly lower percentage of 
both remember and know responses than correct recognitions, z’s > 3.3, p’s < 001. 
Within the divided attention at test only condition, false recognitions were attributed a 
significantly higher percentage of guess responses and a significantly lower percentage of 
remember responses than correct recognitions, z’s > 4.5, p’s < .001. Within the divided 
attention at study only condition, false recognitions were attributed a significantly lower 
percentage of remember responses than correct recognitions, z’s = 3.23, p = .001. Finally, 
for divided attention at both study and test, false recognitions were attributed a 
significantly higher percentage of guess responses than correct recognitions, z’s = 3.57, 
p’s < .001. 
5.4 Discussion 
The purpose of Chapter 5 was to replicate the findings from the previous chapters and 
also extend the study to determine if dividing attention at test would eliminate the 
conceptual metaphor false memory effect. Interpretation of the results was more 
complicated than in the previous chapters because there were differences in the 
proportion of false recognition for the lure types at baseline, that is, when the lures were 
unrelated to the study lists. Nonetheless, even after making adjustments, across the entire 
study there was still evidence of a conceptual metaphor false memory effect. Importantly, 
the effect was not eliminated by dividing attention at either study or test. On the initial 
recognition tests, the critical consistent lures were falsely recognized more often than the 
control metaphor lures and unrelated lures in all attention conditions, and were falsely 
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recognized more often than the control literal lures over the whole experiment, even after 
adjusting for the difference between these lures in baseline false recognition.  
On the other hand, after adjusting for the difference in baseline false recognition between 
the critical consistent and control literal lures, the difference in false recognition did not 
reach significance in any of the four attention conditions (full-full, full-divided, divided-
full, and divided-divided) on their own, but only when all four conditions were analysed 
together. However, each of these conditions alone was only a quarter of the data, which 
reduces the statistical power substantially. Critically, there were no interactions with 
attention at either study or test, which suggests that dividing attention did not attenuate 
the conceptual metaphor false memory effect. Therefore, taken together, this study 
provides further evidence that conceptual metaphors activate and influence memory 
automatically, both at encoding (study) and retrieval (test).  
On the final recognition test, across all combinations of repetition and attention the 
critical consistent lures were falsely recognized more often than the control literal lures 
(even after adjustments) and the unrelated lures. In 6 of the 8 combinations, the critical 
consistent lures were falsely recognized more often than the control metaphor lures, and 
only for repeated lures with divided attention at both test and study, and for non-repeated 
lures with full attention at test and study did the contrasts not reach significance (and 
even in these cases, the differences were trending in the predicted direction). There was 
an interaction between attention at test and lure type on the final recognition test, due to 
an increase in false recognition for the critical CM lures when attention was divided. 
Arguably, this last finding is due to divided attention hindering participants’ ability to 
reject these lures based on their surface form. These lures use an “A is B” format and 
contain fewer words on average than the study list items which may be cues to reject 
these items as “old”. Dividing attention may hinder participants’ ability to use these cues, 
leading to higher levels of false recognition. Importantly, there was no evidence that 
dividing attention at test diminished the conceptual metaphor false memory effect. Taken 
together, this chapter further replicates the conceptual metaphor false memory effect and 
provides additional evidence that the effect does not depend on conscious, strategic 
processing at either encoding or retrieval.  
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5.4.1 Phenomenological experience of recognition 
Overall, there was no consistent pattern for the “remember, know, and guess” 
percentages within false recognitions for the different lure types. Therefore, it seems that 
when the lures actually are falsely recognized, there is no special status for the critical 
consistent lures in the R/K/G percentages. For instance, these lures do not have a higher 
percentage of recollection (R) or familiarity (K) than the falsely recognized lures from 
the other lure types. The R/K/G judgments were included as exploratory since CMT 
makes no predictions on whether conceptual metaphor activation should primarily 
influence recollection or familiarity. That being said, the critical consistent lures always 
have less “remember” judgments than they do combined “know” and “guess” judgments. 
This suggests that most of the time the lures induce feelings of familiarity, rather than a 
quasi-sensory experience of recollection. This finding is consistent with both processing 
fluency (Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989) and fuzzy-trace theory explanations (Brainerd & 
Reyna, 2005) of false memory as both theories suggest that false memories are based 
primarily on familiarity. Furthermore, familiarity is thought to be more automatic 
whereas recollection is thought to involve more effortful processing (Yonelinas, 2002). 
Therefore, the high rates of familiarity indicated by “know” and “guess” responses 
further support the automatic activation of conceptual metaphors, albeit indirectly.  
One additional finding for correctly recognized items was that the percentage of 
“remember” judgments decreased when attention was divided at study but increased 
when attention was divided at test. Although seemingly contradictory, Knott and 
Dewhurst (2007) obtained similar findings. They suggest that at test, “remember” 
judgments can be made rapidly whereas “know” judgments require postretrieval 
decisions that are disrupted by divided attention. Arguably, the same might be happening 
with the processing of the metaphor lists. 
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Chapter 6  
6 General discussion 
The purpose of this thesis was to empirically investigate the psychological reality of 
conceptual metaphors by testing whether reading a list of expressions based on a 
presumed conceptual metaphor would activate other non-presented expressions of that 
metaphor. Across all four experiments, it was found that this was the case: participants 
consistently falsely recognized metaphorically related expressions more often than 
topically related control expressions. The control lures were related in terms of either the 
target domain (control metaphor) or source domain (control literal) and were about 
equally related to the study list expressions in terms of word-based similarity. The 
findings are thus completely consistent with the argument that the conceptual metaphor 
false memory effect depends upon the expression using the same source-to-target 
metaphor mapping. More generally, the findings support the claim (Gibbs, 1996, 2011, 
2013) that conceptual metaphors are indeed psychologically real and influence cognition. 
The secondary purpose was to examine another controversial question: Do conceptual 
metaphors influence memory automatically and unconsciously? This was examined here 
using both direct and indirect measures and converging evidence indicates that 
conceptual metaphor activation is automatic. In Chapter 3, although participants rarely 
reported consciously attending to source-to-target metaphor mappings, the results from 
the recognition tests clearly replicated the conceptual metaphor false memory effect 
found in Reid & Katz (2018a). Furthermore, in Chapters 4 and 5, dividing attention did 
not diminish the conceptual metaphor false memory effect. These results taken together 
strongly suggest that conceptual metaphor activation is automatic and unconscious. This 
is consistent with the original CMT (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1993) and is also 
consistent with the finding from Katz and Law (2010) that giving participants hints about 
the metaphorical nature of the to-be-remembered expressions (and thus, bringing 
conscious attention to the metaphor mappings) did not increase memory performance, but 
in fact, hindered performance.  
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In general, the findings from the current set of studies align with previous research that 
strongly suggests the traditional word-based DRM false memory effect is automatic. 
Along with findings that the effect still occurs under divided attention (Knott & 
Dewhurst, 2007; Pimentel & Albuquerque, 2013), it also occurs when participants are 
warned that the purpose of the study is to induce a false memory (Gallo, Roberts, & 
Seamon, 1997; Gallo, Roediger, & McDermott, 2001; McDermott & Roediger, 1998; 
Multhaup & Conner, 2002) and when study list words are presented rapidly (20ms; 
Seamon, Luo, & Gallo, 1998; Kawasaki & Yama, 2006) such that the participant is not 
consciously aware of the words being presented. These findings suggest that false 
memories for critical lures in the DRM paradigm occur automatically and unconsciously, 
and that participants have difficulty resisting the memory illusion even when they are 
expecting it, at least with word list stimuli. The findings presented in this thesis indicating 
that the conceptual metaphor false memory effect occurs automatically and not 
consciously thus align nicely with the body of research examining the DRM effect. 
6.1 Implications for DRM research 
Most of the previous research on the DRM paradigm has focused on lists of words. The 
current study extends the DRM paradigm to full sentences, and furthermore, complex 
sentences involving figurative language. An analogous memory illusion was found by 
Bransford and Franks (1971) in which non-presented sentences were falsely recognized if 
they contained highly similar semantic content to the presented sentence. In that study, 
however, the sentence lures were much more obviously related and shared many of the 
same words. In the current study, the sentence lures were less related, not sharing as 
much overlap in terms of words, and the sentences were not all referring to the same 
event or occurrence. However, the sentences were related in terms of a deeper underlying 
meaning, in this case sharing a common cross-domain metaphorical mapping. Therefore, 
this finding extends previous research on false recognition for sentences by suggesting 
that even when sentences are fairly unrelated on the surface, they can still induce false 
recognition if they are based on the same metaphorical mapping.  
Although the goal of this thesis was not to test alternative false memory theories, I 
speculate on how three major theories, automatic spreading activation, processing 
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fluency, and fuzzy-trace theory, could accommodate the findings. Following this, I 
consider the findings from the “remember,” “know,” and “guess” judgments and how 
they may relate to CMT and DMT.  
6.1.1 Automatic Spreading Activation  
Roediger, Balota, and Watson (2001) suggest that the DRM effect is due to automatic 
associative activation and mainly focus on word-based similarity or associations, but in 
the current study, word-based similarity cannot fully account for the results. In fact, the 
critical and control lures did not differ significantly in terms of word similarity to their 
respective study lists, at least as measured in terms of a vector-based word model, which 
should tap into both similarity and association (Clark, 2015; Reid & Katz, 2018b). 
Therefore, it seems that false memory in the DRM paradigm can be elicited by factors 
beyond word similarity. In this case, it was elicited by metaphorical similarity.  
Automatic spreading activation could accommodate the current findings if metaphorical 
expressions are stored in semantic memory somewhat like words (e.g., Swinney & 
Cutler, 1979; see Nayak & Gibbs, 1990, for a review of these accounts). Similar to how 
nodes for related words are connected, nodes for expressions might also be connected 
when they are based on the same underlying conceptual metaphor. That is, expressions 
that use the same cross-domain mapping are likely stored in the same semantic memory 
structure, or at least these expressions are in closer proximity than expressions using 
different cross-domain mappings. By this account, activation could possibly spread 
between nodes for expressions as it does with nodes for words. I repeat this is speculation 
because expressions really have not been considered in the spreading activation literature, 
especially regarding DRM false memory effects. 
6.1.2 Processing Fluency 
Processing fluency and spreading activation explanations of false memory go hand-in-
hand as spreading activation results in fluent processing of related lures (Gallo & 
Roediger, 2003; Whittlesea, 2002). However, the critical difference is that processing 
fluency does not depend on metaphorical expressions being stored in semantic memory. 
Alternatively, conceptual metaphors may act more like schemas that help to organize and 
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interpret metaphorical expressions and the schema may be activated when a metaphorical 
expression is read. In other words, the expression itself is not retrieved from semantic 
memory, but the conceptual metaphor schema is employed to make sense of the 
expression. This would still lead to the same processing fluency advantage because if the 
schema is already activated from reading prior expressions, new expressions should be 
more readily processed. 
A processing fluency explanation could be tested using the paradigm employed by 
Whittlesea (2002), who had participants read DRM-type lists, but then make a lexical 
decision on the critical lure rather than a recognition judgment. Applied to the current 
study, participants would first read the study list expressions and then read related and 
unrelated critical consistent lure sentences. A processing fluency explanation would 
depend on the critical consistent lures being read faster when related to the study list than 
when unrelated. Some previous research has found that reading metaphor expressions 
based on the same conceptual metaphor facilitates processing of related expressions, but 
the findings are mixed, and either way, facilitated processing has not been confirmed 
with the stimuli employed in the current study. 
6.1.3 Fuzzy-trace theory 
Lastly, the conceptual metaphor false memory effect could be explained in terms of 
fuzzy-trace theory (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). Recall that this theory focuses on the 
“gist,” or the deeper theme or meaning of the to-be-remembered information. From this 
perspective, the “gist” of each study list would essentially be the underlying conceptual 
metaphor, and the critical consistent lures would be consistent with the “gist” of each list. 
Although some have argued that gist extraction likely relies on more effortful processing, 
and therefore, more conscious awareness than a spreading activation explanation 
(Carneiro, Garcia-Marques, Fernandez, & Albuquerque, 2014), Brainerd and colleagues 
(Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Brainerd, Forrest, Karibian, & Reyna, 2006) do not make any 
claims about whether gist extraction is conscious or unconscious. Therefore, a gist-based 
explanation for the findings from this set of studies accommodates the data nicely.  
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The purpose of this thesis was not to test alternative theories of false memory, but to test 
assumptions of CMT, so I do not make strong claims regarding which memory theory 
best supports the data. Overall, the three outlined theories all reasonably accommodate 
the findings.  
6.1.4 Remember, Know, and Guess Judgments 
Across Chapters 3, 4, and 5 in which the remember-know-guess procedure was 
employed, the results suggest that false recognitions of the critical consistent lures were 
attributed mostly to familiarity. Over all these chapters, the falsely recognized critical 
consistent lures never had a percentage of remember judgments above 50%, and the 
percentage of guess judgments was fairly high across all experiments, suggesting a 
weaker and less confident sense of familiarity (Hirshman, 1998). Although these data on 
their own cannot be used to confidently distinguish between CMT and DMT, when 
considered in light of the other findings from the strategy descriptions and divided 
attention manipulations, they further suggest that conceptual metaphors are activated 
automatically. Familiarity is considered to be the more unconscious and automatic type 
of memory whereas recollection is considered more effortful and intentional. Given the 
automaticity assumption of CMT, one would expect a greater degree of familiarity-based 
false recognitions. This is also consistent with the notion that conceptual metaphor 
activation facilitates processing of related expressions, as processing fluency primarily 
affects familiarity. In contrast, one may expect more false recollection if cross-domain 
mappings depend on conscious and deliberate processing, as proposed by DMT. I repeat 
that this cannot carry the argument for CMT over DMT; however, given the entirety of 
the data, the high percentage of false familiarity further supports the automaticity of 
conceptual metaphor activation. 
It should be noted that the low percentage of “remember” responses could also be due to 
methodological factors unrelated to CMT and DMT. For instance, full sentences were 
employed, and participants may have hesitated to use “remember” judgments if any 
single word in the lure sentence seemed unfamiliar. Full sentences also require a longer 
presentation duration (3 seconds) which is a factor known to weaken false recognition 
effects (McDermott & Watson, 2001) and potentially resulted in less false “remember” 
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judgments in the current study. At best, the “remember,” “know,” and “guess” judgments 
should be interpreted cautiously, but the data is consistent with the original CMT.  
6.2 Implications for CMT research 
These experiments provide a novel way of testing CMT and have demonstrated that 
conceptual metaphors play a role in episodic memory. As Murphy (1996) pointed out in 
his critique rejecting the claim that CMT is a realistic theory of conceptual representation, 
the influence of conceptual metaphors should be observable across the broad domains of 
cognitive psychology, such as memory, problem solving, and categorization. He 
rightfully pointed out that CMT research has not systematically explored these different 
areas. The studies reported here have extended the study of CMT into one of the domains 
proposed as important by Murphy, namely the implications of CMT on episodic memory 
tasks. 
To date, most of the cognitive (psychological) research on CMT falls under one of three 
broad categories: embodiment of concepts, metaphorical framing, and online 
comprehension. Each of these streams of research is valuable and has demonstrated 
compelling effects of metaphor in thought, though as reviewed below, each has issues for 
being a pure measure of the influence of conceptual metaphors on cognition.  
In terms of embodiment, it is not unique to CMT. Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings (2005) 
argue that abstract concepts can be embodied through direct experience rather than 
metaphorical mappings, and Holyoak and Stamenković (2018) argue embodied effects 
could be explained by polysemous words activating both physical embodied and abstract 
senses of words simultaneously. Although embodiment has been a fundamental aspect of 
CMT, some scholars have challenged the more rigid view that conceptual metaphors are 
always concrete source-to-abstract target mappings. Ortony (1988) argued that for many 
emotion metaphors (e.g., ANGER IS HEAT IN A CONTAINER, ANGER IS 
INSANITY), children would have experience with the emotion before they would have 
an understanding of the source domain that structures it. Source domains are presumed to 
supply information from easier understood and directly experienced concepts, yet to 
understand the various ANGER IS HEAT IN A CONTAINER metaphors (e.g., “he 
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flipped his lid”), one would need to know at least some information about physics (see 
also Murphy, 1996; Thibodeau & Durgin, 2008). However, it is unlikely that children’s 
knowledge of physics would precede their knowledge of anger. Therefore, in this case it 
seems that the target domain is the more easily understood and directly experienced 
domain, especially early in life. Gibbs (2018) has also argued that CMT has neglected 
abstract source-to-concrete target mappings, for instance, not only can JOURNEYS be 
used to conceptualize LIFE, but LIFE can also be a metaphor for a JOURNEY. 
Therefore, although many conceptual metaphors may help to conceptualize abstract 
concepts by drawing on concrete experiences, it seems that this need not always be the 
case; conceptual metaphors may simply draw information from another domain that in 
some way helps to highlight or communicate certain aspects of the target domain 
(Thibodeau & Durgin, 2008). As such, CMT research exploring the embodiment of 
abstract concepts may not capture the full spectrum of how conceptual metaphors are 
used in thought.  
The stream of research on metaphorical framing has emphasized ecologically valid 
experiments exploring how metaphors can influence reasoning about real-life issues, such 
as crime (Steen, Reijnierse, & Burgers, 2014; Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2011, 2013), 
marriage (Robins & Mayer, 2000), and global warming (Flusberg, Matlock, & 
Thibodeau, 2017). It should be noted that this line of research is not primarily concerned 
with testing the assumptions of CMT, but rather the focus is on the metaphorical framing 
effect itself. However, metaphorical framing aligns nicely with CMT as the fundamental 
assumption of CMT is that metaphors are a matter of thought, not just of language.  
As a pure measure of the effect of conceptual metaphors on cognition, metaphorical 
framing has some issues. For instance, the metaphorical framing effect disappears when 
the participant is already an expert on the target domain being framed (Robins & Mayer, 
2000). Also, with social and political issues, participants tend to bring in many of their 
own views and beliefs that are not necessarily malleable, and certain individual 
differences influence the strength of the metaphorical framing effect. For instance, 
Thibodeau and Boroditsky (2011) found that, with respect to politics of the USA, self-
identified Republicans were more resistant to metaphorical framing than Democrats and 
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Independents. Arguably, the episodic memory task used here is less influenced by such 
social factors. Lastly, with metaphorical framing, it is not always clear what type of 
reasoning is congruent with what type of metaphor. For instance, two different metaphors 
could lead to similar inferences. With CRIME IS A VIRUS/BEAST frames, “locking up” 
criminals is argued to be congruent with the BEAST frame as it emphasizes punishment 
(Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2011). However, viral outbreaks often involve quarantining 
infected individuals to protect the rest of the public, such as has been seen with the 
coronavirus currently. Therefore, “locking up” criminals could be considered an 
inference following from the CRIME IS A VIRUS frame. Again, such interpretive factors 
are not an issue in the episodic memory tests employed here. This is not to say that 
metaphorical framing research lacks value; however, for the purpose of testing CMT 
itself, episodic memory tests have certain advantages.  
The last stream of research that most directly assesses CMT is online comprehension, 
which has generated mixed findings. Though online comprehension is a logical variable 
to explore, it may not be the only area in which conceptual metaphors influence 
cognition. In fact, Bundgaard (2019) has recently proposed that cross-domain mappings 
are psychologically real, but that their activation is not required to comprehend 
conventional metaphor expressions. Conceptual metaphors may not be strictly required 
for comprehension, but they may serve as useful schemas that help to interpret, organize 
and encode metaphorical language, especially when the same cross-domain mapping is 
extended over several different expressions. If this is the case, this may be why effects 
supportive of CMT are found more consistently in offline studies (Nayak & Gibbs, 1990; 
Katz & Law, 2010; Katz & Taylor, 2008, and studies reported here) than in online 
studies.  
One other possible advantage of the current study over the previous comprehension 
studies is that it employed sentences that were putatively unrelated. In contrast, the 
comprehension studies mentioned earlier used narratives in which the sentences all 
logically connect. The issue here is that the narrative itself may influence online 
comprehension. For instance, Thibodeau and Durgin (2008) point out that comprehension 
times may be affected by the relation of the critical sentence to the meaning of the 
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preceding narrative, and not only by the conceptual metaphor. This is not an issue in the 
current study as the sentences were unrelated on the surface.  
6.3 Implications for Deliberate Metaphor Theory 
The findings from this set of experiments do not support Deliberate Metaphor Theory. 
According to this theory, cross-domain mappings that would lead to the false memory 
effects found in these experiments are proposed to depend on conscious awareness of 
metaphoricity. When a metaphor is deliberate, that is, the speaker is intentionally using 
the metaphor as a metaphor, the deliberateness is thought to afford conscious 
metaphorical cognition. In contrast, non-deliberate metaphors do not afford conscious 
metaphorical cognition, and therefore, do not activate cross-domain mappings.  
It should be noted that these experiments did not manipulate deliberateness, unlike 
Gibbs’s (2015) test of DMT in which deliberateness was manipulated via “pragmatic 
markers” (words such as “like” that putatively signal a metaphorical comparison). Gibbs 
found no evidence that the pragmatic markers influenced metaphor interpretation. 
However, he only examined a single metaphorical utterance (“We really have come a 
long way since the wedding”) and asked participants about the meaning of the utterance, 
which may have in itself drawn deliberate attention to its metaphoricity. I am not arguing 
that the concept of metaphor deliberateness be discounted as playing any role on 
metaphor studies, especially in communicative contexts. It is possible that deliberateness 
enhances conceptual metaphor activation, above activation occurring unconsciously, and 
could possibly elicit stronger effects on memory.17 That possibility aside, Deliberate 
 
17 In fact, one could test the effect of deliberateness on conceptual metaphor activation using the 
current paradigm. For instance, study lists consisting of deliberate metaphor expressions could be 
compared to study lists consisting of non-deliberate metaphor expressions. If the deliberate study 
lists induce a greater proportion of false recognition for the critical consistent lures, it would 
suggest that deliberateness enhances conceptual metaphor activation. Similar between list 
comparisons have been conducted in other DRM research, such as lists based on associates vs. 
categories (Buchanan, Brown, Cabeza, & Maitson, 1999; Knott & Dewhurst, 2007), situation lists 
vs. DRM lists (Cann, McRae, & Katz, 2011, Experiment 2), and lists varying on gist-strength 
(Cann, McRae, & Katz, 2011, Experiment 4).  
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Metaphor Theory explicitly states that deliberateness affords conscious metaphorical 
cognition, and it is consciousness that is the critical factor for a cross-domain mapping to 
be engaged. The current data strongly refutes this claim. 
6.4 Conclusion 
This set of studies employed a novel technique to test the tenets of CMT and found strong 
evidence that conceptual metaphors are psychologically real and influence cognition 
automatically. By using the DRM paradigm, I have tested assumptions of CMT in terms 
of a well-established, robust memory task familiar to cognitive psychologists. Across all 
the studies, it was found that studying a list of expressions all based on the same 
conceptual metaphor led to false recognitions of other expressions that were also based 
on the same conceptual metaphor. These expressions were falsely recognized more often 
than control expressions that also shared semantic overlap with the study list, but were 
not based on the same metaphor. Also, converging evidence from self-reported strategies 
(Chapter 3) and divided attention manipulations (Chapters 4 and 5) indicated that the 
conceptual metaphors were engaged automatically, as participants rarely reported 
consciously attending to the conceptual metaphors and still showed the effect even when 
their attention was divided at either encoding or retrieval (or both). As such, this set of 
studies supports the original conception of CMT proposed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) 
and Lakoff (1993). These studies also emphasize the utility of episodic memory tasks for 
exploring tenets of CMT, and future research could employ other episodic tasks to 
explore the boundary conditions under which conceptual metaphors organize and 
influence memory. 
110 
 
References 
Allbritton, D. W., McKoon, G., & Gerrig, R. J. (1995).  Metaphor-based schemas and 
text representations: Making connections through conceptual metaphors.  Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 21(3), 612-625.   
Barsalou, L. W. (1999).  Perceptual symbol systems.  Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22, 
577-660. 
Barsalou, L. W. (2008). Grounded cognition. Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 617-645. 
Barsalou, L. W., & Wiemer-Hastings, K. (2005).  Situating abstract concepts. In D. 
Pecher and R. A. Zwaan (Eds.), Grounding cognition: The role of perception and 
action in memory, language and thinking (pp. 129-163). Cambridge, England: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Bousfield, W. A. (1953). The occurrence of clustering in the recall of randomly arranged 
associates. The Journal of General Psychology, 49(2), 229-240. 
Bowdle, B. F., & Gentner, D. (2005).  The career of metaphor.  Psychological Review, 
112(1), 193-216. 
Brainerd, C. J., Forrest, T. J., Karibian, D., & Reyna, V. F. (2006). Development of the 
false-memory illusion. Developmental Psychology, 42(5), 962–979. 
Brainerd, C. J., & Reyna, V. F. (2002). Fuzzy-trace theory and false memory. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 11(5), 164-169.  
Brainerd, C. J., & Reyna, V. F. (2005). The science of false memory. New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press.  
Brainerd, C. J., Reyna, V. F., & Mojardin, A. H. (1999). Conjoint recognition. 
Psychological Review, 106(1), 160–179. 
Bransford, J. D., & Franks, J. J. (1971). The abstraction of linguistic ideas. Cognitive 
Psychology, 2(4), 331-350.  
Buchanan, L., Brown, N. R., Cabeza, R., & Maitson, C. (1999). False memories and 
semantic lexicon arrangement. Brain and Language, 68(1-2), 172-177.  
Bundgaard, P. F. (2019). The structure of our concepts: A critical assessment of 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory as a theory of concepts. Cognitive Semiotics, 12(1).  
Cann, D. R., & Katz, A. N. (2005). Habitual acceptance of misinformation: Examination 
of individual differences and source attributions. Memory & Cognition, 33(3), 
405-417. 
Cann, D. R., McRae, K., & Katz, A. N. (2011).  False recall in the Deese-Roediger-
McDermott paradigm: The roles of gist and associative strength.  The Quarterly 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 64(8), 1515-1542.   
Cardillo, E. R., Schmidt, G. W., Kranjec, A., & Chatterjee, A. (2010).  Stimulus design is 
an obstacle course: 560 matched literal and metaphorical sentences for testing 
neural hypotheses about metaphor. Behavior Research Methods, 42(3), 651-664. 
111 
 
Carneiro, P., Garcia-Marques, L., Fernandez, A., & Albuquerque, P. (2014). Both 
associative activation and thematic extraction count, but thematic false memories 
are more easily rejected. Memory, 22(8), 1024-1040.  
Casasanto, D. (2008). Similarity and proximity: When does close in space mean close in 
mind? Memory & Cognition, 36(6), 1047–1056 
Clark, S. (2015). Vector space models of lexical meaning. In S. Lappin & C. Fox (Eds.), 
The Handbook of Contemporary Semantic Theory, 2nd ed. (pp. 493-522). Malden, 
MA: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences (2nd ed.). 
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Deese, J. (1959).  On the prediction of occurrence of particular verbal intrusions in 
immediate recall.  Journal of Experimental Psychology, 58(1), 17-22. 
Desai, R. H., Binder, J. R., Conant, L. L., Mano, Q. R., & Seidenberg, M. S. (2011). The 
neural career of sensory-motor metaphors. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 
23(9), 2376-2386. 
Dewhurst, S. A., Barry, C., Swannell, E. R., Holmes, S. J., Bathurst, G. L. (2007). The 
effect of divided attention on false memory depends on how memory is tested. 
Memory & Cognition, 35(4), 660-667.  
Doss, M. K., Bluestone, M. R., & Gallo, D. A. (2016). Two mechanisms of constructive 
recollection: Perceptual recombination and conceptual fluency. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 42(11), 1747–1758. 
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Lang, A., Buchner, A. (2007). G*Power 3: A flexible statistical 
power analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences. 
Behavior Research Methods, 39(2), 175-191.  
Flusberg, S. J., Matlock, T., & Thibodeau, P. H. (2017). Metaphors for the war (or race) 
against climate change. Environmental Communication, 11(6), 769-783.  
Fusaroli, R. & Morgagni, S. (Eds.). (2009). Conceptual metaphor theory: Thirty years 
after. The Journal of Cognitive Semiotics, 5(1-2). 
Gallo, D. A. (2006). Associative illusions of memory: False memory research in DRM 
and related tasks. New York, NY: Psychology Press. 
Gallo, D. A., Roberts, M. J., & Seamon, J. G. (1997). Remembering words not presented 
in lists: Can we avoid creating false memories? Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 
4(2), 271-276.  
Gallo, D. A., & Roediger, H. L. (2002). Variability among word lists in eliciting memory 
illusions: Evidence for associative activation and monitoring. Journal of Memory 
and Language, 47(3), 469-497.  
Gallo, D. A., & Roediger, H. L. (2003). The effects of associations and aging on illusory 
recollection. Memory & Cognition, 31(7), 1036-1044.  
112 
 
Gallo, D. A., Roediger, H. L., & McDermott, K. B. (2001). Associative false recognition 
occurs without strategic criterion shifts. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 8(3), 
579-586.  
Gardiner, J. M., (1988). Functional aspects of recollective experience. Memory & 
Cognition, 16(4), 309-313.  
Gardiner, J. M., Ramponi, C., & Richardson-Klavehn, A. (1998). Experiences of 
remembering, knowing, and guessing. Consciousness and Cognition, 7(1), 1-26.  
Gardiner, J. M., Craik, F. I. M., & Birtwistle, J. (1972). Retrieval cues and release from 
proactive inhibition. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 11(6), 
778-783.  
Gibbs, R. W. (1996). Why many concepts are metaphorical. Cognition, 61(3), 309-319.  
Gibbs, R. W. (2006). Embodiment and cognitive science. New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Gibbs, R. W. (2009). Why do some people dislike conceptual metaphor theory? The 
Journal of Cognitive Semiotics, 5(1-2), 14-36.  
Gibbs, R. W. (2011). Evaluating Conceptual Metaphor Theory. Discourse Processes, 
48(8), 529-562.  
Gibbs, R. W. (2013). The real complexities of psycholinguistic research on metaphor. 
Language Sciences, 40, 45-52.  
Gibbs, R. W. (2015). Do pragmatic signals affect conventional metaphor understanding? 
A failed test of deliberate metaphor theory. Journal of Pragmatics, 90, 77-87. 
Gibbs, R. W. (2018, June). A little taste of heaven: Metaphor in bodily experience. Talk 
presented at the 12th Researching and Applying Metaphor Conference, Hong 
Kong. Abstract available from 
http://www.engl.polyu.edu.hk/events/raam/book%20of%20abstracts.pdf 
Glucksberg, S., Brown, M., & McGlone, M. S. (1993). Conceptual metaphors are not 
automatically accessed during idiom comprehension. Memory & Cognition, 
21(5), 711-719.  
Glucksberg, S., & Keysar, B. (1990).  Understanding metaphorical comparisons: Beyond 
similarity.  Psychological Review, 97(1), 3-18. 
Glucksberg, S., & McGlone, M. S. (1999). When love is not a journey: What metaphors 
mean. Journal of Pragmatics, 31(12), 1541-1558.  
Gong, S.-P., & Ahrens, K. (2007). Processing conceptual metaphors in on-going 
discourse. Metaphor and Symbol, 22(4), 313-330.  
Hirshman, E. (1998). On the utility of the signal detection model of the remember–know 
paradigm. Consciousness and Cognition: An International Journal, 7(1), 103-107. 
Holyoak, K. J., & Stamenković, D. (2018). Metaphor comprehension: A critical review 
of theories and evidence. Psychological Bulletin, 144(6), 641–671. 
113 
 
Hyönä, J. (1993). Effects of thematic and lexical priming on readers' eye movements. 
Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 34(4), 293-304. 
Jacoby, L. L. (1991). A process dissociation framework: Separating automatic from 
intentional used of memory. Journal of memory and language, 30(5), 513-541.  
Jacoby, L. L., & Dallas, M. (1981). On the relationship between autobiographical 
memory and perceptual learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 
110(3), 306–340. 
Jacoby, L. L., Kelley, C. M., & Dywan, J. (1989). Memory attributions. In H. L. 
Roediger & F. I. M. Craik (Eds.), Varieties of memory and consciousness: Essays 
in honour of Endel Tulving (pp. 391-422). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates.  
Jacoby, L. L., & Whitehouse, K. (1989). An illusion of memory: False recognition 
influenced by unconscious perception. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 118(2), 126–135. 
Johnson, M. K., Hashtroudi, S., & Lindsay, D. S. (1993). Source monitoring. 
Psychological Bulletin, 114(1), 3-28.  
Katz, A., & Law, A. (2010).  Experimental support for conceptual metaphors with an 
episodic memory task.  Metaphor and Symbol, 25(4), 263-270.  
Katz, A. & Reid, J. N. (2020). Tests of Conceptual Metaphor Theory with episodic 
memory tests. Cognitive Semantics, 6(1), 56-82.  
Katz, A. N., & Taylor, T. E. (2008).  The journeys of life: Examining a conceptual 
metaphor with semantic and episodic memory recall.  Metaphor and Symbol, 
23(3), 148-173. 
Kawasaki, Y. & Yama, H. (2006). The difference between implicit and explicit 
associative processes at study in creating false memory in the DRM paradigm. 
Memory, 14(1), 68-78.  
Kelley, C. M., & Jacoby, L. L. (1998). Subjective reports and process dissociation: 
Fluency, knowing, and feeling. Acta Psychologica, 98(2-3), 127-140.  
Keysar, B., Shen, Y., Glucksberg, S., & Horton, W. S. (2000). Conventional language: 
How metaphorical is it? Journal of Memory and Language, 43(4), 576-593.  
Knott, L. M., & Dewhurst, S. A. (2007). The effects of divided attention at study and test 
on false recognition: A comparison of DRM and categorized lists. Memory & 
Cognition, 35(8), 1954-1965. 
Lakoff, G. (1993). The contemporary theory of metaphor. In A. Ortony (Ed.), Metaphor 
and thought: Vol. 2 (pp. 202–251). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Lakoff, G. (1994). The Master Metaphor List. Retrieved from http://www.lang.osaka-
u.ac.jp/~sugimoto/MasterMetaphorList/MetaphorHome.html 
Lakoff, G. (2008). The neural theory of metaphor. In R. W. Gibbs (Ed.), Cambridge 
handbook of metaphor and thought (pp. 17–38). New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press. 
114 
 
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Landauer, T. K., Foltz, P. W., & Laham, D. (1998).  An introduction to latent semantic 
analysis.  Discourse Processes, 25(2-3), 259-284.   
Leboe, J. P., & Whittlesea, B. W. A. (2002). The inferential basis of familiarity and 
recall: Evidence for a common underlying process. Journal of Memory and 
Language, 46(4), 804-829.  
Loftus, E. F., Miller, D. G., & Burns, H. J. (1978). Semantic integration of verbal 
information into a visual memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Learning and Memory, 4(1), 19-31. 
McDermott, K. B., & Roediger, H. L. (1998). Attempting to avoid illusory memories: 
Robust false recognition of associates persists under conditions of explicit 
warnings and immediate testing. Journal of Memory and Language, 39(3), 508-
520.  
McDermott, K. B., & Watson, J. M. (2001). The rise and fall of false recall: The impact 
of presentation duration. Journal of Memory and Language, 45(1), 160-176.  
McGlone, M. S. (2007). What is the explanatory value of a conceptual metaphor?  
Language & Communication, 27(2), 109-126. 
McGlone, M. S. (2011).  Hyperbole, homunculi, and hindsight bias: An alternative 
evaluation of conceptual metaphor theory.  Discourse Processes, 48(8), 563-574. 
Multhaup, K. S., & Conner, C. A. (2002). The effects of considering nonlist sources on 
the Deese–Roediger–McDermott memory illusion. Journal of Memory and 
Language, 47(2), 214-228.  
Murphy, G. L. (1996). On metaphoric representation. Cognition, 60(2), 173-204.  
Nayak, N. P., & Gibbs, R. W. (1990). Conceptual knowledge in the interpretation of 
idioms. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 119(3), 315–330. 
Ortony, A. (1988). Are emotion metaphors conceptual or lexical? [Review of the book 
Metaphors of anger, pride and love: A lexical approach to the structure of 
concepts, by Z. Kövecses]. Cognition and Emotion, 2(2), 95-103.  
Otgaar, H., Peters, M., & Howe, M. L. (2012). Dividing attention lowers children's but 
increases adults' false memories. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 38(1), 204–210. 
Park, L., Shobe, K. K., & Kihlstrom, J. F. (2005). Associative and categorical relations in 
the associative memory illusion. Psychological Science, 16(10), 792-797.  
Pérez-Mata, M. N., Read, J. D., & Diges, M. (2002). Effects of divided attention and 
word concreteness on correct recall and false memory reports. Memory, 10(3), 
161-177.  
Pimentel, E., & Albuquerque, P. B. (2013). Effect of divided attention on the production 
of false memories in the DRM paradigm: A study of dichotic listening and 
shadowing. Psicológica, 34(2), 285-298.  
115 
 
Posner, M. I., & Keele, S. W. (1970).  Retention of abstract ideas.  Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 83(2), 304-308.  
Rajaram, S. (1993). Remembering and knowing: Two means of access to the personal 
past. Memory & Cognition, 21(1), 89-102.  
Rajaram, S., & Geraci, L. (2000). Conceptual fluency selectively influences 
knowing. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 26(4), 1070–1074. 
Reid, J. N., & Katz, A. N. (2018a). Something false about conceptual metaphors. 
Metaphor and Symbol, 33(1), 36-47. 
Reid, J. N., & Katz, A. N. (2018b). Vector space applications in metaphor 
comprehension. Metaphor and Symbol, 33(4), 280-294.  
Reijnierse, W. G., Burgers, C., Krennmayr, T., & Steen, G. J. (2018). DMIP: A method 
for identifying potentially deliberate metaphor in language use. Corpus 
Pragmatics, 2, 129-147.  
Renoult, L., Irish, M., Moscovitch, M., & Rugg, M. D. (2019). From knowing to 
remembering: The semantic-episodic distinction. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 
23(12), 1041-1057.  
Reyna, V. F., & Brainerd, C. J. (1995). Fuzzy-trace theory: An interim synthesis. 
Learning and Individual Differences, 7(1), 1-75.  
Robins, S., & Mayer, R. E. (2000). The metaphor framing effect: Metaphorical reasoning 
about text-based dilemmas. Discourse Processes, 30(1), 57-86. 
Roediger, H. L., Balota, D. A., & Watson, J. M. (2001). Spreading activation and arousal 
of false memories. In H. L. Roediger, J. S. Nairne, I. Neath, & A. M. Surprenant 
(Eds.), Science conference series. The nature of remembering: Essays in honor of 
Robert G. Crowder (pp. 95–115). American Psychological Association. 
Roediger, H. L., & McDermott, K. B. (1995).  Creating false memories: Remembering 
words not presented in lists.  Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 21(4), 803-814. 
Roediger, H. L., Watson, J. M., McDermott, K. B., & Gallo, D. A. (2001). Factors that 
determine false recall: A multiple regression analysis. Psychonomic Bulletin & 
Review, 8(3), 385-407. 
Schacter, D. L., Verfaellie, M., & Pradere, D. (1996). The neuropsychology of memory 
illusions: False recall and recognition in amnesic patients. Journal of Memory and 
Language, 35(2), 319-334.  
Seamon, J. G., Luo, C. R., & Gallo, D. A. (1998). Creating false memories of words with 
or without recognition of list items: Evidence for nonconscious processes. 
Psychological Science, 9(1), 20-26.  
Steen, G. (2008). The paradox of metaphor: Why we need a three-dimensional model of 
metaphor. Metaphor and Symbol, 23(4), 213-241.  
116 
 
Steen, G. (2009). Deliberate metaphor affords conscious metaphorical cognition. 
Cognitive Semiotics, 5(1-2), 179-197.  
Steen, G. (2011). What does ‘really deliberate’ really mean?: More thoughts on metaphor 
and consciousness. Metaphor and the Social World, 1(1), 53-56.  
Steen, G. (2015). Developing, testing and interpreting deliberate metaphor theory. 
Journal of Pragmatics, 90, 67-72. 
Steen, G. (2017). Deliberate Metaphor Theory: Basic assumptions, main tenets, urgent 
issues. Intercultural Pragmatics, 14(1), 1-24.  
Steen, G. J., Reijnierse, W. G., Burgers, C. (2014). When do natural language metaphors 
influence reasoning? A follow-up study to Thibodeau and Boroditsky (2013). 
PLoS One, 9(12), e113536. 
Swinney, D. A., & Cutler, A. (1979). The access and processing of idiomatic expressions. 
Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 18(5), 523-534.  
Thibodeau, P. H., & Boroditsky, L. (2011). Metaphors we think with: The role of 
metaphor in reasoning. PLoS ONE, 6(2), e16782. 
Thibodeau, P. H., & Boroditsky, L. (2013). Natural language metaphors covertly 
influence reasoning. PLoS ONE, 8(1), e52961. 
Thibodeau, P. H., & Durgin, F. H., (2008). Productive figurative communication: 
Conventional metaphors facilitate the comprehension of related novel metaphors. 
Journal of Memory and Language, 58(2), 521-540.  
Traxler, M. J., Foss, D. J., Seely, R. E., Kaup, B., & Morris, R. K. (2000). Priming in 
sentence processing: Intralexical spreading activation, schemas, and situation 
models. Journal of Psycholinguistics Research, 29, 581-595.  
Tulving, E. (1972). Episodic and semantic memory. In E. Tulving & W. Donaldson 
(Eds.),  Organization of Memory (pp. 381-403). Oxford, England: Academic 
Press. 
Tulving, E. (1985). Memory and consciousness. Canadian Psychology/Psychologie 
canadienne, 26(1), 1-12. 
Tulving, E. (2002). Episodic memory: From mind to brain. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 53, 1-25.  
Tulving, E., & Thomson, D. M. (1973). Encoding specificity and retrieval processes in 
episodic memory. Psychological Review, 80(5), 352-373. 
Watkins, O. C., & Watkins, M. J. (1975). Buildup of proactive inhibition as a cue-
overload effect. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and 
Memory, 1(4), 442–452. 
Weidemann, C. T., Kragel, J. E., Lega, B. C., Worrell, G. A., Sperling, M. R., Sharan, A. 
D., Jobst, B. C., Khadjevand, F., Davis, K. A., Wanda, P. A., Kadel, A., Rizzuto, 
D. S., & Kahana, M. J. (2019). Neural activity reveals interactions between 
episodic and semantic memory systems during retrieval. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 148(1), 1–12. 
117 
 
Whittlesea, B. W. A. (2002). False memory and the discrepancy-attribution hypothesis: 
The prototype-familiarity illusion. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 
131(1), 96–115. 
Wickens, D. D. (1970).  Encoding categories of words: An empirical approach to 
meaning.  Psychological Review, 77(1), 1-15. 
Yonelinas, A. P. (2001). Consciousness, control, and confidence: The 3 Cs of recognition 
memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 130(3), 361-379.  
Yonelinas, A. P. (2002). The nature of recollection and familiarity: A review of 30 years 
of research. Journal of Memory and Language, 46(3), 441-517. 
 
118 
 
Appendices 
Appendix A: Copyright permission email 
February 12, 2020 
  
Dear Professor Albert Katz on Behalf of J. Nick Reid, 
  
Material Requested: J. Nick Reid & Albert N. Katz (2018) 
Something false about conceptual metaphors, 
Metaphor and Symbol, 33:1, 36-47, DOI: 10.1080/10926488.2018.1407994 
  
Thank you for your correspondence requesting permission to post the ‘Accepted Manuscript’ of 
your above mentioned article on your institutions intranet or within the Institutional 
Repository of your institution and in your dissertation. 
  
As you are the author of the above article, we will be pleased to grant entirely free permission on 
the condition that you make the following acknowledgement: 
  
“This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Metaphor and 
Symbol on January 3, 2018, available online at the Taylor & Francis Ltd web 
site: www.tandfonline.com and include a link to the article 
- https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10926488.2018.1407994 
  
You will also need to obtain permission from any co-authors of this article. 
  
Please note that this license does not allow you to post our content on any other third party 
websites. 
  
This license does not allow the use of the Publishers version/PDF (this is the version of record 
that is published on the publisher’s website) to be posted online. 
119 
 
  
Thank you for your interest in our Journals. 
  
Sincerely, 
  
  
  
Information Classification: General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
120 
 
Appendix B: Study lists and lures 
 
IDEAS ARE FOOD study list 
 
What he said left a bad taste in my mouth. 
That plan is on the back burner for now. 
All this paper has are raw facts. 
Learning is eating. 
Those are warmed-over arguments. 
We have to regurgitate everything we learned on the final. 
Here’s a concept you can sink your teeth into. 
The plan is half-baked. 
This is the meaty part of the paper. 
He devoured the book. 
Her curiosity is insatiable. 
I’ll give you some readings to chew on. 
Knowledge is consumable. 
She cooked up a new scheme. 
We don’t spoon-feed our students. 
 
Recognition test lures 
 
(Critical CM) 
-Ideas are food. 
 
(Critical consistent) 
-That claim is hard to swallow. 
-He has an appetite for learning. 
-There are too many facts to digest. (Final test only) 
 
(Control metaphor) 
-That kind of thinking is out of style. 
-His first lecture just planted the seeds. 
-She never arrives at the right conclusion. (Final test only) 
 
(Control literal) 
-We discussed the plan over dinner. 
-The dessert was too sweet. 
-This dish is best served cold. (Final test only) 
-I came up with this scheme during lunch. (Final test only) 
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LOVE IS A JOURNEY study list 
 
They’re at a crossroads in their relationship. 
This marriage is on the rocks. 
We’ve come a long way as a couple. 
Dating is a starting point. 
It seems we’re just going in circles as a couple. 
They’re in a dead-end relationship. 
We’ve had some bumps in the road. 
Relationships are vehicles. 
My girlfriend and I may have to go our separate ways. 
Where are we in this relationship? 
Marriage is a landmark. 
My fiancé and I can’t turn back now. 
Break-ups are obstacles. 
Their marriage has gone off the track. 
I want to take things slow in this relationship. 
 
Recognition test lures 
 
(Critical CM) 
-Love is a journey. 
 
(Critical consistent) 
-Their romance just took a turn for the worst. 
-They didn’t take the path most couples take. 
-My boyfriend and I are stuck in a rut. (Final test only) 
 
(Control metaphor) 
-Their relationship has lost its magic. 
-She’s crazy about him. 
-She swept him off his feet. (Final test only) 
 
(Control literal) 
-I took my girlfriend on a nice drive. 
-We took a short-cut to our destination. 
-You can only get to this place on foot. (Final test only) 
-This pathway is a short walk. (Final test only) 
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THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS study list 
 
Your argument had a nice structure. 
Our method will stand or fall on the strength of that claim. 
His assumptions are built on sand. 
Scientists are architects. 
What will the form of the argument be? 
They demolished his reasoning. 
Without data our model will fall apart. 
Evidence is support. 
The argument collapsed. 
That’s a shaky assumption. 
Research is construction. 
We need to buttress our paper with solid facts. 
Facts are foundation. 
She tore down his argument brick by brick. 
Here are some more data to prop up the hypothesis. 
 
Recognition test lures 
 
(Critical CM) 
-Theories are buildings. 
 
(Critical consistent) 
-That claim doesn’t hold much weight. 
-Her work was a pillar in the discipline. 
-We have put together only the framework of this hypothesis. (Final test only) 
 
(Control metaphor) 
-His argument fell apart at the seams. 
-That paper gave birth to new lines of research. 
-Her proposition never bore any fruit. (Final test only) 
 
(Control literal) 
-His house was well constructed. 
-His apartment had an interesting layout. 
-The centre has multiple levels. (Final test only) 
-Her condo has three rooms. (Final test only) 
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TIME IS MONEY study list 
How did you spend the summer break? 
I have some days off banked from last month. 
Budget your hours. 
Weekends are precious. 
I don’t have the hours for this. 
I’ll give you a minute. 
Is that worth your while? 
Years are invested. 
Put aside a few days for this. 
Can you spare an afternoon? 
Hours are wasted. 
How many minutes do I have left? 
Free hours are valuable. 
The diversion should buy him a few minutes. 
This will save me many hours. 
 
TIME IS MONEY recognition test lures 
 
(Critical CM) 
-Time is money 
 
(Critical consistent) 
-Lend me a few minutes. 
-That cost me a day. 
-You don’t use your hours profitably. (Final test only) 
 
(Control metaphor) 
-The weekend seems so far away. 
-The years have not been kind to him. 
-The deadline is approaching. (Final test only) 
 
(Control literal) 
-How much is your rent per month? 
-He makes biweekly payments. 
-She took out a low-interest loan. (Final test only) 
-I will pay you back in a week. (Final test only) 
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UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING study list 
 
Here’s another way you can look at this problem. 
Before you respond, let me first point something out. 
That was an insightful dialogue. 
The truth is clear. 
Her thoughts on the subject are muddy. 
With this issue, you have to look at the whole picture. 
That was a brilliant remark. 
Explaining is illuminating. 
It was a murky discussion. 
Could you elucidate your remarks? 
Falseness is darkness. 
It’s a transparent argument. 
Ignorance is blindness. 
The discussion was opaque. 
He has tunnel-vision when it comes to this issue. 
 
UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING recognition test lures 
 
(Critical CM) 
-Understanding is seeing. 
 
(Critical consistent) 
-We have different views on this subject. 
-That lecture opened my eyes. 
-Let me enlighten you on this topic. (Final test only) 
 
(Control metaphor) 
-I couldn’t grasp his argument. 
-That lesson was in one ear and out the other. 
-It took a while, but the concept finally clicked. (Final test only) 
 
(Control literal) 
-Her vision is blurry. 
-The lack of lighting caused low visibility. 
-I have a nice view from my office. (Final test only) 
-I think I can spot my house from here. (Final test only) 
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Appendix C: Remember, know, and guess instructions. Adjusted from Gardiner, 
Ramponi, and Richardson-Klavehn (1998).  
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY. 
Recognition memory is associated with two different kinds of awareness. Quite often 
recognition brings back to mind something you recollect about what it is that you 
recognise, as when, for example, you recognize someone’s face, and perhaps remember 
talking to this person at a party the previous night. At other times recognition brings 
nothing back to mind about what it is you recognise, as when, for example, you are 
confident that you recognise someone, and you know you recognise them, because of 
strong feelings of familiarity, but you have no recollection of seeing this person before. 
You do not remember anything about them.  
The same kinds of awareness are associated with recognising the sentences on the study 
lists. Sometimes when you recognize a sentence as one you saw on the study list, 
recognition will bring back to mind something you remember thinking about when the 
sentence appeared then. You recollect something you consciously experienced at that 
time. But sometimes recognizing a sentence as one you saw on the study list will not 
bring back to mind anything you remember about seeing it then. Instead, the sentence 
will seem familiar, so that you feel confident it was one you saw from the study list, even 
though you don’t recollect anything you experienced when you saw it then.  
For each sentence that you recognize, after you have pressed “O” (for OLD), please then 
press “R” (for REMEMBER), if recognition is accompanied by some recollective 
experience, or “K” (for KNOW), if recognition is accompanied by strong feelings of 
familiarity in the absence of any recollective experience.  
There will also be times when you do not remember the sentence, nor does it seem 
familiar, but you might want to guess that it was one of the sentences you saw on the 
study list. Feel free to do this, but if your OLD response is really just a guess, please 
press “G” (for GUESS). 
If you have any questions regarding these judgments, please ask the experimenter. If you 
need to be reminded of what these judgments mean during the experiment, please refer to 
the sheet on the desk that has these instructions printed out. Thank you. 
Please press the REMEMBER key to continue. 
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Appendix D: Strategy instructions for the study presented in Chapter 3.  
Could you please take a minute to describe any strategies you used to remember this list? 
If you used a strategy, please provide as much information about your strategy as you 
can. Really, there are no right or wrong answers; we are just trying to get insight into how 
people try to remember sentences. If you did not use any particular strategy, just type in: 
“I just tried to remember the sentences without using any conscious strategy.” 
Here are some possible strategies you might have used: 
- repeating the sentences over and over mentally (if so, please estimate whether you 
repeated the sentences very frequently, frequently, very infrequently), 
- looking for a theme in the sentences presented that you thought might help you 
remember the sentences (if so, please indicate the theme), 
- trying to connect the sentences to a mental image or sound pattern (if so, please tell us 
as much about the image or sound pattern as possible), 
- trying to focus on specific words that you thought were very memorable (if so, please 
indicate these words), 
- some other strategy. If so, please briefly describe what it might be. 
Please type your response below. 
When you are finished typing your answer, press ESC to continue. 
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Appendix E: Proportion (and SD) of unrelated lures identified as old, as well as 
proportion (and SD) remembered, known, and guessed for initial recognition tests 
of Chapter 3. Data displayed by condition (strategy vs. no strategy) and lure type.  
Condition Lure type Old R K G 
Strategy Crit CM .08(.28) .03(.16) .00(.00) .05(.23) 
 Crit consistent .05(.16) .01(.08) .01(.08) .03(.11) 
 Control metaphor .03(.11) .00(.00) .01(.08) .01(.08) 
 Control literal .04(.14) .01(.08) .00(.00) .03(.11) 
 Total¹  .05(.11) .01(.05) .01(.03) .03(.09) 
No strategy Crit CM .05(.23) .03(.16) .03(.16) .00(.00) 
 Crit consistent .08(.19) .04(.14) .00(.00) .04(.14) 
 Control metaphor .14(.25) .04(.14) .04(.14) .05(.16) 
 Control literal .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) .00(.00) 
 Total¹  .07(.10) .03(.07) .02(.05) .02(.05) 
Note: Some discrepancies due to rounding.  
¹Totals represent the average across the four lure types. 
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Appendix F: Proportion (and SD) of unrelated lures identified as old, as well as 
proportion (and SD) remembered, known, and guessed for final recognition test of 
Chapter 3. Data displayed by repetition (previously tested vs. untested), condition 
(strategy vs. no strategy) and lure type. 
Previously 
tested 
Condition Lure type Old R K G 
Yes Strategy Crit CM .19(.40) .11(.32) .03(.17) .06(.23) 
  Crit consistent .21(.30) .11(.21) .04(.18) .06(.16) 
  Control metaphor .21(.32) .08(.22) .08(.22) .04(.14) 
  Control literal .14(.31) .04(.18) .03(.12) .07(.21) 
  Total¹  .19(.26) .09(.19) .05(.12) .06(.10) 
 No strategy Crit CM .14(.35) .03(.16) .05(.23) .05(.23) 
  Crit consistent .26(.33) .07(.17) .09(.23) .09(.23) 
  Control metaphor .23(.32) .04(.18) .08(.19) .11(.24) 
  Control literal .14(.25) .03(.11) .04(.14) .07(.17) 
  Total¹  .19(.21) .04(.09) .07(.11) .08(.11) 
No Strategy Crit consistent .03(.17) .03(.17) .00(.00) .00(.00) 
  Control metaphor .06(.23) .03(.17) .00(.00) .03(.17) 
  Control literal .01(.08) .01(.08) .00(.00) .00(.00) 
  Total¹  .03(.11) .02(.10) .00(.00) .01(.06) 
 No strategy Crit consistent .08(.28) .00(.00) .03(.16) .05(.23) 
  Control metaphor .11(.31) .05(.23) .00(.00) .05(.23) 
  Control literal .03(.11) .00(.00) .01(.08) .01(.08) 
  Total¹  .07(.13) .02(.08) .01(.06) .04(.11) 
Note: Some discrepancies due to rounding.  
¹Totals represent the average across the four lure types. 
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Appendix G: Proportion (and SD) of unrelated lures identified as old, as well as 
proportion (and SD) remembered, known, and guessed for initial recognition tests 
of Chapter 4. Data displayed by condition (full vs. divided attention) and lure type. 
Condition Lure type Old R K G 
Full attention Crit CM .04(.20) .02(.14) .02(.14) .00(.00) 
 Crit consistent .07(.20) .01(.07) .01(.07) .05(.18) 
 Control metaphor .05(.15) .01(.07) .01(.07) .03(.12) 
 Control literal .05(.15) .02(.10) .01(.07) .02(.10) 
 Total¹  .05(.09) .02(.05) .01(.05) .03(.07) 
Divided attention Crit CM .20(.40) .08(.27) .02(.14) .10(.30) 
 Crit consistent .30(.34) .13(.24) .06(.16) .11(.21) 
 Control metaphor .31(.33) .11(.23) .06(.19) .14(.25) 
 Control literal .24(.29) .06(.16) .08(.19) .10(.20) 
 Total¹  .26(.17) .10(.14) .06(.09) .11(.13) 
Note: Some discrepancies due to rounding.  
¹Totals represent the average across the four lure types. 
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Appendix H: Proportion (and SD) of unrelated lures identified as old, as well as 
proportion (and SD) remembered, known, and guessed for final recognition test of 
Chapter 4. Data displayed by repetition (previously tested vs. untested), condition 
(full vs. divided attention) and lure type. 
Previously 
tested 
Condition Lure type Old R K G 
Yes Full Crit CM .12(.33) .06(.24) .04(.20) .02(.14) 
 attention Crit consistent .26(.34) .08(.21) .08(.21) .10(.25) 
  Control metaphor .21(.32) .05(.18) .07(.18) .09(.22) 
  Control literal .22(.32) .13(.24) .03(.12) .06(.16) 
  Total¹  .20(.22) .08(.11) .06(.09) .07(.12) 
 Divided Crit CM .36(.48) .14(.35) .10(.30) .12(.33) 
 attention Crit consistent .35(.37) .17(.28) .05(.15) .13(.26) 
  Control metaphor .48(.38) .20(.29) .12(.28) .16(.31) 
  Control literal .40(.40) .25(.35) .07(.18) .08(.21) 
  Total¹  .40(.25) .19(.19) .09(.15) .12(.15) 
No Full Crit consistent .04(.20) .00(.00) .04(.20) .00(.00) 
 attention Control metaphor .12(.33) .02(.14) .02(.14) .08(.27) 
  Control literal .02(.10) .00(.00) .01(.07) .01(.07) 
  Total¹  .06(.13) .01(.05) .02(.08) .03(.10) 
 Divided Crit consistent .12(.33) .04(.20) .02(.14) .06(.24) 
 attention Control metaphor .26(.44) .04(.20) .06(.24) .16(.37) 
  Control literal .16(.28) .05(.15) .02(.10) .09(.22) 
  Total¹  .18(.24) .04(.12) .03(.11) .10(.18) 
Note: Some discrepancies due to rounding.  
¹Totals represent the average across the four lure types. 
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Appendix I: Proportion (and SD) of unrelated lures identified as old, as well as 
proportion (and SD) remembered, known, and guessed for initial recognition tests 
of Chapter 5. Data displayed by attention at study (full vs. divided), attention at test 
(full vs. divided) and lure type. 
Attention 
at Study 
Attention 
at test 
Lure type Old R K G 
Full  Full  Crit CM .18(.39) .00(.00) .08(.27) .10(.31) 
  Crit consistent .18(.27) .03(.11) .03(.11) .13(.25) 
  Control metaphor .09(.19) .03(.11) .04(.13) .03(.11) 
  Control literal .06(.20) .01(.08) .03(.11) .03(.11) 
  Total¹  .13(.18) .02(.04) .04(.12) .07(.11) 
 Divided  Crit CM .08(.27) .05(.22) .03(.16) .00(.00) 
  Crit consistent .15(.26) .08(.21) .01(.08) .06(.17) 
  Control metaphor .10(.20) .06(.17) .04(.13) .00(.00) 
  Control literal .08(.21) .05(.19) .00(.00) .03(.11) 
  Total¹  .10(.16) .06(.14) .02(.05) .02(.05) 
Divided Full  Crit CM .15(.37) .00(.00) .08(.27) .08(.27) 
  Crit consistent .32(.35) .03(.11) .13(.25) .17(.29) 
  Control metaphor .32(.39) .01(.08) .10(.20) .21(.30) 
  Control literal .17(.26) .03(.11) .05(.15) .09(.19) 
  Total¹  .24(.20) .02(.05) .09(.12) .13(.12) 
 Divided  Crit CM .25(.44) .03(.16) .05(.22) .18(.38) 
  Crit consistent .33(.33) .05(.15) .13(.22) .15(.26) 
  Control metaphor .35(.36) .05(.15) .16(.29) .14(.25) 
  Control literal .24(.34) .03(.11) .09(.19) .13(.22) 
  Total¹  .29(.25) .04(.08) .11(.14) .15(.14) 
Note: Some discrepancies due to rounding.  
¹Totals represent the average across the four lure types. 
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Appendix J: Proportion (and SD) of unrelated lures identified as old, as well as 
proportion (and SD) remembered, known, and guessed for final recognition test of 
Chapter 5. Data displayed by repetition (previously tested vs. untested), attention at 
study (full vs. divided), attention at test (full vs. divided) and lure type. 
Previously 
tested 
Attention 
at Study 
Attention 
at test 
Lure type Old R K G 
Yes Full  Full  Crit CM .49(.51) .15(.37) .13(.34) .21(.41) 
   Crit consistent .38(.42) .14(.28) .14(.30) .10(.20) 
   Control metaphor .33(.42) .13(.27) .13(.25) .08(.18) 
   Control literal .36(.40) .12(.24) .09(.19) .15(.28) 
   Total¹  .39(.33) .13(.24) .12(.17) .13(.15) 
  Divided  Crit CM .38(.49) .15(.36) .03(.16) .20(.41) 
   Crit consistent .35(.38) .11(.27) .09(.22) .15(.28) 
   Control metaphor .36(.36) .14(.28) .10(.20) .13(.25) 
   Control literal .25(.36) .09(.25) .09(.22) .08(.21) 
   Total¹  .33(.27) .12(.20) .08(.14) .14(.16) 
 Divided Full  Crit CM .54(.51) .18(.39) .10(.31) .26(.44) 
   Crit consistent .58(.34) .14(.26) .13(.27) .31(.32) 
   Control metaphor .50(.38) .09(.19) .19(.32) .22(.30) 
   Control literal .33(.37) .08(.18) .09(.19) .17(.26) 
   Total¹  .49(.27) .12(.20) .13(.14) .24(.22) 
  Divided  Crit CM .53(.51) .15(.36) .03(.16) .35(.48) 
   Crit consistent .45(.39) .16(.29) .10(.23) .19(.27) 
   Control metaphor .46(.43) .15(.28) .14(.28) .18(.31) 
   Control literal .45(.39) .11(.29) .14(.28) .20(.35) 
   Total¹  .47(.31) .14(.19) .10(.13) .23(.23) 
No Full Full Crit consistent .05(.22) .03(.16) .00(.00) .03(.16) 
   Control metaphor .10(.31) .03(.16) .00(.00) .08(.27) 
   Control literal .08(.22) .03(.11) .00(.00) .05(.15) 
   Total¹  .08(.20) .03(.11) .00(.00) .05(.13) 
  Divided Crit consistent .20(.41) .08(.27) .00(.00) .13(.33) 
   Control metaphor .08(.27) .03(.16) .00(.00) .05(.22) 
   Control literal .10(.26) .03(.11) .01(.08) .06(.20) 
   Total¹  .13(.19) .04(.12) .00(.03) .08(.15) 
 Divided Full Crit consistent .15(.37) .03(.16) .05(.22) .08(.27) 
   Control metaphor .28(.46) .03(.16) .05(.22) .21(.41) 
   Control literal .13(.30) .01(.08) .01(.08) .10(.26) 
   Total¹  .19(.26) .02(.08) .04(.10) .13(.23) 
  Divided Crit consistent .25(.44) .08(.27) .08(.27) .10(.30) 
   Control metaphor .30(.46) .05(.22) .10(.30) .15(.36) 
   Control literal .19(.33) .08(.24) .03(.11) .09(.19) 
   Total¹  .25(.31) .07(.20) .07(.17) .11(.22) 
Note: Some discrepancies due to rounding.  
¹Totals represent the average across the four lure types. 
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Appendix K: High-threshold correction procedure 
To apply the “high-threshold correction,” the false recognition proportion when the lure 
is unrelated to the study list is subtracted from the false recognition proportion when it is 
related (Gallo & Roediger, 2002; Schacter et al., 1996; Seamon et al., 1998). In Chapter 
5, the unrelated critical consistent lures were falsely recognized more often than the 
unrelated control literal lures for both the initial recognition tests (.244 vs. .136) and for 
the repeated lures on the final recognition test (.440 vs. .348). However, there were no 
reliable interactions between lure type and attention at either study or test, so the overall 
unrelated false recognition proportions averaged across all conditions were used as the 
subtraction values. These values were subtracted from the main false recognition 
proportions (i.e., when these lures were related to the study list) for each participant. For 
example, on the initial recognition tests, one participant had a false recognition 
proportion of .5 for the critical consistent lures and .25 for the control literal lures when 
these lures were related to the study lists. After the adjustment was applied, the 
proportions would be .256 and .114 respectively. The mean adjusted values for the initial 
recognition tests are displayed in Table K-1 and for the final recognition test are 
displayed in Table K-2. 
Table K-1. Comparison of adjusted false recognition proportions for critical consistent 
lures and control literal lures. Data are from the initial recognition tests in Chapter 5. 
Unadjusted proportions, the adjustment calculation, and the final adjusted values are 
presented. 
Attention 
at study 
Attention 
at test 
Lure type Unadjusted 
false 
recognition 
Adjustment Adjusted 
false 
recognition¹ 
Full Full Crit consistent .29(.24) – .244 .05(.24) 
  Cont literal .18(.20) – .136 .05(.20) 
 Divided Crit consistent .33(.23) – .244 .09(.23) 
  Cont literal .16(.19) – .136 .03(.19) 
Divided Full Crit consistent .54(.22) – .244 .29(.22) 
  Cont literal .36(.26) – .136 .22(.26) 
 Divided Crit consistent .52(.26) – .244 .27(.26) 
  Cont literal .36(.24) – .136 .23(.24) 
¹Some discrepancies due to rounding.  
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Table K-2. Comparison of adjusted false recognition proportions for repeated critical 
consistent lures and repeated control literal lures. Data are from the final recognition test 
in Chapter 5. Unadjusted proportions, the adjustment calculation, and the final adjusted 
values are presented. 
Attention 
at study 
Attention 
at test 
Lure type 
(Repeated) 
Unadjusted 
false 
recognition 
Adjustment Adjusted 
false 
recognition¹ 
Full Full Crit consistent .61(.28) – .440 .17(.28) 
  Cont literal .36(.31) – .348 .01(.31) 
 Divided Crit consistent .60(.25) – .440 .16(.25) 
  Cont literal .29(.26) – .348 -.05(.26) 
Divided Full Crit consistent .73(.20) – .440 .29(.20) 
  Cont literal .47(.23) – .348 .13(.23) 
 Divided Crit consistent .69(.23) – .440 .25(.23) 
  Cont literal .50(.27) – .348 .15(.27) 
¹Some discrepancies due to rounding.  
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